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 Summary  
The past decades, cluster and innovation theories have become increasingly popular. 
This has led to the development of public cluster strategies for innovation enhancement. 
A result of the cluster strategies has been the forming of new arenas for interaction. 
Cluster initiatives have been promoted as a regional development tool for public 
governments, proposed to lead to innovation and economic development.  
 
Michael Porter (2000:15) defines clusters as “geographical concentrations of 
interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related 
industries, and associated institutions (e.g. universities, standards agencies, trade 
associations) in a particular field that compete but also cooperate.” According to 
Porter, clusters affect competition by increasing productivity, stimulate the formation of 
new businesses and drive innovation.  
 
This study argues that cluster cooperation initiated to promote regional innovation 
seldom is successful in doing so. There is little unambiguous evidence for correlation 
between initiated clusters and innovation. From working in the empirical field, I 
experienced that developing and maintaining a cluster initiative is much more complex 
than the literature usually acknowledges. In cluster environments, political features of 
actors in the form of diverging interests and perceptions lead to political behavior such 
as conflicts, strategy development and power play. The lack of innovative output in 
initiated cluster efforts may be explained by the strong presence of political features and 
behavior. Politics influence the field, consume time and energy of involved stakeholders 
7
 and deflect the original intention of cooperation. This means that politics must be taken 
into account when speaking of, planning and carrying out cluster cooperation.  
 
Business development and innovation is the expressed goal of cluster cooperation. 
Although cluster cooperation is concerned with joint efforts to achieve innovation, the 
involved actors are mainly concerned with achieving their own goals. These goals may 
or may not be coherent with other actors’ agendas or with the overall goal of the cluster 
effort. As goals and behavior vary, activities in clusters may seem confusing. Strategies 
related to either political or business agendas encourage different ways of behavior. 
Multiple strategies are played out simultaneously, which makes cooperation more 
challenging.  
 
The popularity of cluster strategies has increased the initiation of cluster initiatives, 
leading to a new form of competition between similar initiatives, as well as between the 
actors initiating them, which usually come from public and institutional environments. 
As several cluster initiatives are oriented towards the same resources, ‘political’ aspects 
of such cooperation are strengthened. In the long run, some initiatives are enlarged, 
some join forces, while others die out. In this study, these phenomena are called cluster 
cannibalism. 
 
Debates on the outcomes of cluster strategies and cluster initiation have been almost 
absent in the public sphere. Managing cluster initiatives is a complex activity, which 
leads to complex development processes and quite often, unintended results. These 
unintended results do not necessarily relate to or lead to any kind of innovation. The 
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 suggested strategic approach of promoting clusters for enhancing innovation seems to 
offer little to strengthen value creation and regional development. The case presented in 
this study reveals a field where politics and rivalry both among inter-agencies and 
competing cluster initiatives are present. As politics come to dominate clusters, cluster 
strategies seem to have become strategies for organizing the policy field of innovation, 
rather than a way of actually achieving innovation. 
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Actors, Organizations, Labels & Abbreviations  
Overview of the Cluster Initiative 1  (CI1) 
The Cluster Initiative 1 – Initial Member Organizations & Companies (2008-2010): 
x 7 private companies, key actors in the business field, including: 
x The PDC - Private Development Company 
x 3 public organizations, key actors in the business field  
x The RBF - the Regional Business Facilitation organization, facilitating the CI1  
The CI1 Working Group – People (2007-2010): 
x The Initiator, idea holder and representative of the PDC  
x The Project Manager, employed by the RBF  
x Me, an Administrative Cluster Coordinator (and researcher), employed by the RBF  
The CI1 Interims Board – People (2009-2010): 
x The Initiator, Chair  
x A representative from a private member company  
x A second representative from a private member company (engaged 2nd quarter of 
2009)  
x A representative from a public member organization (replaced 3rd quarter of 2009)  
----------------------------------------------------- 
x The Project Manager, reporting to the board 
x Me, Secretary of CI1 Interims Board 
 
Overview of Organizations & Actors of Importance to the Analysis 
National (and regional) organizations: Relevant actors representing the organization 
in focus: 
x The RBF - the Regional Business 
Facilitator Organization  
x The RBF Manager 
 
x The NGO - the Norwegian 
Governmental Organization 
x The NGO Manager 
x The BFO - the Business Facilitator 
Organization 
x The BFO Representative, who also 
served as the CI2 Facilitator 
x The GDO - the Governmental 
Development Organization  
x The GDO Representative 
x The PDFO - the Private Development 
Facilitator Organization 
x Not directly involved, but represented 
by the CI3 Facilitator (see below) 
x The PDC - the Private Development 
Company 
x The Initiator 
Cluster initiatives: Relevant actors representing the cluster 
initiatives in focus: 
x The CI1 - the Cluster Initiative 1, 
facilitated by the RBF  
x See table above: Overview of the 
Cluster Initiative 1 
x The CI2 - the Cluster Initiative 2, a 
cluster initiative facilitated by the 
BFO  
x The CI2 Facilitator, also known as 
the BFO Representative 
x The CI3 - the Cluster Initiative 3, a 
cluster initiative facilitated by the 
PDFO 
x The CI3 Facilitator, hired by the 
PDFO  

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 Chapter 1 – Introduction  
1.1 Problem Statement   
The past decades, cluster and innovation theories have become increasingly popular. 
This has led to the development of public cluster strategies for innovation enhancement. 
A result of the cluster strategies has been the forming of new arenas for interaction. The 
expectation has been that cluster initiatives could strengthen innovative efforts and 
consequently contribute to increasing economic prosperity within a region or nation.   
 
Michael Porter (2000:15) defines clusters as “geographical concentrations of 
interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related 
industries, and associated institutions (e.g., universities, standards agencies, trade 
associations) in a particular field that compete but also cooperate.” According to 
Porter, clusters affect competition by increasing productivity, stimulate the formation of 
new businesses and drive innovation.  
 
This study argues that clusters initiated to promote regional innovation in a short-term 
perspective seldom are successful in doing so. A key explanation is that political 
features and behavior1 of actors influences the field of clusters, consuming time and 
energy of involved stakeholders and deflecting the original intention of developing such 
initiatives. This means that politics must be taken into account when speaking of, 
planning and carrying out cluster cooperation.  

1 In this study ‘politics’ is ’operationalized’ as political features related to interests and perceptions as 
well as political behavior related to conflict, strategies and power play. See Chapter 5, section 5.3 for 
details.     
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According to Jeffrey Pfeffer (1981:7),“organizational politics involves those activities 
taken within organizations to acquire, develop, and use power and other resources to 
obtain one’s preferred outcomes in a situation in which there is uncertainty or 
dissensus about choices.” This kind of political behavior can also be identified in 
relation to cluster cooperation.  
 
Clusters have some key features in which lead to political behavior. This is true even if 
business development and innovation is an expressed goal of cooperation. Clusters 
represent arenas where multiple interests and perceptions occur. This leads to political 
behavior in the form of conflict, strategy development and power-games among 
involved stakeholders.  
 
The cluster arenas can be characterized as complex environments, where some actors 
have goals related to business and fast action, while others have ‘slower’ and more 
political agendas. Actors may also maintain both types of agendas simultaneously. 
Strategies related to either political or business agendas encourage different ways of 
behavior. Even if cluster cooperation is targeted at joint activity and action orientation, 
it has resemblance to voluntary activity, and actors are mainly concerned with achieving 
their own goals. These goals may or may not be coherent with other actors’ agendas. As 
goals and behavior vary, activity in a cluster may seem confusing. Multiple strategies 
are played out simultaneously, of which are not always known or understood by the 
involved parties. This makes cooperation more challenging.  
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Developing and maintaining a cluster initiative is much more complex than the 
literature usually acknowledges. Cluster initiatives have been promoted as a regional 
development tool for public governments, proposed to lead to innovation and economic 
development. There is, however, little unambiguous evidence for correlation between 
initiated cluster cooperation and innovation. A recent study by Rune Dahl Fitjar & 
Andrés Rodriguez-Pose (2011) even suggests that regional business cooperation has 
little effect on companies’ ability to innovate.  
 
The popularization of cluster strategies has increased the initiation of cluster initiatives, 
leading to a new form of competition between similar initiatives, as well as between the 
actors initiating them. As several cluster initiatives are oriented towards the same 
resources, political aspects of such cooperation are strengthened. In the long run, some 
initiatives are enlarged, some join forces, while others die out. In this study, these 
phenomena are called cluster cannibalism.     
 
Debates on the outcomes of cluster strategies and cluster initiation have been almost 
absent in the public sphere. Managing cluster initiatives is a complex activity, which 
leads to complex development processes and quite often, unintended results. These 
unintended results do not necessarily relate to or lead to any kind of innovation. The 
case presented in this study reveals a field where politics and rivalry both among inter-
agencies and cluster initiatives are present. As politics come to dominate clusters, 
cluster strategies seem to have become strategies for organizing the policy field of 
innovation, rather than a way of actually achieving innovation. 
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1.2 How the Study Came About 
Since 2003 I have been involved in and observed several cluster enhancement projects 
within the Oslo region. During these years, I became increasingly concerned with the 
gap between the theoretical and practical field of clusters. The complex, empirical field 
seemed to be affected by quite different things than what was highlighted in cluster 
theory. Quite often cooperative efforts lead to controversies that seemingly have little to 
do with innovation.   
 
The research originally intended to document the developments of a successful cluster 
initiative within the Oslo region, demonstrating how regional actors enhanced inter-
organizational cooperation on innovation. During 2007, I became involved in a start-up 
cluster initiative, the CI1 (Cluster Initiative 1), which at the time seemed highly 
promising. The case had several interesting aspects: Powerful, motivated and 
experienced business actors, as well as access to financial and knowledge resources in a 
current and relevant business field. Timing was excellent, and as a part of a cluster 
facilitator team, I was able to follow the process of developing the Initiative while I was 
conducting my research.   
 
The project design of CI1 was inspired by Henry Chesbroughs book Open Innovation 
(2006). The main focus was companies’ opportunities to take advantage of knowledge 
and ideas, of external as well as internal sources. Focusing on innovation with external 
partners could contribute to sharing risks and awards and promote opportunities to 
develop ideas externally which the company itself did not have resources to see further. 
The project management team was eager to achieve inter-organizational innovation by 
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combining the needs of a set of public organizations with the competence of a group of 
private companies. In 2008 a core member base was recruited for a pilot project. My 
plan for research was to look into how the CI1 would achieve innovation, while 
working on administrative tasks for the Initiative. But, as often happens in research, the 
case turned out to provide quite different data than expected.  
 
Approximately one year into the project, I acknowledged that I had almost no data on 
actual emphasis to cooperate on innovation, nor the process towards developing the 
three planned innovation projects. In reality, little data existed. I had been present 
during almost all activities during the relatively short life of the CI1. The fact was that 
the Initiative had not been able to execute any of the innovative projects. Still, 
substantial time and resources had been used on the CI1, and more was to be used in the 
coming year.  
 
Why this lack of output? A range of answers to why the cluster cooperative efforts did 
not result in (a focus on) innovation were offered, related to topics such as high 
expectations within limited time frames, lack of resources and lack of experience, both 
among participants and management. Potentially, all of these answers were of relevance 
to the CI1, but at the same time, there was something else that had not really been 
considered.  
 
Over time, the task of building and developing the initiative had become more and more 
complicated, leaving almost no opportunities to focus on the innovation projects. When 
looking further into the data material, reflecting on the past year’s intensive activity, I 
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realized two important things: First of all, most time spent on the CI1was related to 
handling controversies in the field, rather than on proceedings and methods for 
achieving innovation. Secondly, few of the controversies came about within the CI1, 
rather they were played out between the CI1 and external actors with conflicting 
agendas. Consequently, the cluster initiatives’ time and resources had been dedicated to 
the handling of various kinds of political behavior.   
 
As most researchers who receive a different result of a research projects than expected, I 
was troubled with what to do next. My research focus had to be changed. From looking 
into the process of building a cluster initiative and engaging in how innovation came 
about, I became concerned with the cluster development process and what had come out 
of the cooperative effort, if not innovation. The reflections on the available data material 
made me question the expectations of cluster enhancement projects and what such 
initiatives were actually able to perform. From my perspective, there was time to review 
the application of cluster theory into strategy. The research on CI1 has made this 
emphasis possible.  
 
1.3 Defining the Case for Research  
The research is a single case study of an initiated cluster initiative, the CI1. The study is 
focused towards the process of initiating and developing the CI1, with a focal interest in 
why conflicts and competition occurs within such processes. The main research 
question asks: Why does cluster cooperation seldom result in innovation?  
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The working hypothesis developed proposes that political features and behavior in 
clusters influences the opportunities for innovation. The data presented is focused on the 
main events influencing effort and opportunity of the CI1. These data mainly concerns 
various kinds of politics and conflict occurring between the CI1 and its surrounding 
environment. In the end, these features and behaviors contributed to the lack of 
innovative output related to the CI1 and consequently the legitimization for carrying on 
with the cluster cooperation efforts. This resulted in a closing down of the CI1 
approximately two years after its initiation.  
 
Various definitions of clusters occur and are applied differently by different 
practitioners (Porter, 1990; Maskell & Kebir, 2005). In order to keep track while 
analyzing the data material in this study, a key distinction has been created between a 
smaller, initiated cluster initiative and its larger, surrounding environment. A formalized 
and initiated cluster initiative is defined as the materialization of a cluster, notably some 
kind of organized, initiated effort of a group of business and research & development 
(R&D) related stakeholders, who are dedicated to work towards issues of joint 
importance. The goal of the initiative is to develop some kind of cluster cooperation 
leading to innovation enhancement and business development. The case in this study, 
the CI1, is defined as a formalized and initiated cluster initiative. 
 
The surrounding informal cluster arena can be interpreted as a larger and less defined 
version of a cluster, including business related stakeholders, institutional and public 
stakeholders and potentially various types of formal cluster initiatives. The overall 
objective in the informal cluster arena is regional and economic development, 
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encouraging innovation enhancement and growth. In this study, the environment the 
CI1 deals with, but is also a part of, and is defined as the informal cluster arena. Both 
the formalized cluster initiative and the surrounding cluster arena fulfill the 
requirements in definitions of clusters made by Michael Porter (1998, 2000).   
 
Porter (1998:45) defines innovation “to include both improvements in technology and 
better methods or ways of doing things. It can be manifested in product changes, 
process changes, new approaches to marketing, new forms of distribution, and new 
concepts of scope.” This definition ranges widely and but aligns with contemporary 
definitions of innovation (OECD, 1981). In this study, a second and practical condition 
for defining innovation as an output of cluster cooperation has been added: In order to 
be counted as innovation, the output must be regarded as an innovation by participating 
actors.  
 
1.4 Research in the Field  
The purpose of this research is to show how innovation is far more difficult to achieve 
in cluster cooperation than the cluster theory proposes, also pointing to how theory 
cannot explain the absence of innovation. Consequently, the study questions whether 
cluster cooperation leads to innovation, suggesting certain factors that may hinder such 
output.  
 
The popularity of innovation systems theories has increased the past two decades. A key 
contribution in this field is Porter’s cluster theory (see for instance Porter: 1990, 1998). 
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He is concerned with how a company could enhance its business and innovation 
through cooperation and competition locally. Other important theoretical contributions 
are national and regional innovation systems (Freeman, 1987; Cooke, 2001), 
emphasizing how innovation relies upon the cooperation between a set of regional and 
institutional actors, and triple helix (Etzkowitz & Leyesdorff, 1997), concerned with the 
institutionalization of collaboration between academia, industry and public government 
and highlighting the role of the universities and research institutions.  
 
Porter’s cluster theory originates in American traditions and is concerned with business 
and the companies’ opportunities for growth. Comparatively, national and regional 
innovation systems theory and triple helix theory, are embedded in European traditions, 
and to a greater degree directed towards regional economic development and public 
management facilitation.  
 
The theories on innovation systems, including cluster theory, range over several 
disciplines, and are in nature heterogeneous. Not only is the theoretical field large and 
widespread, similar and partly overlapping notions belong to different academic 
disciplines. The consequence is a lack of precise and agreed upon definitions. This 
creates challenges in terms of understanding the field, and methodologically in 
developing research relevant across disciplines. When it comes to cluster theory, the 
definition is purposely equivocal to cover what Porter defines as “local varieties of the 
cluster phenomenon” (2000:18). In addition to its vagueness, the mechanisms of 
clusters leading to innovation have showed difficult to prove (Edquist, 2005; Fitjar & 
Rodriguez-Pose, 2011). 
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Along the popularity of innovation systems theory, a strategic and practical field has 
developed, which the past decade has had an increasing impact on public and business 
life. The application of various kinds of innovation systems theories into public 
strategies suggests that different public oriented (regional development) and private 
oriented (company development) perspectives are brought together. This is rarely 
emphasized and the translation of theories into strategy and further into practice seems 
to be treated relatively uncritically.  
 
The vagueness of the cluster theories invites to many interpretations and hence also 
many approaches to practice. Critiquing the field is popular in some research 
environments (Martin & Sunley, 2003), but relatively few academic contributions are 
available. Critiques are, surprisingly, almost non-present in practical life. 
 
Cluster theory does to a little extent catch the challenges in the field and are mainly 
concerned with the potential benefits of clusters. The difficulty in proving the proposed 
mechanisms is also present in the practical field, where identifying successful 
measurements for evaluating the effect of cluster development efforts are few. In many 
respects, facilitating cluster development is about facilitating social interaction. This 
makes cluster facilitation difficult to measure, creating issues in both theory 
communities and in the practical field.  
 
This study has a critical perspective on cluster theories and is concerned with providing 
some additional tools for understanding the field and how it has developed as a result of 
implementation of cluster strategies. The cluster theories provide limited information on 
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the wheeling and dealings related to cluster efforts. A selection of politics and 
organization theory is advised, with the goal of taking advantage of complementary 
theoretical contributions on networks, interests, perceptions, competition, conflict, 
strategies and power play.    
 
Niels Brunsson (1989) presents two ideal types of organizations, the action 
organization, which is oriented towards business considerations, and the talk 
organization, which is oriented towards political considerations. Both considerations 
may be present within in an organization, and both ideals seem to be present in and 
around cluster efforts. In this study action is related to business environments with a 
proposed goal of innovation enhancement, while talk is related to politics and public 
and institutional environments, with overall goals oriented on regional and economic 
enhancement. The sum of organizational theories presented in this study should help 
understand key features and behavior in clusters, which cannot be explained by the 
cluster theory itself, but yet influence opportunity for innovation.   
 
1.5 Choice of Methods  
The research has been conducted in relation to the research program EDWOR II, which 
is an acronym for Enterprise Development and Work-life Research. The program was 
established with the ambition of promoting the advantages and opportunities of action 
research. Action research can be defined in several ways, but usually involves some 
kind of reflective and participatory process related to organizational change 
(Greenwood & Levin, 1998). It is common that such research is conducted in a team, 
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where practitioners and researchers guides each other and are concerned with practical 
improvements along with the process. Ideally, this contributes to connecting theory and 
practice. The opportunity to develop such a participatory action research team was for 
several reasons not present in this study. Nevertheless, the research has been influenced 
and inspired by this methodological fundament in developing its design and thinking.  
   
The study’s theory of science fundament relates to a constructivistic approach, 
including key elements of pragmatism in conducting the actual research. My general 
view is that the field of clusters is developed through layers of constructed 
interpretations and understandings, influencing the opportunities and forming the 
culture of those involved.  
 
The research design is a participatory, qualitative study of one case, the CI1, of which I 
took active part in as an administrative professional between 2007 and 20092. Various 
types of data material have been collected, through observations, interviews and the 
analysis of existing written material. The analysis is developed on the basis of grounded 
theory, with an abductive3 logic and approach. As case study research offers little 
opportunity for generalization, this has not been an objective of the research. Lessons of 
importance to other cases of cluster initiation may still be present.  
 

2 See Chapter 3, section 3.4.1 for details on my role.  
3 See Chapter 3, section 3.3.2 for details on abduction. 
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1.6 Relevance  
The research is important for several reasons. Innovation related policies are a relatively 
new field, both in a Norwegian and an international context. In the past two decades the 
theoretical field of clusters has had a substantial impact on public understanding of 
innovation. This has led to development of cluster-related strategies and public 
emphasis on creating and enhancing various types of cluster initiatives. The cluster 
theory has been promoted towards several environments, mainly of public characters, 
which have been eager to identify (simple) tools in order to enhance the pace of 
innovation and economics within the targeted region. As a result, evaluating efforts are 
needed.  
 
Cluster theory and the suggestion that clusters are important for innovation 
enhancement have avoided many critical voices. Traditionally, public efforts to support 
innovation have taken place by targeting individual ideas and companies. 
Comparatively, cluster enhancement proposes a relatively cheap way of ‘doing 
something’ for a larger number of actors. It is however not necessarily the best strategy 
to achieve innovation. With increasing use of both public and private resources, the 
need to debate the outputs of cluster efforts, is necessary. This debate should include 
issues such as whether and how cluster initiatives are useful to the actors involved, 
whether this form of cooperation seems to be appropriate to achieve results, what results 
the involved actors are experiencing, how strategies can be improved and what happens 
as more or similar initiatives are introduced and start competing.  
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Awareness of what cluster initiatives actually produce and regional consequences of the 
enhancement of cluster strategy must be strengthened. There are plenty of cluster 
initiatives that have been presented as great success both towards public funders and in 
media. These presentations are often made by public facilitators eager to promote 
successful developments in a field, where short-term outputs are rare and long-term 
funding is necessary, but not a prerequisite for results. Their interests in presenting 
successful outputs may prevent the opportunities for fruitful conversations on what 
challenges and results such cooperative efforts bring. Although successful cluster 
enhancement projects are not necessarily absent, debates on what a satisfactory result of 
cluster cooperation is and for whom should be more frequent.  
 
Nils Brunsson & Johan P. Olsen (1998:22-23) call for a greater theoretical insight in 
interrelations between organizations, arguing that appropriate concept- and methods 
development have been “remarkably slow” in research on inter-organizational 
networks. They point to the potential misfit between a theoretical map and its terrain. 
To reformulate in the context of this study, there is a need to explore some sides to 
cluster enhancement that influence the opportunities for achieving the expected results 
of innovation.  
 
The data in this study is unique compared to most cluster research. Taking an active part 
in an actual cluster development project for several years has provided an opportunity to 
observe and reflect on a selection of cluster related development projects over time. 
This in-depth insider opportunity has contributed to detailed knowledge, perspectives 
and reflections on the practical field, not common or possible in traditional research.  
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A key theoretical contribution is the application of organizational understandings to 
cluster cooperation, highlighting political features and behavior related to the presence 
of interests, perceptions, conflict, strategy development and power games in clusters. 
Such features have rarely been touched upon in cluster theory, but are highly present in 
the practical field.   
 
1.7 Outline of the Dissertation  
This dissertation is divided into nine chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 
introduces the background and context for the research, as well as data material on the 
case in focus, the CI1. The chapter provides the empirical fundament for the analysis 
chapters and highlights four key events influencing the life of the CI1.    
 
Chapter 3 on methodology presents an overview of theory of science perspectives, 
providing philosophical arguments for the dissertation. These arguments are followed 
by an overview of the research design, a presentation of the methods and how the 
research was carried out, as well as a final part emphasizing challenges and limitations 
considered important in evaluating this research.  
 
Chapter 4 presents cluster theory and its critiques. The goal is to frame the original 
understanding of the case, as well as the application of cluster theory into strategies of 
innovation enhancement. Chapter 5 presents organizational theories related to politics 
and serves as a ‘tools’ chapter for analysis. The goal is to present a complete analytical 
framework, which makes it possible to access and understand key events, actions and 
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developments of the case. The final part of the chapter presents the analytical model in 
detail and proposes the research questions.  
 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 answer the three sub-research questions, respectively looking into 
features, behavior and consequences of cluster cooperation efforts in the case of the 
CI1. The final chapter 9 provides a set of conclusions from the analysis, as well as some 
reflections on the field, its logic and its future.  
 
If you are a reader with less interest in the academic and theoretical parts of this 
dissertation, the recommendation is that you put your main focus into Chapter 2 for an 
introduction to the field and the case in question, and devote the rest of your time to 
Chapter 6-9, which presents the analysis and conclusion.  
32
 
Chapter 2 – The Cluster Initiative 1 and its Context 
2.1 Introduction  
The following chapter presents the case of the Cluster Initiative 1 (CI1), in addition to 
relevant information on its surroundings. The CI1 was initiated in 2008 in the Oslo-
region, Norway. The Initiative came about at a time where attention toward innovation 
and cluster strategies had escalated in Norwegian public life. Consequently, features and 
events in the life of the CI1 must be understood in relation to these emerging trends.  
 
The chapter is introduced by a few facts about the work-life in Scandinavia and 
Norway, which may be different to what is found in other parts of the world and have 
an effect on the development of cluster initiatives. Then, regional development and 
innovation policy trends of importance to the Oslo region are presented. The third and 
extensive part, introduces the data on CI1, providing the fundament for analysis. With a 
few exceptions, this data is presented chronologically. Four main events of key 
importance to the fate of the CI1 are highlighted: Event 1: Funding & public 
competition; Event 2: Cluster competition – part one; Event 3: Public regulation 
interference, and; Event 4: Cluster competition – part two.  
 
2.2 Scandinavian and Norwegian Society and Work-life  
It is a great challenge to sum up the uniqueness of the Norwegian society. Norway bears 
many similarities to the other Scandinavian countries Sweden and Denmark, all stable 
democracies and wealthy welfare states. But unlike the two, Norway is not a part of the 
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European Union, and has in recent years experienced a somewhat different economic 
development, less affected by the financial crisis than most other countries in the world. 
At present time, Norway is ranked as one of the wealthiest countries in the world.  
Norway is a unitary constitutional monarchy, with a parliamentary system of 
government and a population of about five million people. The country is a welfare state 
and the economy is divided between a combination of free markets and substantial state 
ownerships in certain key sectors. Due to its large oil reserves, the Norwegian 
government has afforded to develop a public welfare system, covering benefits such as 
health care, schooling and work-life security. 
 
The public sector employs almost thirty percent of the labor force, which is the highest 
among the OECD countries. The unemployment rate in 2013 was approximately 3.5 
percent, well below most other western countries. Norway is the fifth largest exporter of 
oil and the third largest exporter of gas in the world. Other key industries are shipping, 
fishing and food processing.  
 
The Norwegian society is characterized by a high degree of equality, ranging from 
issues such as gender, class, salaries, housing etc. The population is well educated. 
Higher education is affordable compared to most other countries in the world, and is 
supplemented with opportunities for public loans and funding, giving every citizen a 
chance to get an education.    
 
Norwegian work-life also has some unique characteristics. The management style is 
egalitarian compared to most other countries in the world. Further, the organizational 
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structures are usually relatively flat, and consensus decisions are often favored. The 
information-flow among workers and management is high, providing opportunities for 
influence, involvement and engagement on all levels in an organization. Scandinavian 
companies have a reputation for a high level of transparency, both in relation to 
operations and finances. This situation is also reflected in political life, as information is 
easily obtainable and opportunities to influence decision-makers are greater than in 
most parts of the world (Levin et al, 2012). 
 
The Nordic cooperative model is a well-known term that is often used to describe key 
qualities of the Nordic societies. Levin et al (2012:25-27) refers to the Norwegian 
cooperative model to characterize how a democratic, innovative and competitive work-
life is created. This is achieved by specific organizational structures, practices and 
cultural features between government, work-life and society in general. The authors 
describe recent changes in work-life, where new technology and demands lead to 
changes in organization, and where competence and knowledge development plays an 
increasing part in economic development. In a Norwegian context, the Oslo region is a 
center for this knowledge-oriented development.  
 
The Oslo region is defined as the capital city Oslo and the surrounding county 
Akershus. The population is relatively young and just above one million people. The 
population is international, with twenty percent of foreign origin. The work force of 
approximately 600,000 people is highly educated, and the unemployment rate is low, 
resembling other parts of Norway. Twenty-five percent of all companies in Norway are 
registered in the Oslo region, a total of approximately 115,000 companies. The region 
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accommodates forty-four percent of Norwegian R&D activity, which includes fifteen 
public and private universities and university colleges, four science parks and eleven 
Research and Development (R&D) Centers (Statistics Norway, 2013; Norway, 2013). 
All in all, knowledge intensive environments are a key fundament in the Norwegian 
economy.  
 
2.3 The Regional Innovation Landscape of the Oslo Region  
In the 1990s and beginning of 2000 an emerging interest in innovation and urban 
regional development evolved, both in research and among policy makers in western 
societies (MacKinnon at al, 2002). When the European Commission published the 
“Green paper on innovation” in 1995, it became the first paper to systematically debate 
innovation policy, arguing that innovation was a crucial mechanism for economic and 
societal development. A main goal was to identify key factors for innovation in the 
European Union and formulate tools to contribute to the innovation activity in the 
member countries. Among prioritized tools was the region, an administrative and 
political unit of a more tangible size (EU, 1995:1, in Spilling & Aanstad, 2010:14-15). 
 
Bjørn Gustavsen (2012) describes how work-life cooperation in a Norwegian context 
has taken many shapes and forms since it set out in the turn of the twentieth century. He 
places a shift in focus towards networks and clusters to the 1990s. During the 1990s, 
more companies were eager to participate in cooperative projects and relations between 
companies became a main component. A goal became to strengthen individual 
company’s motivation and opportunities for learning by extending experiences.  
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One of the first programs to contribute to the thinking and strategizing of regional 
innovation in Norway was Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research 
(NIBR) (Pålshaugen, 2011:4). NIBR launched a research program on conditions for 
regional and industrial development in the mid 1990s, identifying the potential for 
innovation in key business environments in the Oslo region. The program led to a 
public strategy for enhanced focus on promising industries and R&D environments, 
with both methodological and practical aspects. The possibilities for increased value 
creation were considered especially high within the health industry, the media industry 
and the IT industry.  
 
Gustavsen (2012), who was a key professional driver in the research and development 
of programs by the Norwegian Research Council during the 1990s, points to the launch 
of the research and development program Company Development 2000 (CD2000) in 
the mid 1990s. The program had a focus on process support for companies. The 
companies had for some time worked on issues of organizational development, but were 
becoming more concerned with networking issues and identifications of partners with 
broad and advanced knowledge in organizational development.  
 
In 1998 the Oslo region became a partner in the European Union program entitled 
Regional Innovation and Technology Transfer Strategy and Infrastructures (abbreviated 
RITTS). The program was financed by the European Commission and focused on 
identifying experiences from regional actors already in fields important to innovation in 
knowledge industries. A main point in the program was to establish closer relations 
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between key business and research actors and regional authorities, in order to develop a 
joint strategy for innovation.  
 
The NIBR- and the RITTS-programs provided important theoretical and practical 
fundaments for regional policy in the Oslo region, legitimizing a selection of target 
business areas for increased focus. The programs contributed to arguments leading to 
the establishment of an inter-municipal regional innovation facilitation company, Oslo 
Teknopol, owned by the Municipalities of Oslo and Akershus.  
 
During the first decade of 2000 this company developed and facilitated projects for key 
actors in a set of prioritized industry areas, all of importance to Norwegian economic 
development. The emphasis was on developing stronger ties between and within 
relevant research and business environments. The approach was cluster and network 
cooperation, with an overall purpose of promoting regional cooperation and innovation. 
  
In the beginning of 2000 the Value Creation 2010 (VC2010) replaced the CD2000. This 
shifted focus towards emphasis on innovation as a goal for workplace development. The 
regions were introduced as a key level for organization of economic and innovation 
policies (Gustavsen, 2012). The program was oriented towards development and 
cooperation in and between enterprises, with the goal of increasing value creation. 
Knowledge generation and network creation were key aspects of every project, 
involving not only practitioners, but also experienced researchers observing and 
influencing the organizational processes. 
 
38
 
The Norwegian Government initiated the Arena-program in 2002. The goal was to 
support pilot projects with a focus on inter-organizational cooperation, R&D and long-
term development of regional business clusters with flexible approaches. A key tool was 
the establishment of arenas for stakeholder meetings, in order to create stronger and 
more dynamic interaction between participants. The program offered both advisory and 
financial support. The interaction was to be long-term, goal-oriented and focused on 
collaboration, international awareness, access to knowledge and new business (OECD, 
2007:268).  
 
Despite both international and regional attention since the mid 90s, the national 
Norwegian innovation policy was first explicitly formulated as an independent policy 
area in 2003. This policy was presented through the Government’s Unified Innovation 
Plan. The plan outlined a strategy to support conditions for innovation, with emphasis 
and initiation of various “tools” for innovation enhancement. Key issues were increased 
interaction between companies and knowledge environments, greater focus on 
commercialization, higher skilled labor, network building and coherence among public 
agencies. Consequently, innovation was a targeted priority by the Norwegian 
Government. 
 
The vision of the Norwegian Government was to become “the most innovative country 
in the world.” They argued that increased international focus, a fast technology 
development and tough competition demanded a stronger focus on competitive business 
arenas in the coming years. With the Government’s Unified Innovation Plan (2003), the 
importance of city regions, clusters and networks was acknowledged. Another tool of 
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significance was the organizational merger resulting in a governmental organization for 
innovation and development of Norwegian enterprises and industry. The organization, 
Innovation Norway, was to operate nationally and internationally and serve both start-
ups and established Norwegian business environments, contributing with funding and 
expertise (OECD, 2007; Spilling & Aanstad, 2011:14-18). 
 
Soon after, the Norwegian Parliament succeeded with Whitepaper 25 (2004-2005) “On 
regional policy.” Again, the importance of clusters was highlighted as an important tool 
for innovation and business development. Policies for regions and policies for 
innovation were going to be closely tied together in Norwegian public life.  
 
As mentioned, an aspect of the Government’s Unified Innovation Plan was the 
acknowledgement of the role of the city regions as drivers for innovation. The city 
region represents a high density of competent workers and businesses, as well as 
research and development (R&D). The plan suggested a special program for key urban 
areas, drawing attention to knowledge-environments and potential clusters within the 
city regions. In the Oslo region this led to the initiation of the Capital Project, initiated 
in the autumn of 2004. This project was to become a main influence for the 
establishment of the CI1 four years later.  
 
Oslo Teknopol was assigned a key role in the Capital Project, providing a secretary 
function for six target areas. One area was focused on “support organizations” dealing 
with innovation, while the five others were devoted to the business areas in focus. Six 
working groups were established, comprising of all sorts of influencing actors from the 
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respective fields, in total involving more than seventy companies and organizations in 
the Oslo region.  
 
Under the Capital Project umbrella, twenty-three pilot- and demonstration projects were 
developed, with a scope in level of detail and ambition, which also reflected on actual 
outcomes in the longer run. The projects were defined by the challenges of each 
business area, with a focus on illustrating and realizing innovative potential. Funding 
was partly provided by regional government, which integrated the Capital Project in a 
regional framework program. In the coming years, more “overlapping” projects were to 
be integrated with the Capital Project, aiming at concentrating the means and resources 
of the innovation field in the Oslo region.  
 
According to Pålshaugen (2011), the Capital Project provided a shift in the 
understanding on regional innovation systems in the Oslo region. This resulted in a 
broadening of the overall perspectives on innovation. The ruling idea at the time was 
that innovation would happen between enterprises and research environments within a 
cluster. The Capital Project participants acknowledged the possibility that innovation 
might happen between the enterprises, too. Moreover, the participants emphasized that 
innovation-relevant knowledge could come from a variety of sources, not limited to 
research environments. The Capital Project also moved away from the presumption that 
geographical proximity was a necessary condition for such development. Rather, a 
cluster could be organized as a functional entity, not limited to territory. This approach 
somewhat parted with the leading strategies proposed by other Norwegian public 
stakeholders involved in the field of regional innovation.   
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An additional tool derived from the Government’s Innovation Plan, was the Norwegian 
Centres of Expertise (NCE) program initiated in 2006. It was committed to provide 
funding and expertise to a group of high-rising Norwegian cluster environments. The 
objective was increased innovation through development and improvement of clusters, 
which had already demonstrated high levels of success, with an international orientation 
and potential for innovation-led growth by increasing value creation. A secondary 
objective was “to create interests in and commitment to cluster development, to 
generate concrete results at cluster and company levels and to provide greater insight 
into co-operative development processes” (OECD, 2007:268; Mariussen & Ørstavik, 
2005:5). An NCE status quickly became a high priority objective for inter-
organizational cooperative projects with cluster ambitions.  
 
In 2007, the VC2010 program was replaced by Program for R&D and Regional 
Innovation (VRI). The VRI program was designed to promote regional collaboration 
between trade and industry, R&D institutions and the government authorities, and to 
establish close ties to other national and international network and innovation measures. 
Among these was the Arena program and the NCE (VRI, 2013). The VRI-program 
contributed to funding and research on several of the pilot- and demonstration projects 
initiated by the Capital Project and provided the framework and funding for EDWOR II, 
the PhD-program in which this study belongs.  
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2.4 Presenting the Case in Focus - the Cluster Initiative 1  
The data to be presented is about the initiation and development of the Cluster Initiative 
1 (the CI1). Although it might be possible to trace certain organizations and actors 
mentioned in the data material, data is kept anonymous out of principle, as the attention 
of this study is to highlight some structural trends influencing the cluster cooperation 
efforts, rather than the actions and whereabouts of individual actors and organizations.  
 
The following sections introduce the everyday life of the CI1, as an initiated cluster 
initiative, from its early phases in 2007 until the Initiative was closed down in the end 
of 2010. The data was collected between the summer of 2007 and autumn of 2010, 
through interviews, personal memos, various written sources, and from personal 
participation. The CI1 was established in spring 2008 and although not a formal part of 
the Capital Project, it had strong links to key actors, drawing upon the practical 
experiences from previous cluster initiation efforts. The goal of the following 
presentation is to provide a detailed outline, following what Clifford Geertz (1973) 
characterizes as ‘thick description.’      
 
During its two years of existence, the CI1 underwent a range of challenges, influenced 
both by participants and the surroundings. These challenges were part of a set of events, 
occurring in different time slots or phases. Some overlapped and had relation to each 
other, while others happened independently, and without the involved party’s 
awareness. Four events had pivotal influence of the fate of the CI1. The selection of 
events was identified after carefully looking into the life of the CI1 and debating what 
had been the most influential for the fate of the CI1 with informants. The four events 
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will be given extra attention in the following presentation of the CI1 and include Event 
1: Funding & public competition; Event 2: Cluster competition – part one; Event 3: 
Public regulation interference, and; Event 4: Cluster competition – part two. Together 
they provide the empirical fundament for the analysis in Chapters 6-9, subsequently 
dealing with sub-research question one, two and three. Table 2.1 presents the three main 
phases in the life of the CI1, their respective sub-phases and the four events that 
proposed major challenges for the CI1s existence. In total, this makes out the structure 
for this part of the chapter. 
 
Table 2.1  
Key Phases in the Life of Cluster Initiative 1: August 2007<>December 2010 
 
1) Planning Cluster Initiative 1: August 2007<> April 2008 
Initial planning: August 2007-February 2008 
Concrete planning: February 2008-April 2008 
 
2) Establishing Cluster Initiative 1: April 2008<>December 2008 
Pilot-project start-up: April 2008-August 2008  
- Event 1: Funding & public competition  
The pilot project: August 2008–November 2008 
- Event 2: Cluster competition – part one  
Concluding the pilot-project: November 2008-December 2008 
 
3) Formalizing Cluster Initiative 1: January 2009<>December 2009 
Establishing the organization: January 2009-March 2009 
- Event 3: Public regulation interference  
Developing and institutionalizing the organization: March 2009-June 2009 
- Event 4: Cluster competition – part two  
Re-thinking the CI1 organization: July 2009-December 2009  
 
The data related to the case of the CI1 and the actors involved are extensive. Several 
cluster initiatives were of relevance to the CI1. Further, a range of public or institutional 
facilitator organizations were present in the field. In addition the CI1 included a set of 
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public and private actors. As it may be a challenge to keep track of the issues in focus, 
table 2.2 provides an overview of the organizations and actors involved in the CI1, 
while table 2.3. provides an overview of the organizations and cluster initiatives 
involved with the CI1, which are of importance for telling the story of the CI1.  
 
Table 2.2 
Overview of the Cluster Initiative 1  (CI1) 
The Cluster Initiative 1 – Initial member organizations & companies (2008-2010): 
x 7 private companies, key actors in the business field, including: 
x The PDC - Private Development Company 
x 3 public organizations, key actors in the business field  
x The RBF - the Regional Business Facilitation organization, facilitating the CI1  
The CI1 Working Group – People (2007-2010): 
x The Initiator, idea holder and representative of the PDC  
x The Project Manager, employed by the RBF  
x Me, an Administrative Cluster Coordinator (and researcher), employed by the 
RBF  
The CI1 Interims Board – People (2009-2010): 
x The Initiator, Chair  
x A representative from a private member company  
x A second representative from a private member company (engaged 2nd quarter 
of 2009)  
x A representative from a public member organization (replaced 3rd quarter of 
2009)  
----------------------------------------------------- 
x The Project Manager, reporting to the board 
x Me, Secretary of CI1 Interims Board 
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Table 2.3  
Overview of Organizations, Actors and Constellations of Importance to the 
Analysis 
National (and Regional) Organizations:  
x The RBF - the Regional Business Facilitator organization  
x The NGO - the Norwegian Governmental Organization 
x The BFO - the Business Facilitator Organization  
x The GDO - the Governmental Development Organization  
x The PDFO - the Private Development Facilitator Organization 
x The PDC - the Private Development Company 
Cluster Initiatives: 
x The CI1 - the Cluster Initiative 1, facilitated by the RBF  
x The CI2 - the Cluster Initiative 2, a cluster initiative facilitated by the BFO  
x The CI3 - the Cluster Initiative 3, a cluster initiative facilitated by the PDFO  
 
2.4.1 Planning the Cluster Initiative 1: August 2007-April 2008 
The first phase of the CI1 comprises of the planning of the Initiative. In this phase, the 
idea for the Initiative was refined, a pilot project plan was developed and various actors, 
organizations and companies were contacted for potential involvement. 
 
2.4.1.1 Initial Planning: August 2007-February 2008 
In August 2007, the Manager of the Regional Business Facilitator organization (the 
RBF) and myself4 were invited to a meeting at a large public organization in the Oslo 
region. The person (the Initiator) who invited us had a promising idea for a cluster 
project he wanted to develop, with the help of the RBF. The meeting became the outset 
for a longer planning phase, which resulted in the initiation of the Cluster Initiative 1 
(the CI1) in April 2008.  
 
The idea of establishing a cluster initiative for innovation enhancement within this 
specific business field was born some years previously. It came from the Initiator 

4 See Chapter 3, section 3.4.1 for details on my role.  
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himself, a key representative within the industry, who had extensive experience from a 
large public organization. Through almost a decade he had experienced challenges in 
how to preserve, develop and commercialize innovative ideas coming from the 
employees of his organization. In the process of identifying a solution for seeding ideas, 
he had been introduced to the field of clusters, and consequently encountered the idea of 
establishing a cluster initiative for the business environment in focus.  
 
As the Initiator had no previous experience with cluster initiation, he had been advised 
to contact the RBF, which had a public mandate and experience from developing 
similar initiatives. At this point, the Norwegian Governmental Organization had 
expressed interest in contributing financially to kick off the project. The long-term goal 
would be to develop a cluster initiative, which after a sufficient maturing, could apply 
for a status as an NCE.  
 
Timing was perfect. The business field in question was relevant to the RBF, who was in 
search for ambitious projects and motivated actors. The Initiators’ knowledge and 
contacts in the industry were impressive, as well as his drive for realizing the project 
idea. His project would potentially contribute to strengthen a key field in the project 
portfolio of the RBF.  
  
The cooperation between the Initiator and the RBF was quickly established, with an 
agreement that the Initiator would serve as the head of the CI1, holding the idea of the 
concept, while the RBF would provide an operating team to help with setting up and 
developing the Initiative in the Oslo region. During autumn, the RBF, represented by 
47
 
the Manager and myself, and the Initiator refined the idea and planned steps for 
developing a pilot project, which would lead to the CI1, a cluster initiative.   
 
The initial goal was to establish an initiative including public organizations and private 
companies that could get involved in issues related to business development and 
commercialization within their field. A mandate was produced, presenting several 
ambitious, but relatively rough goals for the CI1:  
The CI1 has a focus on developing solutions and services to meet the needs of its 
member organizations. The goal is to take already existing solutions into 
advantage in new ways. The CI1 will contribute to a structured and focused 
coordination of information and activities, link different environments and 
initiate projects for increased knowledge, development and innovation (Source: 
CI1 pilot report, 2008).  
The Initiative was to serve as a fundament for developing a cluster further in the coming 
years. At present time, the prospects seemed promising.  
 
2.4.1.2 Concrete Planning: February 2008-April 2008 
The planning of the CI1 pilot proceeded slowly during the autumn of 2007, speeding up 
in February 2008. By then the Initiator had started working for a newly founded Private 
Development Company (the PDC), specializing in the business field. The PDC 
encouraged the launch of the CI1, as it would complement the company’s strategic 
plans. At the time, they were planning the development of an incubator for the industry. 
Potentially, the CI1 could get a key role in expanding the functions of the incubator. 
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Also, the PDC had a range of valuable connections, both nationally and internationally, 
which could serve the CI1 well.  
 
A project plan for the pilot project was developed, with a main goal of identifying 
potential opportunities for the CI1. The first task in the pilot project was to formally 
invite a group of key stakeholders and potential CI1-members to a start-up meeting. 
Most of the suggested members were acquainted with the Initiator from previous 
engagements. Some were chosen due to their professional position in their organization, 
while others were invited due to their professional or personal ‘status’ in the business 
field. Either way, all were representatives of larger organizations with some kind of 
power and market relevance.   
 
In order to secure member engagement in the pilot project process, it was agreed that 
the members would commit themselves to contribute in 3-5 meetings, in addition to an 
interview that would form a fundament for the pilot project report. They were also 
obliged to pay a fee for participating in the project. The point of committing the 
members with both time and funding was to secure proper involvement from all parties. 
The ingredients for a successful initiative seemed to be present, involving an ambitious 
project, motivated key stakeholders with drive and commitment in terms of both time 
and funding.  
 
2.4.2 Establishing the Cluster Initiative 1 - April 2008-December 2008  
The second phase of the CI1 comprises of the establishment of the Initiative. In this 
phase, the initial members of the CI1 were gathered and the pilot-project for developing 
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the CI1 was kicked off. CI1 also experienced the first challenges: Event 1, which was 
related to funding and public competition, and Event 2, which was related to potential 
competition between the Initiative and another cluster initiative.  
 
2.4.2.1 The Pilot-project Start-up: April 2008-August 2008 
The CI1 was informally established through the meeting of the key invited group of 
companies and organizations in the end of April. They were to serve as an advisory 
board during the pilot project phase. The group consisted of three large public 
organizations with links to the business field functions, and a group of seven relatively 
large commercial companies (see table 2.2). A few other stakeholders were invited to 
the meeting for observation, such as the NGO and a private R&D organization. Also, a 
project manager, newly hired by the RBF, was introduced at the meeting and accepted 
as the project manager for the CI1 pilot project (the Project Manager).  
 
During the meeting a range of issues were addressed. Some of the actors present were 
enthusiastic to the planned CI1, while others seemed more reluctant. The participants 
had concerns on how to fit the CI1 in with similar initiatives already existing and how 
to differentiate business development from coordination of activities within the field. 
Also politically sensitive issues and available resources were discussed. The discussions 
made clear the importance of communication towards the surrounding world. At the 
time, the issues seemed nominal, and no one in the CI1 Working Group (see table 2.2) 
was worried. 
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What the CI1 would become was not totally clear. The CI1 Working Group was mainly 
concerned with some core functions, such as teaming up the member organizations in 
order to develop relevant innovative projects. The projects should address issues of 
concern to its members, and provide development opportunities and potential business. 
Time and resources were scarce and there were numerous issues to address in the pilot 
phase.   
 
Event 1: Funding & Public Competition  
The first encounter experienced by the CI1 occurred in events developing from autumn 
2007 until autumn 2008. In order to finance the project, a representative from the NGO 
had been advised on the application criteria. Initially, the NGO had assured willingness 
to support the pilot financially, but demanded a solid project plan. An early project draft 
was reviewed by the NGO in October 2007, with feedback about some alterations that 
had to be made.  
 
Due to the delay in the project planning, the communication with the NGO had to be 
reintroduced in spring 2008. A restructuring of responsibilities inside the NGO made it 
necessary to find a new contact person to finalize the application for funding. This was 
easier said than done. No one seemed to be in charge of the business area, and various 
people inside the NGO proposed different and vague answers. After several requests, an 
email from a representative in the NGO explained that the CI1 probably would be in 
competition with another project initiated by NGO. A conversation with another 
representative implied that the willingness to fund the project was there, but that the 
funding had to wait, due to the support of a competing initiative. A third representative 
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claimed that the CI1 project had little to do with the initiative already receiving funding, 
and encouraged the finalization of the application. 
 
The application for funding the pilot project was sent by the RBF to the NGO in May 
2008, and formally registered the following month. A representative from the NGO was 
appointed to handle the application. A meeting between the RBF and the NGO in June 
again revealed worries about potential competition between the CI1 pilot and another 
initiative. The NGO representative in charge was hesitant to grant the application, but 
had not made a decision.  
 
In mid-August a response on the application was still missing. As the schedule for the 
pilot project was tight, the planned feasibility study was kicked off. The project funding 
was partly secured by the member fee and mankind from the RBF, so there was no 
urgency. Simultaneously, the RBF management was beginning to make assumptions on 
reasons beyond slow procedural work that may delay the response from the NGO.  
 
In a new meeting between the NGO and the RBF, the NGO agreed to participate in the 
CI1. At this point, the NGO expressed that they probably would not contribute with 
funding, but they would return to the question late autumn or early the following year. 
During the meeting, the NGO voiced unhappiness with the name of CI1, requesting a 
name change.  
 
In September, the CI1 encountered some key representatives from the NGO who had 
been available the past months. One had been responsible for handling the funding 
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application, but was taken off the case. He said that some funding was kept for the CI1 
by another NGO representative. The representative with the available funding had been 
instructed to hold back until the potential conflict of interest between the CI1 and 
another initiative was resolved, of which finally seemed to be settled. This was new 
information to the CI1. The NGO representatives believed some misunderstanding had 
resulted in the lack of formal feedback.  
 
In October the CI1 had still not received a formal answer to the application. It also 
turned out to be impossible to find out who was now in charge of the application in the 
NGO. The CI1 Working Group was aware of an escalating conflict between the NGO 
and the RBF, which potentially would effect the opportunity for financial assistance. 
Contacting various representatives from the NGO, different explanations were 
proposed, without any constructive answers.  
 
A new meeting between the RBF and the NGO was held in the end of October. The 
head of the RBF characterized the meeting as constructive. It resulted in an agreement 
between the RBF and the NGO on a withdrawal of the CI1 application. In return a new 
application for the next phase of the project would be developed with help from the 
NGO. The formal explanation for withdrawing the application would be that the 
application was outdated.  
 
Opposed to previous arrangements, the NGO subsequently decided that they would not 
actively participate in the CI1, which would make it easier to provide funding. The 
NGO requested involvement of key institutional actors and repeated the name change 
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request. The RBF and the NGO scheduled a new joint meeting, where the formulation 
of a new application for the CI1 was to be developed. The meeting time was set to the 
beginning of November, but the NGO failed to participate and did not respond to any 
follow-ups.    
 
For several reasons, including the events in relation to the CI1, the relationship between 
the RBF and the NGO had deteriorated the previous months. During November and 
December 2008 it was further aggravated. As a public evaluation of the NGO was 
presented, the manager of the RBF revealed several negative encounters between the 
two organizations in a magazine article. The unresolved case of the CI1-application was 
used as an illustration.  
 
The time spent on handling the application process and navigating among involved 
actors in the NGO was extensive. The finances of the pilot had been sorted out by 
splitting the costs between the RBF and the involved members. The CI1 never received 
any funding from the NGO, nor a formal decline of the application. The whole process 
with the application resulted in several speculations: Why had the CI1 got into this 
confused situation? Why had communication been so ambiguous? Any formal 
explanation to the somewhat untidy process was never offered. Several potential 
explanations were proposed, and some seemed closer to conspiracy theories than factual 
explanations.  
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Event 1: Reflections From the Involved Parties 
Discussing what happened between representatives from the NGO, the RBF and the CI1 
in the case of the application revealed quite different understandings. A set of claims 
and interpretations presented during interviews uncovered several potentially 
overlapping factors, divided into three main areas:  
 
1) The Relationship Between the NGO and the RBF 
Four explanations were offered concerning the relationship between the NGO and the 
RBF, which may have influenced the application process of the CI1: 
a) General (competitive) climate between the facilitators in the regional field  
The establishment of the NGO some years previously, had lead to an overlapping of 
tasks and roles and also some (potential) blurring of responsibility between parts of the 
NGO and the RBF. Close cooperation would be ideal for both parties, and a formal 
cooperative intentional agreement had been signed some years previous, but in reality 
this did not lead to any closer connections. The past years, the two organizations had 
been involved in several controversies and discussions. These discussions had been 
about issues such as priorities, directions and approach to the field of clusters within the 
region, as well as concrete projects. As a result of strong disagreements, a less favorable 
mood for cooperation seemed to have developed, as well as indications of competitive 
behavior. Interviewing the manager of the RBF he offered the following explanation:  
 
The NGO used to be an administrative entity handling applications and 
providing funding for developmental projects. After the merger, the NGO 
suddenly became engaged as both funder and developer, creating more unclear 
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situations. (…) In reality, the NGO and the RBF have become direct 
competitors, as the RBF has been established as a pure developmental actor.  
 
b) Different professional perspectives related to the development of the cluster field  
The professional perspectives on cluster development of the NGO and the RBF were 
similar, but still not identical. One reason for the difference may have been that the 
strategic outset and priority for the NGO and the RBF was diversified. Further, the 
interpretation of the notion of clusters, as well as the approach to developing such 
initiatives seemed to be slightly different. One informant characterized the difference in 
approach between the NGO and the RBF to be close to the difference between a 
‘bottom-up’ and a ‘top-down’ approach. In general the NGO was more focused on 
targeting cluster efforts for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The RBF on 
the other hand had concluded that larger companies should be involved in cluster 
cooperation to attract the SME companies.  
 
The NGO, by mandate, was more concerned with embedding the cooperative efforts in 
the public organizational landscape, focusing on involving various institutions. The 
RBF on the other hand, had experienced that great institutional involvement had curbed 
the involvement of the companies, and lead to less interest in the cooperative efforts.  
In more than one project, the differences between the RBF’s and the NGO’s 
perspectives and approach seemed to challenge possible cooperation, which definitely 
may have influenced the funding application situation of the CI1. The Manager of the 
NGO emphasized differences in professional and theoretical understanding, rather than 
competition as an element in the relationship between the NGO and the RBF:  
56
 
 
Our professional and theoretical understanding is different. The NGO approach 
is focused on bottom-up mobilization of companies. The RBF approach is more 
focused towards top-down, engaging single actors rather than companies and 
their value chains. The RBF have promoted something with more resemblance to 
imaginary clusters than real ones. The NGO have not wanted to support this.   
 
c) Poor communication between the NGO and the RBF  
Communication between the NGO and the RBF declined during 2008. This resulted in 
less information on the status quo and development of prioritized projects. Finding the 
correct people responsible within the two organizations and accessing necessary 
information had in some cases proved difficult. Formal communication did however 
seem to suffer more than the informal one, as employees of the two organizations 
continued cooperation on specific efforts. During interviews, the RBF Manager 
commented on the development:  
 
In the starting phase the RBF put effort into coordinating activities. We even had 
a seminar with NGO where a cooperative agreement was signed. This 
agreement should have secured mutual information sharing. But unfortunately, 
the competitive situation soon became to dominant. 
 
d) A challenging relationship between the managers of the NGO and the RBF  
The cooperative climate between the NGO and the RBF had escalated over time. 
Several time the managers of the two organizations had conflicting public encounters, 
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and the last one played out using the CI1 application as an example. Their 
disagreements may have been rooted in professional differences in perspectives and 
approach to the cluster field. At the same time, both actors were ambitious with high 
goals for developing their respective organizations. The eagerness to achieve their set 
goals may have influenced the opportunities to achieve cooperation on projects. 
Interviewing the RBF manager he acknowledged that he might have personally 
influenced the relationship to the NGO, “I personally may have been regarded as 
‘sensitive’ in regards to the NGO.” 
 
2) Issues Related to the NGO 
Two explanations were offered concerning issues related to the NGO, which may have 
influenced the application process of the CI1:  
 
a) Challenged proceedings system inside the NGO 
The lack of clarity on who was in charge of the application of the CI1 internally in the 
NGO, might have been a result of internal restructurings. A challenged proceedings 
system inside the NGO could have created confusion on who was in charge, what 
information to give to applicants or what information had been provided by whom. The 
RBF Manager commented on what he regarded a “general weak treatment of cases 
inside the NGO”: “We waited months to get contact with the NGO (…) In previous 
years, the RBF applied for funding and was treated as a client. Then we could expect 
answers within a couple of weeks.” The NGO Manager on the other hand argued that 
the CI1 pilot was already finalized when the application was taken into consideration: 
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“The CI1 applied for funding to a pilot project. But already before the application was 
‘treated’ by the NGO, the pilot project was finalized”.   
 
b) Internal debates in the NGO on what projects to support  
Internal conflicts inside the NGO on what applications and projects to prioritize, might 
have led to hesitation on how to handle the CI1 application. This again may have led to 
confusion and ambiguous information presented to the RBF and the CI1 management.  
 
3) Issues Related to the CI1 Itself   
Three explanations were offered concerning issues related to issues of the CI1 itself, 
which may have influenced the application process of the CI1:  
 
a) Sensitivity of the project and the project idea – competition 
The idea of the CI1 seemed original and new to the key actors involved in the start-up 
phase. However, there were already various types of related initiatives present at the 
national arena. A competitor analysis in 2009 revealed as many as 14 initiatives in 
Norway with a similar focus. The CI1 may therefore have been regarded as a potential 
competitor to other initiatives, something that had been mentioned in several 
conversations with NGO representatives.  
 
b) Issues related to how the CI1 was designed 
During the application process, the NGO requested a name change for the Initiative, as 
well as the involvement of institutional actors from the business field. The request for a 
name change was never actually considered and institutional actors were first invited at 
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a later stage. The seemingly lack of flexibility of the CI1, may have hindered the NGOs 
interest. According to the NGO Manager, several issues were relevant:  
The NGO believed that the CI1 should have included more institutional actors, 
and incorporate a bottom-up strategy. (…) The CI1 lacked an overview of the 
institutional actors or embedment towards key knowledge environments, as well 
as public actors. (…) My impression was that the CI1 was a network with a 
desire to change the business from the outside. From a narrow perspective the 
idea was to innovate.  
 
c) Sensitivity related to the Initiators role in the project 
The Initiator had a controversial reputation among public and private actors in the field. 
This sensitivity may have altered the NGOs interest in engaging in the CI1, as key 
institutional actors in the field may have presented objections. The RBF Manager 
confirmed the issue, but he did not believe that sensitivity towards the Initiator was a 
viable explanation: “The Initiator might have been regarded ‘sensitive’. Others in the 
business system may have warned the NGO, but this was probably not relevant for what 
happened in this specific event.”  
 
In sum, all these explanations may have had an impact on the application process and 
may also have influenced actors understanding of the field.   
 
2.4.2.2 The Pilot Project: August 2008-November 2008  
The CI1 pilot project was carried out through the autumn of 2008. The pilot project was 
organized by the CI1 Working Group. The Initiator had previous experience from the 
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actual business field, while the Project Manger and myself mainly had experience from 
facilitating innovation and cluster enhancement projects.  
 
The main expected outcome of the pilot was a feasibility study in the form of a 
published report. It was to be focused on the core group of the CI1 and conducted by the 
Project Manager and myself. The feasibility study was to determine whether there was 
potential to develop a sustainable cluster in the long term. Each participating member 
was interviewed and asked to present the main challenges and/or concrete products or 
solutions they wanted to promote in the context of the CI1. They were further invited to 
come up with concrete ideas for improvement within the business field, with an 
emphasis on issues that could have a quick effect or not be too difficult to achieve.  
 
The interviews with the core members of the CI1 revealed that they had good reasons 
for participating. They were all concerned with the possibility of accessing the other 
members on a new arena. Most of them also had specific issues they wanted to address. 
The public organizations expressed certain challenges related to their workplace, while 
the companies on the other hand demonstrated new projects under development.   
 
At this point the CI1 Working Group’s concern was whether the access to other 
participating members was the sole driving force for engaging in the CI1. This was not 
an unfamiliar challenge in cluster initiation projects, but could potentially lead to a lack 
of interest and commitment when proceeding with developing the proposed innovation 
projects. The CI1 Working Group concluded that it might take some time to create 
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additional value for participating members, but discussions on what the short-term value 
could be for the members continued.   
 
Through the interviews conducted in August and September 2008 the Project Manager 
and myself learned more about basic conflicts and issues debated in the Norwegian 
business field surrounding the CI1. An important piece of information new to us was 
the Initiator’s controversial status in certain parts of the environment. Over the years, he 
had developed a certain pool of enemies in the business field, due to his involvement in 
a disputed project. The PDC also seemed to have played a part in this project. 
 
During the feasibility study, the Project Manager worked on mixing and matching the 
different ideas that came up during interviews. Three main areas of joint interest to the 
participants were identified. This became a fundament for a workshop with a focus on 
developing new ideas that could form several innovation projects. As a continuation of 
the workshop, the members were encouraged to finish brief project descriptions that 
would be incorporated in the feasibility study and developed into realistic projects. Only 
one of the groups actually met in order to develop a project idea further. As the 
resources were scarce, the CI1 Working Group realized that they would become 
increasingly dependent on the members initiating activities on their own.  
 
Event 2: Cluster Competition – Part One  
The second encounter experienced by the CI1 occurred between September and 
December 2008. During the autumn of 2008, the cooperation between the Initiator and 
the Project Manager of the CI1 evolved. The Project Manager was hired by the PDC to 
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develop the planned incubator. This seemed like an excellent opportunity to tie the CI1 
and the incubator closer together, which would be favorable as the CI1 members could 
take advantage of the incubator for the proposed innovation projects.   
 
Through the cooperation with the PDC, the Project Manager also became involved in 
organizing an event for members of the industry, together with other key stakeholders. 
Among them was a private facilitator organization, the BFO, representing a group of 
companies in the industry. On behalf of the PDC, the Initiator and the Project Manager 
invited the CI1 members to join this event. As most of the CI1 members were present, 
the event was regarded as an opportunity to develop the cooperation of the CI1. The 
event was a great hit, and gathered a group of powerful actors within industry and 
government.  
 
In November, the start-up activities and the plan for the CI1 were presented in a 
meeting with a group of business stakeholders. The BFO, who had been involved in the 
event with the PDC, also participated. During the meeting the representative from the 
BFO became quite aggravated. Confronting the CI1 Working Group afterwards, he 
claimed that the Project Manager and Initiator had kept key information from him.  
 
Since the event in early autumn, the three had been involved in cooperative efforts 
together, but the planned CI1 had never been a topic. The BFO representative argued 
that he in the same period had shared the BFOs plan for developing an initiative for 
handling similar issues. He was further upset about the lack of credit for the BFO’s 
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contributions in arranging the event. He indicated that the agenda for the CI1 and the 
incubator project of PDC seemed to have been mixed up.   
 
The BFO representative was obviously upset, building up frustration over some time. 
Dealing with the controversy, the Project Manager and Initiator expressed surprise over 
the reaction from the BFO representative. They acknowledged they had forgotten to 
credit BFO for the involvement in the event, but claimed openness on the plans for the 
CI1. The RBF had for some time been promoting the CI1, which the BFO had missed.  
 
After the encounter, the CI1 Working Group tried to accommodate the project 
management of the BFO. An excuse was offered in writing and a meeting to plan joint 
cooperation between the two initiatives was scheduled. The agenda included 
suggestions to get involved in joint activities, as well as plans for securing improved 
communication. As the two initiatives would be developing simultaneously, there were 
reasons to make distinctions between activities and be specific on who would and could 
be involved on what arenas.  
 
The two initiatives had some important differences. The CI2 was more focused on 
politics and on opportunities for lobbying. Only the member organizations of the BFO 
could participate, and excluded some, but not all members, from the CI1. The CI1 was 
more concerned with business opportunities and innovation through cooperative 
projects, and its member-base was defined by member organizations that contributed 
with time and some funding.    
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Even if there seemed to be limited actual competition between the CI2 and the CI1, the 
following meetings did not go down as expected. The relationship between the two 
management teams was damaged and proved difficult to get back on track. When the 
CI1 Project Manager was invited to the establishment of the BFO, it turned out that the 
relevant part of the meeting had been conducted in the hours before his arrival, and that 
he was only invited to a meet and greet event. A few days later a representative from the 
BFO was present at the CI1 meeting where finalizing the pilot project was on the 
agenda. The representative expressed unease with several of the points presented, but 
was not heard. In the following months, there was basically no communication between 
the two initiatives. Any cooperation between the CI1 and the CI2 was never realized. 
 
Event 2: Reflections From the Involved Parties 
Interviews with the involved parties revealed that more than one issue caused tension.  
During interviews, the BFO representative said that developing the CI2 had been a long 
planned project:  
 
The development of the CI2 has been going on for several years. (…) This 
business field is ‘hot’ topic now, compared to what it was five years ago. As 
more money is put in to the field, it is also becoming more attractive for the 
companies to be involved. (…) We realized that the field was excellent for 
recruiting new members and presenting a political agenda.   
 
The BFO had identified a focus area of key importance both to their members and for 
developing their organization. Specifically, the BFO had targeted one large Norwegian 
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company they wanted to engage in the CI2, the Target Company. In order to secure 
legitimacy and opportunities for agenda setting, the BFO had successfully focused on 
getting this company involved in the CI2 from the start.  
 
Along with the cooperation on the event, the BFO representative had openly discussed 
the plan for establishing the CI2 with the Initiator and the Project Manager, but had not 
heard mentioning of the initiated CI1-pilot, “I was involved with the recruitment to the 
event. And at the same time I tried to get the CI2 established. I was completely open in 
regards to this. I regretted being so open later, but I really think it was for the best in 
the long run.”  
 
The BFO representative was introduced to the CI1 pilot project during the joint meeting 
in November. During the same meeting, the BFO’s involvement in the event was left 
un-approved. The BFO representative was provoked. His impression was that he had 
been fooled by the Project Manager and the Initiator and assumed they had hidden their 
agendas. In the best case, the process could be characterized as untidy:  
 
The event was presented as the birth of the CI1, even if the CI1 hadn’t even been 
mentioned. My impression was that they were fooling me and that they have 
hidden their own agendas. At best, I have experienced this to be an untidy 
process. Nothing was clarified properly (…) and then we suddenly became 
competitors. I have no problems with competing, but then you cannot pretend to 
be friends.  
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After this episode, the representative of the BFO started searching for more information. 
The Initiator was representing the PDC, which also owned a competing company of the 
of BFO’s Target Company. Further, the Project Manager of the CI1 was engaged by the 
PDC. In reality, both the Initiator and the Project Manager indirectly represented a 
competitor of BFO’s Target Company. The BFO representative therefore assumed that 
this would influence the choices and actions related to the CI1.  
 
The BFO representative found himself in a difficult spot. Some of the members of the 
CI2 were also members of the CI1. The CI1 was regarded as attractive due to its access 
to (potential) customers. The BFO representative decided to avoid further involvement 
with the CI1, but left it open for the members to participate, underlining that a 
contribution from the BFO had to be made in the arenas of the CI2:  
 
I was invited to the meetings of the CI1, but did not prioritize it, as I did not wish 
to get involved. (…) We discussed a contribution. But for me it became difficult, 
as I felt that I was working against my own organization, and I could not do 
that. That was also the message I gave my members who were involved. If they 
wanted contributions from the BFO, they would have to be on our arena.  
 
Interviewing the Project Manager of the CI1, his interpretation of what happened was 
relatively clear. His perception was that the CI2 and the CI1 had stumbled into pure 
competition, as they were going after the same member-base for activities and projects: 
“This was pure competition. The CI2 wanted the same members as we had for their own 
activities.”  
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The Initiator seemed to have a similar interpretation of the situation, explaining how the 
BFO had increased their focus on the target industry, and how the CI1 had become a 
competitor rather than a potential cooperation partner. He also acknowledged that the 
CI1 might have failed in communicating its intentions:  
 
The BFO uses a lot of their time on this specific business area. The BFO have 
become very active, and this business field has become an important target area 
for them. Maybe they experienced CI1 as a threat. In my understanding, the 
BFO representative did not support the CI1, and in some situations he has even 
worked against us. (…) Perhaps we were not successful in communicating the 
message. (…) In my perspective, the BFO is more focused on competition than 
on cooperation, but that accounts for more fields than where the CI1 is involved. 
 
A member involved with both the CI1 and BFO was more concerned with how different 
preconceptions had played out between the involved actors:  
 
The way I interpret it, the BFO-representative was afraid the Initiator and the 
Project Manager had different agendas, and that they lacked honesty. And if you 
don’t trust people, it gets hard. But the way I know the Initiator and the Project 
Manager, I don’t think it ever crossed their mind, and they did not see their 
connections and links as a problem, so they did not have a need to go into the 
details. But I guess it could have helped to go into a dialogue. 
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It was easy for this joint member to see the difference between the two initiatives—
what was regarded as a more politically oriented CI2 and the more project- and 
innovation-oriented CI1. The member had observed issues of distrust, which would 
explain why the suggested cooperation between the two initiatives never became a 
reality. Communication was lacking, even if neither parties were really negative 
towards cooperation. 
 
2.4.2.3 Concluding the Pilot-project: November 2008-December 2008 
The feasibility study was finished in the beginning of December. The CI1 Working 
Group was happy with its results. Based on the interviews and the workshop, the report 
concluded positively that there was a fundament for developing the CI1 into something 
more concrete. The suggested approach was to establish a formal organization, which 
had been tried out with success previously. The argument in favor of a formal 
organization was that efficiency could be raised when establishing an individual, formal 
unit. It would be easier to create financial and legal boundaries towards financial 
supporters and the surroundings, dedicate a manager full-time and communicate with 
the surroundings. Further, it was a strong belief that it would be easier to involve a 
larger group of actors in a formal membership organization. In addition to public 
support, the plan was to receive membership funding.  
 
The CI1 organization would consist of the members from the pilot project, in addition 
to a wider group of national and international interests, including SME’s, interest 
organizations, Norwegian government administration, etc. The organization would be 
open for all interests within the business field, but be registered in Oslo and mainly 
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engaged in activities in the region. The goal for the formal establishment would happen 
by the end of May 2009. 
 
The CI1 Working Group spent time on developing the ideas with the members before 
presenting the feasibility study at the third joint CI1 meeting. It seemed like most 
members were positive to a formal CI1 organization. One major issue was the need to 
actively involve the public organizations more closely.  
 
The CI1 pilot project took a greater amount of resources during the autumn than 
anticipated. The time was spent on wrapping up the pilot project, getting an overview of 
the environment and handling the issues related to Event 1 and Event 2. There seemed 
to be goodwill and interest in developing the CI1, but it was still uncertain what actual 
content would be possible to put into the CI1 organization. Ideally the focus on the 
innovation projects would increase in the coming year, but issues such as developing 
the organization, handling enquiries, and expanding the member base definitely would 
require resources. A three-month plan was made dedicated to the administrative tasks, 
in order to make all the formal arrangements for registering the CI1 as an organization.  
 
2.4.3 Formalizing the Cluster Initiative 1: January 2009-December 2009 
In the third phase of the CI1, the Initiative was established as a formal organization. 
Following this establishment, several new challenges occurred. Event 3, which was 
related to public regulations, and Event 4, which was related to the establishment of 
another competing cluster initiative, interfered with the proposed plans of the CI1 and 
subsequently led to the closing down of the organization of the CI1.  
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2.4.3.1 Establishing the CI1 Organization: January 2009-March 2009 
In the end of February 2009 the CI1 was established as a formal organization in the 
Brønnøysund Register Centre. Simultaneously an CI1 Interims Board consisting of key 
member representatives and the Initiator was established (see table 2.2) The Project 
Manager would continue as a Manager of the formal CI1 organization, while I would 
serve as a secretary to the Interims Board. The Interims board was to be active until the 
first General Meeting where all members were to participate. The goal was to recruit 
thirty members and hold a General Meeting before the end of May 2009.  
 
During spring 2009 CI1 Working Group made emphasis to kick off the proposed 
innovation projects. A joint workshop was planned in the end of April, but cancelled, as 
none of the public organizations were able to participate. The official reason for the lack 
of presence was time constraints, as the organizations were about to go through a heavy 
reorganization. There were, however, rumors that the public organizations had other 
reasons for their absence.  
 
Event 3: Public Regulation Interference  
The third encounter experienced by the CI1 occurred between March 2009 and 
September 2009 and involved the GDO. The GDO informally learned about the 
establishment of the CI1 in the autumn of 2008, but had not been involved in the initial 
phases. In January 2009 the GDO asked for the CI1 pilot feasibility study for internal 
distribution in the organization. This was interpreted as a sign of interest in the activities 
of the CI1, which could provide legitimacy in the longer run.  
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In April 2009, the perception of acceptance from the GDO quickly changed. During a 
meeting between the PDC and the GDO, the GDO representatives expressed great 
dissatisfaction concerning content in the feasibility study produced by the CI1. The 
meeting resulted in a large and heated discussion on CI1s impartiality. A principled 
version of this debate later emerged in national media, probably triggered by the CI1 
case. 
 
In the aftermath of the meeting, a strategy for responding to the GDO was discussed by 
the CI1 Working Group and the RBF. As the issues of impartiality could be a challenge 
also in the case of other cluster initiatives, it was suggested that the topic should be 
faced as a principled matter. Following the meeting, the CI1 authored a letter to the 
RBF, asking them to help define and potentially solve the challenge of impartiality as 
presented by GDO. The GDO was informed about the letter, for the sake of keeping 
communication open.   
 
Simultaneously, and as a consequence of the initial meeting between GDO and the 
Initiator in April, the GDO demanded that the CI1 board member, whose organization 
was closely tied to the GDO, should step down from the CI1 initiative. The board 
member was unsure of whether GDO had jurisdiction to micro-manage his efforts, and 
wanted to test the case.  
 
In order to find out more about the details of the GDO-reactions towards the CI1, the 
RBF benefited from a contact with good connections inside the GDO. He discovered 
that the negative reactions toward the CI1 were only partly related to the impartiality 
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issue. An equally important issue of concern for the GDO was the Initiator’s 
controversial reputation among certain public actors in the business field. GDOs 
informal advice was that the CI1-initiative would more easily survive if the Initiators 
presence was ‘toned down.’  
 
By the end of May, it seemed like the relationship between the CI1 and the GDO had 
somewhat improved. Some communication between the CI1-members and the GDO 
had been reintroduced and GDO participated at a seminar organized by the CI1. During 
the seminar the GDO expressed an interest in involving themselves in the CI1, but 
emphasized that the CI1 needed to work within the traditions of the GDO.  
None of the members from the public organizations were present at the seminar. In 
advance, it had been impossible to get responses from any of them, either by email or 
phone. The rumor was that the GDO demanded that they stay away from the CI1. 
Access to the public organizations was a key imperative for the companies to remain 
involved in the CI1, and also in recruiting new (and financially necessary) members. 
Consequently, the whole situation was becoming a great challenge to the CI1.  
 
To deal with the seriousness of the situation, an informal meeting was held between 
representatives for the RBF and the PDC. During this meeting, it was discussed whether 
the Initiator should tone down his engagement in the CI1. The meeting did not result in 
any conclusion and the organization of the CI1 remained the same.  
 
As a result of a job change, the CI1 Interims Board member from the public 
organization had to leave his commitment, but was replaced by a new representative 
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from the same organization. The new representative was prepared to test the issues of 
impartiality legally in order to define the lines of external activity for his organization. 
Only a few weeks later, the representative was asked to leave the CI1 by his employer. 
He was no longer allowed to participate in initiatives where groups of representatives 
from private supplier organizations were present, in particular those involved in local 
and regional procurements. This decision would formally account for all the involved 
public organizations related to the business field and was a major setback for the 
fundament and attractiveness of the CI1. Eventually, this setback contributed to the 
disbanding of the CI1. 
 
Event 3: Reflections From the Involved Parties 
Interviewing the GDO representative who had been most in contact with the CI1, a few 
new aspects of the events occurring were revealed. The GDO had learned about the CI1 
during the autumn of 2008, regarding the CI1 as, “an interesting constellation of actors, 
but with a blurring of roles.” The GDO had for some time been concerned with issues 
related to impartiality of organizational actors who were present at “both sides of the 
table.” The CI1 involved both public organizations and private companies that 
potentially had shared interests. The public organizations presence was regarded 
problematic by the GDO.  
 
The GDO’s understanding was that the CI1 mainly wanted to influence public policies 
for innovation and purchase, the procurement policies. The regulations implied that 
companies should not contribute to developing the philosophy of the procurement, and 
then be a part of the procurement process later. The GDO was highlighting the 
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importance of cultivating roles. The GDO representative interviewed emphasized that as 
public regulation had tightened over the past years, the GDO had probably become 
overly sensitive to regulations.  
 
After the encounter between the GDO and the CI1 in April 2009, the GDO expected 
that the CI1 would ask the public organizations to step out and continue activities with 
the companies and other relevant environments. According to the GDO, the CI1 should 
have positioned itself differently. The GDO had advised the CI1 Initiator to point 
towards some business areas of importance and invite the GDO and others to join in on 
the development of these areas. In the GDO’s perspective, the CI1 had not identified 
such areas. The GDO representative’s perception was that the CI1 management had not 
grasped the concerns made by the GDO: “I don’t think the CI1 representatives 
completely recognized what this was all about.”  
 
The CI1 Initiator had been advised by the GDO to “tone down” his engagement, 
emphasizing his controversial reputation in the business field. This suggestion was 
communicated to the RBF and the CI1 management as well, through informal sources 
inside the GDO. These sources argued that the Initiator was a hinder for developing the 
CI1, due to former “encounters” with representatives in the industry. The GDO 
representative explained: “At one point I gave the Initiator clear advice. It was no 
advantage for him to front this initiative.” 
  
The RBF Manager could confirm that he had been advised to look into the possibilities 
for replacing the Initiator as a Chairman: “A key source confirmed that the Initiator was 
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‘politically’ sensitive, and that informally, the GDO had recommended to replace him 
as a Chairman of the CI1.” 
  
Interviewing CI1 members about the difficulties with GDO, revealed slightly different 
concerns. The meeting and following involvement with GDO in April 2009 became the 
major turning point in the destiny of the CI1. Initially, the management of the GDO had 
given positive signals about the CI1, but after the meeting in April 2009, attitudes had 
changed. The Initiator explained:  
 
The GDO was clear. If the CI1 should get any support, we needed to be in line 
with how they wanted to develop the field. During the meeting with GDO I was 
told that the CI1 feasibility study should have been proof read by them before it 
was published. (…) But the report was wrongly interpreted, it was supposed to 
indicate some potential, not be ‘the one right answer.’ The report was only a 
fundament for working with this type of activity. (…) Their reactions took me by 
surprise.  
 
For the involved demander organizations, the CI1 engagement became an issue of 
loyalty towards the GDO, which in the end left them with little choice than to back out 
of the CI1. The fact that the GDO’s communication went through the PDC, rather than 
directly to the CI1, also marked a difference. The PDC’s engagement with the CI1 
seemed to color the GDOs attitude towards the CI1, as both the Initiator and the PDC 
had been involved in the aforementioned disputed project. This perception was 
76
 
strengthened by the fact that other cluster initiatives, with similar constellations of 
actors, seemed to be treated differently.   
 
When asking the GDO what difference in impartiality was found between the CI1 and a 
similar and competing initiative, involving the same constellation of actors, the 
representative admitted that some of the same problems were encountered also here:  
 
Some of the problems are the same, but so far they >the competing initiative@ 
have had focus on cooperating on specific projects on innovation, and not 
purchase and procurement policies. They are very clear on this, but obviously 
they would have to be careful to step clear of this problem.  
 
In the perspective of several of the CI1 engaged members, the sensitivity towards the 
CI1 seemed to be related to several things. A CI1 Board member presented it in the 
following way:  
 
The issues of impartiality were already a concern for the GDO. (…) Secondly, 
this business field really is very politically focused. (…) the GDO now had a 
chance to show how they could manage the field, and if they didn’t succeed, 
there would be consequences for the survival of the GDO as an organization. 
(…) Further, being an initiative developed by the Initiator contributed to 
reactions. He is a vibrant soul, but had hurt his name in certain environments.  
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The original plan for the CI1 had been to focus on a set of core innovation projects. As 
these innovation projects had become more and more difficult to develop, due to the 
absence of the public organizations, the CI1 had suggested an additional side project in 
order to engage the members. The GDO’s arguments against the CI1 were related to this 
suggested project, and not towards what had been the intended core areas of focus.  
 
During the interview, the Initiator provided a summary of the changes in the business 
field, influencing the opportunities of the CI1:  
When the CI1 was established we were focusing on the local problems in the 
business, but the (public) steering in the field has changed since the 
establishment, and acceptance from higher authorities was becoming more 
necessary than before. (…) The establishment came in a period where a lot of 
structures within the business were in transformation. The CI1 ended up in a 
conflict between those changes. Among the demander organizations, at the 
ground level, the CI1 had support. But the public and regional support was 
absent.  
 
2.4.3.2 Institutionalizing the CI1 Organization: March 2009-June 2009 
Several new challenging issues materialized for the CI1 during spring 2009. Following 
the controversies of Event 1, related to the application for funding, the CI1 and the 
BFO, potential conflicting agendas had become a greater concern. When the CI1 
organization was asked to promote a study trip arranged by some of industrial actors, 
one of the competing industrial actors reacted. As they were all part of the CI1 it created 
some extra stir. This resulted in several meetings, revealing that the provocation had 
78
 
more to do with dissatisfaction and personal controversy that had developed between 
the industrial member, the Initiator and the Project Manager. To clear out the 
misunderstandings, the member was invited to join the Interims Board of the CI1.   
 
In the spring the NGO invited the CI1 to a meeting with a group of cluster initiatives 
within similar business agendas. The goal was for the various initiatives to start a 
collaborative effort in order to gather into one national business cluster effort. If the 
actors could make this cooperation possible, the NGO would provide funding. The CI1 
had already experienced some controversies with one of the participating initiatives, but 
decided to get involved in the cooperation project. The effort went on until autumn 
2009, but after several rounds of trying to establish a common base for a joint project, 
the participants gave in.  
 
It was assumed that all organizations from the CI1 pilot project would prolong their 
initiative into 2009. Not all did. The membership in the CI1 organization was dependent 
on a membership fee. For some the fee was too high. The financial crisis had emerged 
some months previously and tightened many organizational budgets, in particular 
regarding activities such as cluster participation where outcomes were ambiguous. Since 
the pilot project phase, several similar, and partly competing initiatives had become 
more visible, none of which required membership fees. The consequence for the CI1 
was that the recruitment was proceeding in a slower pace than expected. In several 
cases, organizations had dropped out when learning about the involvement of 
stakeholders with whom they had unresolved conflicts. This indicated old controversies 
around the involved actors were still in effect.  
79
 
The recruitment was a prerequisite for arranging the General Meeting, but was moving 
too slowly, so it was decided instead to hold an information meeting for all interested 
parties. The meeting presented ongoing and planned activities, and participating 
stakeholders were invited to join the CI1 activities. After months of unexpected 
challenges, a CI1 activity was finally experienced as successful. Key people in the 
industry participated and showed interest, and even the GDO turned up and made a 
speech on the importance of inter-organizational initiatives. The event created a new 
drive after a demanding spring semester.   
 
A new board meeting was held before summer. Before the meeting, the relationship 
between the experienced challenges of the CI1 and the Initiator’s role was debated. As 
the Initiator had been involved in the aforementioned disputed project, more than one 
source had claimed that key stakeholders’ were actively “obstructing” the plans of the 
CI1. A potential solution for speeding up the work was to tone down his involvement 
and find another person to take his role as Chairman of the board. The suggestion was 
never carried out.  
 
The spring had been hectic and full of challenges taking most of the available resources 
from the CI1 Working Group. The CI1 had been established as a formal organization, 
dealt with the planning of a large workshop which had to be cancelled twice, started a 
new business project, and handled controversies with GDO and one of the member 
companies, in addition to contributing to the emerging national cluster project, carrying 
out a couple of board meetings with following administrative duties and so on. 
Additionally, work on promoting the CI1 organization and trying to recruit new 
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members had been conducted. Overall, there seemed to be an increasing unwillingness 
to get engaged in the CI1 activities, but no established answers to why this was the case.   
 
Event 4: Cluster Competition – Part Two  
The fourth encounter experienced by the CI1 mainly occurred in events during summer 
and autumn of 2009. During spring 2009, the CI1 was made aware of the re-initiation of 
the CI3, a regional cluster initiative. The CI3 was concerned with related business 
challenges to the CI1. The Initiative had been established some years’ previously, with a 
group of SMEs, but had later moved into a more inactive phase. During spring 2009, the 
CI3 was reinvigorated and new stakeholders were engaged, both in facilitating and 
supporting the Initiative. The facilitation was provided by a private development 
facilitator organization, the PDFO, engaged in various innovation projects within the 
Oslo region.  
 
In the reinvigoration phase of the CI3, the prime focus was slightly altered and new 
members were invited to join. The goal of the CI3 was to “achieve increased innovation 
through cooperation between businesses and organizations.” This goal was presented 
in the prolonging of a scenario similar to the one the CI1s had developed the year 
before, including issues such as improving activities of innovation at the public 
organizations, by cooperation with the businesses and creating new innovation projects, 
either coming from public organizations or from private companies.  
 
As a part of the reinvigoration of the CI3, an application for funding was filed at the 
NGO. The goal was to become a key regional stakeholder within the specific business 
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field in which the CI1 was also operating. The CI3 applied for the same type of funding 
that the CI1 initially had targeted. In the CI1 Interims Board, it was discussed whether 
the CI1 could or should ask for participation and active involvement in the CI3 
application. For several reasons this was rejected. According to reliable sources in the 
business field, the there were few reasons to have faith in the newly revitalized CI3.  
 
A more pressing argument was related to timing. The CI1 management had set 
ambitious goals for recruitment and activities for the coming period and lacked both 
time and resources. After the past years experience, losing time in various kinds of 
wheeling and dealings, a major concern was that contributing to the application would 
create more administration and bureaucracy. Consequently, the actual funding and 
support might be limited compared to the investment. At this point, the CI1 Interims 
Board did not anticipate the challenges that would come in raising new members, which 
would influence the financial situation. After consideration, the CI1 board decided 
against asking for involvement in the CI3 application. 
 
During the summer 2009 the CI3 Facilitator contacted one of the CI1 member 
companies, asking the company to get involved in the CI3. In August 2009, a joint 
meeting between the CI1, the CI3 and the invited company was initiated in order to 
explore the opportunities of cooperation between the CI1 and the CI3. The meeting 
turned out mainly an informative meeting and little concrete action came out of it.  
 
In October, the CI3 received funding from the NGO and was assigned special status as a 
‘promising’ regional cluster in the Oslo region. By November, the CI3 were established 
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as a formal association, going through the same procedures as the CI1 underwent in the 
beginning of the year. During this period, the CI1 Project Manager contacted the CI3 
again, in order to see what kind of cooperation could be possible. Informal sources 
claimed that the CI3 was reluctant towards cooperating with the CI1, and the attempt of 
contact resulted in nothing more than a lot of emails back and forth.  
 
One of the suggestions made by the CI1 was that the CI1 could become an individual 
unit within CI3. As the CI3 wanted to treat all members equally, the CI3 board decided 
to turn down the offer. They were not ready to alter any proposed plans. At the same 
time they emphasized that all involved parties of the CI1 were welcome to become 
members of the CI3.  
 
Event 4: Reflections From the Involved Parties 
Interviewing the involved actors, several reflections seem to be of importance to 
understand the development of events and perceptions during 2009.  
 
The CI3 Facilitator learned about the CI1 the summer of 2009:  
 
I was made aware of the CI1 through one of the board members of the Initiative. 
We contacted the company of the CI1 Board Member to expand our member 
base, primarily because of their competence within important business fields. 
The Board Member organized a meeting and wanted to explore the 
opportunities of cooperation between CI3 and the CI1.  
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The Board Member, who also was an active participant in the CI2, the BFO Initiative, 
explained an increasing concern about the development in the field:  
 
(…) my company needed to clear out how much we were going to engage in 
these initiatives. I had the feeling such cluster initiatives were presenting 
themselves everywhere. They (the CI1 and the CI3) were both good initiatives, 
but there was a need to find out how to merge activities, as the same people 
were engaged all over. 
 
The CI1 Initiator reflected on the development between the meeting in August 2009 and 
the point where the CI3 got their new funding status:  
 
At that point it would definitely have been a win-win situation to merge projects. 
But the CI3 wanted to confirm the application for funding before engaging in 
any cooperation, which was understandable. During autumn 2009, there was a 
dialogue between the CI1 Project Manager and CI3. Afterwards we noticed that 
the suggestion of cooperation wasn’t so interesting. And that is understandable, 
because there was really not that much we could offer CI3 at this stage.  
 
The CI3 Facilitator emphasized how the CI3 had reasoned:  
 
CI3 was assigned funding in October and was established as a formal 
association in November. (…) When the finances for CI3 were settled, the CI1 
suggested becoming an individual unit within CI3. We wanted to treat all 
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members on the same ground, preparing one true model for everyone. So we 
were not ready for the suggested model. But we emphasized that all 
organizations were welcomed to become members CI3.  
 
Interviews revealed that among certain actors there were strong perceptions that the 
CI3s lack of interest in engaging with the CI1 had little to do with their new status, nor 
necessarily with the challenging situation of the CI1. The RBF, who had been heavily 
involved in the CI1 the past two years, was also involved in other cluster initiatives. The 
RBF had been active in turning down the support of an initiative led by the PDFO, the 
facilitator organization of the CI3. This had led to a perception that the CI3’s lack of 
interest in the CI1 was payback for the RBF’s turndown: “I think this was about what 
happened in the PDFO case – like a thank you card. (…) They >the PDFO@ have tried to 
stop a close cooperation independently of the attitudes of the board in CI3. (…) This 
contributed to creating the grave-stone for the CI1.”  
 
During interviews, the CI3 representative was confronted with the perception that the 
somewhat difficult relationship between the RBF and the PDFO had caused negative 
attitudes. This suspicion was strongly denied: “No. The CI1 Project Manager said that 
the CI1 had a good dialogue with the GDO until some point, and then a lot of people 
were asked not to be involved in the CI1 anymore. It was a very locked situation. And 
we did not wish to inherit this situation. We could not risk that.”  The CI3 
representative emphasized that one of the key challenges with the CI1 had been their 
reduction in legitimacy towards the GDO. This was a main reason for turning the final 
CI1 proposal down. 
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The CI3 did not experience conflicts with GDO or any other actors with opportunity to 
provide financial resources, such as the NGO. In the establishing phase they received 
both financial support and legitimacy from key actors in the field. Some actors claimed 
they were less ‘sensitive’ than the CI1, focusing on projects with practical and less 
‘political’ impact.  
 
The relation with the GDO was one of the things that challenged the CI1 activities the 
most. When the public member organizations were (silently) denied participation during 
spring 2009, the fundament for the CI1 was drastically weakened. When looking into 
the CI3 membership base, it turned out that they too were represented by the same 
constellations. These constellations were also involved in cooperative innovation 
projects through the CI3. The CI3 had kept a contact person in the GDO, but was 
relating to the public organizations directly in the case of their innovation projects. They 
had been specific in emphasizing that their activities were related to innovation and not 
political activities. From the CI1s point of view, it seemed like GDO had endorsed the 
same type of organization and activities for CI3 that they had, only months before, 
prevented the CI1 from carrying out.  
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2.4.3.3 Re-thinking the CI1 Organization: July 2009-December 2009  
Just before the first autumn board meeting, the Board Member from the public 
organization had to withdraw due to newly settled GDO regulations. The CI1 Interims 
Board was now worried that all contact with the public organizational actors was 
impossible. This would have an effect on what kind of projects it was possible to 
engage members in. Access to the non-industrial participants had been a key 
competitive advantage for the CI1, attracting more members and funding to the 
Initiative. As some changes to the CI1 were necessary to make, the Interims Board 
requested an analysis of relevant competitors. 
 
The analysis of competitors revealed a fast changing reality. Since the publication of the 
CI1 feasibility study approximately ten months previously a set of important issues 
influencing the opportunity for succeeding with the CI1 had materialized. In general, 
the way the organizational actors in the field was re-organizing had created insecurity 
and political sensitivity. It had also created competition between innovation 
environments, cluster initiatives and individual actors, and access to resources was 
scarce.  
 
In relation to the CI1, the concrete ambitions and expectations of had been huge. 
Comparatively, other successful initiatives had a substantially greater access to both 
people and funding, as well as less expectations to results and more realistic time 
horizons. Cluster initiatives in other businesses had spent approximately two years on 
the establishment and a further two years on organization issues before expecting any 
results. A third key issue was the growing amount of Norwegian cluster initiatives with 
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similar focus and approach. Adding them all up, a total of fourteen similar cluster 
initiatives were competing for the same resources, both in terms of funding, member-
base and time. 
 
At this point, the CI1s contact with the public organizations, which had been a 
competitive advantage, was lost due to tightened public restrictions. The situation might 
improve in the long run, but the public organizations were unlikely to be more involved 
until the second half of 2010 at the earliest. Hence, at the present time the experienced 
value of participating in the CI1 was reduced for all members.  
 
Furthermore, the CI1 seemed to have been ‘politicized’ by the surroundings. The people 
involved were suspected of hidden agendas from several external sources. The chances 
of getting into new challenges with the current environment were high. The CI1 
organization would have limited resources available in the coming periods, as both time 
and funding potential were scarce. Important points revealed by the competition 
analysis was a need for realistic plans and patience regarding development of the CI1 
organization. In retrospect, these points seemed to have been missing along the way. 
The opportunity for the CI1 to survive or keep momentum going was not very 
promising.  
 
The activities of CI1 were becoming more and more difficult to carry out. The CI1 
Interims Board realized that the lack of engagement from members, a lack of financial 
resources available for running the CI1 organization, further combined with an 
intensified competition from alternative cluster initiatives, provided an almost 
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impossible situation for keeping the CI1 organization running much longer. It seemed 
more and more likely that the CI1 would not survive. The CI1 Working Group had been 
extending deadlines again and again to adapt to surrounding challenges. It had been 
impossible to get the intended innovation projects kick-started and the organization had 
been forced to deal with a range of issues less relevant for business development.  
 
By the end of November, the CI1 board decided to shut down the Initiative the best 
possible way. A main emphasis was to find a proper solution for continuing the 
activities that were already started by the CI1. In this process, the Project Manager was 
given authorization to provide CI3 with any material or projects they might be 
interested in. Following this, a formal email was sent to the board members of the CI3 
with a request to help to find a way to proceed. But at this point, there was not much left 
for the CI1 to offer the CI3. The RBF agreed to take on the financial costs of 
substituting the CI1 until the end of 2010, and while waiting for additional funding, 
declared the costs as “lost in effort.”  
 
The two years of the CI1 had been represented by great ups and downs. The road from 
start-up to visible results turned out longer than anticipated and the CI1 did not make it 
to this point. The CI1 gave in after two years, as the list of opponents had increased and 
the navigation in the cluster field in the Oslo region had become more and more 
challenging. 
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2.5 Conclusion  
Norwegian public and strategic focus on innovation and clusters materialized in the first 
decade of 2000. Regional development became a priority field, both in city- and 
periphery regions. This was very much in line with a European popularization of the 
cluster field, driven by organizations such as OECD and EU. Various actions to increase 
the focus on innovation were taken simultaneously. This was done in the form of the 
establishment of a national public organization for innovation enhancement, as well as 
regional units. Additionally, various support programs were launched in order to build 
up under network- and cluster initiatives targeted at enhancing innovation. Finally, 
concrete projects, networks and other arenas were developed in order to focus on 
innovation at a regional level.  
 
The CI1 was established in the prolonging of the Capital City project. During existence, 
the CI1 underwent a set of difficulties related to its development and survival. Four key 
events causing pivotal challenges for the CI1 have been selected as main focus for the 
analysis, each representing a variety of issues relevant to the working hypothesis. The 
events will be further dealt with in Chapter 6-8. The following chapter is concerned 
with the methodological aspects of this study, outlining philosophical considerations 
made in relation to the research, as well as more practical considerations related to how 
the research was carried out. 
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Chapter 3 - Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter introduces the reader to the methods and methodological considerations 
made in the process of this study. I regard research a pragmatic exercise, which rests on 
a set of philosophical perspectives. A researchers position is subject to change, along 
experiences, reflections and external influence. Inconsistencies in perspectives may 
occur, alongside or within a specific research project (Dick, 2005:40-41). Defining the 
researchers’ perspectives is however a necessary task that contributes to important 
reflections on the research.    
 
While many PhD projects are relatively set from the beginning, with a defined problem 
and access to data material and theory fundament, a key part of this dissertation has 
involved identifying the field for research, creating a precise problem description and 
searching for relevant gaps in the literature. The study seeks to answer the following 
research question: Why does cluster cooperation seldom result in innovation? The 
proposed working hypothesis is that clusters have political features built into them, 
leading to political behavior, which complicates the practical field and influences 
opportunities for innovation. The presence of politics has to little extent been 
acknowledged in the theoretical field of clusters.   
 
The following chapter is divided into five parts. The first part is concerned with 
perspectives on theory of science connected to constructivistic and pragmatic 
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worldviews. The second part presents the research design, which is focused on a 
qualitative case study approach, using abductive reasoning and grounded theory for 
analysis. The third part goes into details on the actual research process, my role and 
methods applied. The final part presents challenges and limitations of the research to be 
taken into account when reading the study.  
 
3.2 Theory of Science and Methodological Perspectives  
Over the past decades social science research has been influenced by a variety of 
methodologies for conducting research. Different disciplines have concerned 
themselves with and favored different approaches, based on divergent philosophical 
fundaments or views of the world (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). There are no completely 
unified overviews of worldviews, and various schools overlap and differ, depending on 
discipline and issues emphasized. As research phenomena are rarely directly verifiable 
in social science, there will always be some distance between what is observed and the 
theory concepts to be tested.   
 
It is important to be aware, implicitly or explicitly, of the worldviews the researcher 
brings into a study. A researcher makes assumptions, influencing his or her perspectives 
on reality, how knowledge is obtained, as well as values and methods for gaining 
knowledge. My understanding of the field is made up by the sum of personal 
experiences, pre-conceptions and understandings, and may be influenced and changed 
over time. My research perspectives lie somewhere between a constructivist and 
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pragmatist worldview (Creswell & Clarke, 2007). In the next sections, I present 
considerations that have influenced the research.  
 
The Nature of Reality 
Ontology is concerned with the nature of reality or what can be known of reality (Guba, 
1990:17-27). Constructivists argue in favor of multiple realities, arguing that reality is 
socially constructed and that the sociology of knowledge must analyze the processes in 
which this occurs. Everyday knowledge is constructed at different levels of society, and 
people’s awareness and understanding is determined by where they stand. What is taken 
for knowledge varies depending on culture and position within and between societies. 
Therefore the sociology of knowledge must concern itself with everything that passes 
for knowledge in the society (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). 
 
While traditional research perspectives are concerned with rejecting or failing to reject 
hypothesis, the constructivist approach stresses the providing of multiple perspectives in 
research (Creswell & Clark, 2007). My perspective on ontology identifies with the 
understanding of the multiple realities of constructivists. Anticipations and perceptions 
are key parts of human assumptions. Joint understanding of reality is not always shared 
by people with the same experience. This is an important recognition in this 
dissertation.  
 
The cluster arenas, both formal and informal, are characterized by varieties of 
assumptions and perceptions, which forms different views on the surrounding reality. 
This has influenced how challenging situations related to the CI1 have been handled by 
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involved stakeholders. Some assumptions and perceptions seem obvious, while others 
are never revealed to the outside world. This has left little room for negotiation on 
common understandings between actors.  
 
This view on ontology, favoring an understanding of multiple realities leaves me with 
an approach where an overall working hypothesis on the presence of (organizational) 
politics in cluster cooperation is suggested. Several interpretations of what has been 
going on in the field are provided, using data from four pivotal events in the life of the 
CI1. I reject the opportunity of presenting an ‘accurate’ picture of events, but am 
concerned with understanding how the people involved have perceived specific 
situations and how this has influenced the CI1.  
 
Gaining Knowledge of What We Know 
Epistemology deals with the nature of the relationship between the knower (the 
inquirer) and the known (the knowable). A common distinction goes between an 
objectivist and a subjectivist approach. While objectivist’s ‘truth’ needs to be in 
accordance to reality, subjectivists argue that ‘truth’ varies from person to person. 
Alvesson & Sköldberg (2008:47) claim that correspondence between statement and 
truth remains relatively unproblematic when it comes to simple claims such as, “this 
ball is red.” With complex theories, degrees of truth create problems for true and false. 
For instance, a ball might be partly red. This means that something may be true in some 
respects, but not in all, leading to challenges in measuring truth. A theory will 
consequently need revision rather than falsification, and traditional approaches seems 
less useful (Causey, 1974).  
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Philosopher Hans Skjervheim (1957) differs between a participant and a spectator 
perspective. A triangular relationship comes out of engaging in the claims or content of 
someone, potentially also making a judgment of the content of conversation. This is the 
role of a participant, engaging in a relationship between the other, himself and the 
subject matter, sharing the subject matter between participant and the other. A dual 
relationship is present when a person registers what another person is saying, but avoids 
getting involved in the content. This is the objectifying role of a spectator.  
 
Objectification prevents the objectified from participating in the relation. This creates 
an asymmetric power relation. The spectator’s lack of participation leads to an 
alienation from society and society appears unchangeable. The spectator advocates for 
distance and impartiality believing that researchers should use approaches that are easily 
quantifiable and agreed upon in advance. In comparison, the participator believes in 
closeness to research, where researchers visit participants to collect data in their fields. 
Participators contribute to change and acknowledge their subjectivist perspectives 
(Creswell & Clark, 2007:24). 
 
I believe true objectivity is an impossible ideal in research. The truth as experienced by 
one party is not necessarily the truth for another. The researcher must acknowledge a 
subjective position and make it accessible in the presentation of research. Alvesson & 
Sköldberg (2008:47) point to how extreme perspectives risk losing important 
perspectives in the research process. Social science research rarely has easily 
quantifiable measures or approaches. A pragmatist standpoint stresses the present 
opportunities for research, arguing that researchers should collect data in what way 
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possible, focusing on what is best to close in on the research question These 
perspectives align with the carried out research project. 
 
During research, I was influenced by the nature of various types of organization, where 
understandings are not necessarily complementary. My philosophical underpinnings are 
inspired by constructivist perspectives, with a goal of adding insight to the theories I 
have applied in my research, rather than falsifying them. The study is further influenced 
by a pragmatist approach, concerned with the real world and how different people 
perceive it. In terms of methods, the pragmatic influence means that research has been 
carried out with a focus on what has been possible and what would provide the best 
solutions, given the resources available. In the following part, the research design of this 
study is presented. It will add further insight into considerations influencing the choices 
made with attention to the application of qualitative case inquiry, abductive reasoning 
and grounded theory in the design.  
 
3.3 The Research Design  
The research design has been influenced by a flexible approach, where developments in 
the field could be taken into account during proceedings providing opportunities to alter 
between theory and observation. A concrete case, the CI1 was selected for research, 
using abductive reasoning and grounded theory for designing the research.  
 
3.3.1 Qualitative Inquiry – A Flexible Case Study Approach 
The research is of a qualitative nature, with a goal of gathering an in-depth 
understanding of a cluster initiative and its challenges. As the research is focused on 
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both presenting the specificities and development of the CI1, a case study approach was 
a suitable choice for this dissertation. Hakim (2000:66-68) notes that case studies have 
advantages for research on social groups, organizations and institutions. The study 
focuses on the development process of the CI1 and its interaction with its surroundings.  
 
The case study of the CI1 involves more than one unit of analysis, which means that 
attention has been given to a set of subunits or events. The research is in that sense 
embedded rather than holistic. Even if multiple case studies may be preferred over 
single-case designs for generalizability purposes5, this was not a realistic opportunity 
when selecting research unit. The need to focus the attention was required, limited by 
the time and resources available (Yin, 2003:42-45, 53). 
 
The case study is probably the most flexible of all research designs, making room for 
adjustments during the research (Hakim, 2000:59). A pretty clear purpose of the study 
of the CI1 was set from the beginning, but had to be changed midway. The case was 
developing differently than anticipated and consequently the data-material collected 
could not answer the research questions proposed. The decision of methods and data-
collection was decided upon at an early stage, providing room for flexibility and change 
during the research process. A desk-based review of the background literature of 
innovation system theory and clusters was developed, with a goal of searching for more 
insight on the process of cluster development. The data was then advised, before the 
available theories again were reconsidered, followed by several rounds of investigations 
into the data material and relevant theories. Initially the theoretical framework to use for 

5 For considerations on generalizability, see section 3.5.2  
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analysis purposes was unclear. During research, theories on networks, governance, 
organizational development, power and politics were consulted for deeper 
understanding of the cluster development process. These theories have been used as a 
supplement to the literature on innovation systems and clusters.   
 
The research is partly of a descriptive nature and partly of an explorative nature. 
Descriptive case studies may be exploratory if relatively little previous research exists 
on the topic (Hakim, 2000:59). General research on clusters is widely known and 
distributed. Research on political initiatives and politics in organizations is also 
common. However, empirical research with a combined focus on cluster initiatives and 
organizational politics perspective is relatively rare, as to my current knowledge.  
 
3.3.2 Abductive Reasoning  
I find that the logic of this dissertation does not apply either to the traditional 
understanding of deduction or induction. Deduction implies starting out with a theory in 
order to explain a phenomenon of interest, while induction implies observing reality and 
drawing conclusions based on those observations. Alvesson & Sköldberg (2008:60) 
argue that the weakness of deduction comes from the fact that it does not have anything 
to deduct from, apart from guessing. Comparatively, induction cannot generate theory 
apart from empirical summaries.  
 
A third, but not nearly as commonly known approach, has been suggested by Pierce 
(2010), labeled abduction: “Given an observed outcome not completely understood, 
abduction is the process by which a person decides how it might have come about” 
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(Dick, 2005:50). Abduction is a form of logical inference that goes from observation to 
a hypothesis, which accounts for reliable data (observation) and seeks to explain 
relevant evidence (Magnani, 2001). 
 
Abduction is in reality used in a range of investigations (Sköldberg, 1991) involving a 
single case being interpreted from a hypothetic overall pattern, which explains the case 
in question. This interpretation should be further strengthened through new 
observations, while theory should be adjusted and refined. In practice a research process 
look like this: When an observation of a certain phenomenon is made, a search for 
underlying causes must be made. The underlying causes to the phenomenon are then 
used to explain the observed phenomenon. This implies an alternation between 
empirical loaded theory and theory-loaded empirics.  
 
Abduction has similarities with both induction and deduction, but cannot be understood 
as a mix of the two, nor reduced to the two. Abduction introduces some new aspects. 
Lead from empirical facts, just like induction, it does not reject the theoretical pre-
dispositions. Subsequently, it is closer to deduction. Analysis of the empirical facts can 
be combined with or be anticipated by studies of previous literature to search for 
understandable patterns. During the research process there will be an alternation 
between (previous) theory and observations, which is reinterpreted in light of each 
other. Furthermore, there is no implication of a ‘grand theory’ perspective in abduction. 
On the other hand, findings are dependent on what (subjective) perspective is chosen 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008:56-62). 
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In this study, the original phenomenon observed was that initiated cluster efforts rarely 
lead to innovation. Following this, an observation was made, highlighting how political 
features and behavior in cluster cooperative efforts influenced activities. The 
assumption made was that the features and behaviors affected cluster opportunity to 
concentrate on innovation and then again the output of innovation itself. Therefore the 
preliminary conclusion is that politics influence the output of cluster cooperation. 
Several events in the CI1-case show the same pattern. These observations, however, 
have not been tested toward a larger group of cases, which means that this observation 
may be unique for the CI1. I believe otherwise and will argue for this in the analysis and 
conclusion chapters.  
 
3.3.3 Grounded Theory  
Grounded Theory was introduced by sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm Straus in 
1967 and is today one of the most influential modes for carrying out qualitative inquiry. 
The overall goal of the Grounded Theory methodology is to generate theory and either 
formulate or verify hypotheses, of which are not proposed in advance. In the field, the 
goal of Grounded Theory is to reveal participants’ concern and their emphasis to resolve 
them. There is no aim to reveal a unified truth, rather, empirical research is used to 
conceptualize what goes on. The unit of analysis is the event or incident, not the people 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
 
The classic approach of Grounded Theory analysis is that the researcher starts off with a 
theme or general research question for exploration. The first step involves data 
collection, using several methods. After some data is collected, key points are marked 
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as a series of codes, extracted from the data texts. The next step is marking the codes 
into groups of similar concepts. The following step involves transforming the concepts 
into categories. Then the conceptual categories are developed into a theory in order to 
explain key observations.  
 
Simultaneously, more information is gathered. Established categories and new data are 
compared, and categories are developed and changed as new information is revealed. At 
some point the researcher experiences a form of saturation of data, where little new 
information emerges. The information of the categories and the way they are linked 
contribute to provide the fundament of a theory. By using theoretical codes, a 
theoretical model is applied to the data. This model emerges during the research process 
of collecting and comparing data and should not be forced. A key in this process is the 
theoretical memoing, which represents the notes made along the research, including 
information on codes and relationships discovered. Memos must be used as a tool 
during research in order to keep track of ideas and discoveries and they need to be 
sorted in order to formulate the theory. The final stage is to write up the sorted memos, 
where relevant literature is woven in (Glaser 1998).  
 
The four stages of analysis are: 
1) Coding – identify anchors allowing key points of data to be gathered 
2) Concepts – collect codes of similar content that allows data to be grouped 
3) Categories – broad groups of similar concepts, used to generate a theory 
4) Theory – a collection of explanations that explain the subject of the research 
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According to Glaser (1998), Grounded Theory involves a certain ‘freedom,’ which 
distinguishes it from other kinds of social research. No literature review should be 
undertaken previous to research, but should be read in the organizing stage, and treated 
the same way as the coded data to avoid preconceptions. Field notes should be sufficient 
for generating concepts and conducting research. The researcher should avoid 
discussing the theory generation before it is finalized, as this may drain motivation. 
Discussions should be limited to people who are able to help the researcher, but not 
influence his or her judgment. The application of Grounded Theory in the analysis will 
be dealt with in section 3.4.5.   
 
Grounded Theory and abduction are not commonly applied simultaneously in research. 
In this study, both Grounded Theory and abductive reasoning seem to contribute to 
research and develop my theory considerations. Therefore abduction was integrated into 
the Grounded Theory approach. Previous to the actual research project, I had been 
observing the practical field of clusters over several years. As in Grounded Theory, a 
general theme of innovation was chosen and a first round of data was collected and 
organized. Then, a form of working hypothesis was proposed, concerning the politics 
present in and around clusters. The hypothesis helped the search for an overall pattern, 
during another round of data collection in the field. Alongside the development of a 
theory, previous theory was advised and new observations were taken into account. This 
alternation proved useful in terms of proposing a theory to explain the relevant 
observations and the theme proposed for study. The next part will present in more detail 
how the research design has been applied, taking advantage of the case study approach 
and Grounded Theory considerations while analyzing the available data.   
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3.4 The Research Process 
In the following sections, my role in the study, and how data was collected, organized 
and analyzed between the period of 2007 and 2010 will be explained.  
 
3.4.1 My Role in the Study  
The research project was rooted in an Action Research (AR) oriented academic 
program, EDWOR II, inviting to an action-oriented approach to research. During 
research I have dealt with the professional roles as a cluster facilitator and as a 
researcher simultaneously. Although a true AR-approach was never possible I have 
collected inspiration from the field.  
 
According to Greenwood & Levin (1998:4) AR is:  
Social research carried out by a team encompassing a professional action 
researcher and members of an organization or community seeking to improve 
their situation. (…) Together, the professional researcher and the stakeholders 
define the problems to be examined, cogenerate relevant knowledge about them, 
learn and execute social research techniques, take actions, and interpret the 
results of actions based on what they have learned.  
 
The epistemological assumption of AR is that the purpose of academic research and 
discourse is not just to describe, understand and explain but also to change. Research, 
action and participation must all be present in order to be defined as AR. Change must 
increase the ability of the involved actors to develop and improve their own destinies. 
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AR is always context bound and aiming at addressing real-life problems. It also links 
closely to the skills, background and interests of the practitioner.  
 
‘Action learning’ as presented by Coghlan & Brannick (2005) is focused on developing 
the people within organizations through learning experiences. This is done through 
reversing the traditional learning process and starting out with action rather than 
learning. The original action research cycle is comprised of a pre-step and three core 
activities: planning, action and fact-finding. The pre-step involves naming the general 
objective. ‘Planning’ comprises having an overall plan and a decision regarding what 
the first step to take is. ‘Action’ involves taking the first step, and ‘fact finding’ 
involves evaluating this step, seeing what was learned in order to correct the next step. 
This leads to a “spiral of steps, each of which is composed of a circle of planning, action 
and fact-finding about the result of the action” (Coghlan & Brannick, 2005:21). ‘Action 
learning’ is useful in terms of developing an organization and its people, and can be 
identified as an approach practically taken when developing a cluster initiative.  
 
Actual requirements of AR differ between perspectives and a researcher may not 
necessarily have the opportunity to fulfill the expected specifications. As an insider of 
the CI1-project, I influenced activities in terms of how they were carried out. Apart 
from this I had no role in changing the course of actions, either in transferring reflection 
from research into the real world. My role in facilitation of the cluster development 
processes was not considered as AR at any point in the research and does not fulfill the 
requirements of an AR project as outlined by Greenwood and Levin (1998). The AR-
fundament did, however, provide inspiration to the context bound research project 
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addressing real-life problems. This improvement thinking is more of an allover 
perspective for the study, than focused towards the specific development of the CI1.  
 
The Role as a Cluster Facilitator 
My interest in the field of clusters and networks comes out of practically working with 
such issues. I was first introduced to regional development and the theories on clusters 
in 2003, when I started working for a regional business development organization in the 
Oslo region. The wider work environment of cooperators was male-dominated, and to a 
great degree influenced by men in their 50s and 60s, representing the managing level in 
various organizations and companies. As a young professional, the field could 
sometimes be challenging. Many young professionals, and perhaps women in particular, 
experience that their expertise is not always (instantly) recognized in such 
environments. In certain ways, my presence in this arena was definitely ‘visible’ due to 
my age and gender, but in others, I was almost invisible in the field, often present, but 
rarely ‘counting’ in ongoing discussions. This kind of invisibility provided 
opportunities for observations and insights that probably would have been more 
difficult to achieve in other ways. 
 
For several reasons, my role in the CI1 became more participative. I served an 
administrative role, labeled a cluster facilitator. To some extent, I was involved in 
almost all activities. A useful and relevant description of the role and tasks of a cluster 
facilitator is made by Susskind and Cruikshank (1987:154, 157, found in Kickert & 
Koppenjan, 1997:49): 
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‘The facilitator focuses almost entirely on process, makes sure meeting places 
and times are agreed upon, sees that meeting space is arranged appropriately, 
and ensures that notes and minutes of the meetings are kept…facilitators 
monitor the quality of the dialogue, and intervene with questions designed to 
enhance understanding.’ In order to foster conditions for consensus building, 
the facilitator may employ a number of techniques, such as organizing 
workshops, conducting surveys, organizing brainstorming sessions, initiating 
role play and promoting collective image building. These activities contribute 
towards increasing an understanding of the issues at stake, the diversities of 
ideas, the ability to appreciate each other’s viewpoint and the dedication to joint 
problem solving. 
 
My business in the CI1 was to know and collect as much information as possible and 
help the Project Manager and the Interims Board members with organizing and 
analyzing the available information. In addition, I made sure that the CI1 operations 
were reported on and coordinated with other activities of the regional business 
development organization, bridging activities of the two organizations.   
 
The Role as a Researcher  
My role as a researcher was subordinate in the CI1. I was provided with access and an 
opportunity to actively participate, observe and reflect on the process. The collection of 
data was made in relation to, but as an additional task, which went on parallel with the 
CI1 development. My familiarity with the Initiative was however a great asset to the 
research. 
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Participating actors in the CI1 were made aware of my role as a PhD-candidate in the 
field, but beyond that, my actual research focus was only discussed during reflective 
interviews in 2010. In the life of the Initiative, I think participants reflected little upon 
my dual role. This may have changed during interviews. At this point the Initiative had 
terminated and participants had few restraints in terms of commenting on the process 
and events. Most people interviewed seemed curious and eager in reflecting on the 
destiny of the CI1. This made interviews highly interesting and inspiring, and I am 
grateful to my informant for this experience. 
 
The obvious advantage of being a complete insider in a project or organization while 
conducting research is the grand access to the research unit and data material. This 
access may in itself be challenging, as the amount of data material available usually 
turns out enormous. Further, it is easy, as a researcher, to become too close to the units 
of study and to the data material in itself. This may provide difficulties in identifying 
relevant and interesting patterns, and create biases towards certain attentions. It is also 
difficult to juggle the role of researcher and the role of professional. On the other hand, 
I imagine that the closeness to the research project helps secure an engagement 
throughout the research process, compared to what may be the case in more traditional 
research approaches. I have been lucky to keep an interest in the research topic 
throughout the time of the dissertation.  
 
Granting adequate time and resources has been a challenge for the finalization of this 
dissertation project. As Levin (2012) suggests, participation in a research field may lead 
a researcher to become too absorbed into the local culture and politics and losing sight 
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of the research role. In such respect, gaining distance from development processes and 
the field in general may serve a useful purpose to mature reflections. This aligns with 
my personal experience. In 2011 I left the empirical field. This may have distanced me 
from details of the collected data material, but at the same time, overall reflections and 
perspectives seemed to have matured and improved the focus of the dissertation.  
 
3.4.2 Defining the Unit of Research 
In this research the CI1 can, at different stages of its existence, be labeled a cluster, a 
network, a project and an organization. Each has some theoretical implications.   
 
The dissertation is a study of a cluster initiative, which I defined as a delineated 
initiative of inter-organizational actors who has initiated cooperation for developing a 
cluster. In practice, as well as in the research literature, there seems to be unclear 
definitions towards what can be regarded a cluster. Theoretically, Michael Porter favors 
a less clear definition on clusters, as he argues that defining borders continuously 
change (Porter, 2000:18). This lack of boundaries is however problematic in case of 
research methodology, where opportunities for defining a cluster and comparing 
research becomes more problematic. Empirically, the notions of clusters are used on 
regional business fields, as well as on more specific initiatives.  
 
In this study, I have made a distinction between a formal and an informal cluster, 
defining the formal cluster as a concrete initiative of defined actors, while the informal 
cluster is the larger environment of actors in a business field belonging to a region, 
without a specific definition of borders. This distinction is presented as both forms are 
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perceived as and labeled ‘clusters’ in the empirical field, which can be somewhat 
confusing. The CI1 is regarded as a formal cluster initiative, while the total of its 
surrounding business-related environment comprise the informal cluster. This 
corresponds with Porter’s understanding of a cluster as a large and not completely 
definable unit.  
 
The CI1 was regarded a cluster initiative, developed for achieving the goal of a cluster 
strategy. The initiative was also defined as ‘a network’ of inter-organizational actors. 
Network initiation and development is the most commonly used tool in cluster 
enhancement, which is why the terms are often used interchangeably in the field. The 
CI1 was also regarded as a ‘project’ in the start-up phase, and a formally established 
‘organization’ in February 2009.  
 
3.4.3 Collecting Data  
In the conduction of research, data was collected using a mixed methods approach to 
gather a range of qualitative data, aligned with Grounded Theory suggestion. By using 
an inclusive approach, the research has been able to collect information on the same 
phenomenon from different angles, and the methods for collecting data have 
supplemented each other. This has contributed to the prevention of a collection of one-
sided data and reduced the probability of missing important data. No single source has a 
complete advantage over the others, but may be used to complement each other (Yin, 
2003:85; Hakim, 2000:61). A main disadvantage of using a mixed approach is time and 
complexity (Ackroyd & Huges, 1992:171). 
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The research is based on data from the case of the CI1 and its interaction with its 
surroundings. The data collected spans from summer 2007 when the joint planning of 
the project was initiated, until January 2010, when the organization was closed down. In 
addition, certain background information was collected related to specific issues of 
importance and influence to the events occurring between the period of 2007 and 2010. 
Also, the reflective interviews were conducted during 2010, in the aftermath of the CI1 
closing down. 
 
There exists almost no written material about the CI1 apart from what is produced by 
the CI1 itself. As a facilitator, I had full access to all internal information on the CI1. 
This included all kinds of documentation related to specific activities such as minutes 
from planning, network or board meetings, progress reports, newsletters, newsletter 
clippings, etc. This documentation has an overall value and plays an important role in 
the data collection. I also had access to most email correspondence. In addition, I was 
present as a cluster facilitator as well as a participant observer in almost all meetings 
held from the planning phase until the initiative ended.   
 
Data was collected using participant observation, interviews and written material. 
According to the distinctions used by Yin (2003:85, 92-93) the existing material can be 
categorized as both documentations and archival records. This evidence has been useful 
in providing additional information about the topic studied. The analysis is based on 
data material from the following sources:  
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1) Chronological history outline is a description of the life of the CI1, based on 
participant observations and provides a fundament for the thick description presented in 
Chapter 2. These data collected spans from August 2007-January 2010 and includes an 
account of order of events, actual happenings, important conversations and reflections, 
as well notes on written material available. It is difficult to estimate the amount of 
information, but the time I spent on the CI1 during these years adds up to approximately 
fifty percent of a work-year, which gives an indication of presence. This data is based 
on observations (2), as well as diary notes/personal memos and various written material 
(5). 
 
2) Diary notes/personal memos are personal reflections made by me along the course of 
the CI1, as a researcher and observer, which have been organized chronologically and 
coded after data collection. The data spans from 2007 until beginning of 2010.  
 
3) Interviews from 2008 are interviews conducted with all members of the CI1 in 
August and September 2008. The interviews took place as a part of the feasibility study, 
with a goal of collecting information to ensure the opportunities of creating a cluster 
initiative and developing the network into something valuable for all its members. 
Hence, the interviews were not originally intended for this, but have been utilized as 
background information. Ten interviews were conducted, lasting between one and two 
hours. Participants who were interviewed were mainly male and ranged from one to 
four per interview. At the time of the interviews, I had met several of the participants on 
the occasion of the start-up meeting, but I was not acquainted with any of them. 
Interviews were held at their offices. 
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4) Interviews from 2010 are reflective conversations with the key stakeholders involved 
in the CI1 during its existence. Additionally, key stakeholders involved with the CI1 
through the four challenging events have been interviewed. The goal has been to discuss 
and present the challenges with various perspectives and highlight perceptions in the 
field. Nine reflective interviews, of which six were men and three were women, 
spanned from one-three hours and were conducted in a one-on-one setting. With one 
exception, I was well acquainted with all those interviewed. Interviews were held at the 
offices of those interviewed, except for two, which for logistical reasons were held at a 
meeting room at my office.     
 
5) Various written materials are e-mails, minutes from meetings, project plans, reports 
and similar, targeted for the CI1, and available through the administration of the project. 
A few newspaper articles are also a part of this written material. The data spans mainly 
from August 2007-January 2010. Additionally, a few pieces of background information 
from before 2007 and newer additions have been added.   
 
I regard 1) Chronological history outline; 2) Diary notes/personal memos; and 4) 
Interviews from 2010 to be the most important sources for this study. It is important to 
note that every document, article or e-mail was written for some specific purpose or 
some specific audience other than those of the case being studied. By constantly trying 
to identify these objectives, the research has been less likely to be misled by 
documentary evidence. The aim has been to interpret critically the contents of the 
evidence selected (Yin, 2003:85-87). All material and notes are kept for potential 
reviews.  
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Table 3.1 Collected Data 
Sources What Whom When Duration 
Observation 
of process  
Observation and 
participation in 
various formal and 
informal meetings 
and conversations  
All involved 
stakeholders in the 
CI1, as well as actors 
surrounding the 
initiative 
2007-2010 Approximately 
1000 hours of 
active and 
passive 
observation  
Interviews Interviews part 1: 10 
investigating 
conversations, 1-4 
people present 
during each 
interview 
All involved 
stakeholders in the 
CI1, 3 public 
organizations and 7 
private companies  
2008, 
August-
September  
1-2 hours each 
Interviews part 2: 9 
reflective 
conversations, one-
on-one setting 
4 most active CI1 
members, 5 active 
stakeholders 
surrounding the 
initiative   
2010, 
January-
April  
1-3 hours each 
Document 
data 
E-mails, minutes 
from meetings, 
project plans, 
reports, newspaper 
articles, produced by 
various actors 
- 2007-
2011, 
mainly 
- 
 
3.4.4 Organizing the Data Material  
The data material has been organized in accordance to several distinctions. The most 
important ones are presented in Chapter 2 and will only be briefly mentioned here.  
 
The Case Timeline & Phases 
A main issue in the research has been to follow the CI1 over time, in order to gain 
insight into the process of a cluster initiative. When developing cluster initiatives, both 
time and process are highly relevant factors. Outputs of such cooperative initiatives 
usually take time and the process of getting there has a major impact on opportunities 
for success. The case of the CI1 has had a set of distinct phases in the period between 
August 2007 and December 2009, as presented in Chapter 2, table 2.1.  
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Involved Stakeholders  
People, organizations, networks and regions are all part of cluster theory. Cluster theory 
is more concerned with the regional and organizational levels, rather than the people. 
Researching cluster cooperation with a focus also on single actors activities and agendas 
reveal additional insights. People who are involved in cluster efforts usually represent 
the interests of one or more organizations, as well as their own, which underlines the 
complexity of interests and perceptions developing in such fields.   
 
The CI1 had specific members—key people representing a set of organizations. In some 
cases the actual representatives were invited specifically, in others, the organization was 
invited, but chose the representative. Additionally, the CI1 had interaction with public 
and private surrounding actors, organizations and cluster initiatives. The involved 
organizations and actors can broadly be divided into three groups, although somewhat 
overlapping: 
1. The CI1 organization - various organizations and companies and their 
representatives 
2. National (and regional) ‘facilitator’ organizations and their representatives 
3. Various cluster initiatives and their representatives 
For more details, see Chapter 2, table 2.2.  
 
Events of Specific Interest and Priority in the Research  
A set of events causing challenges for the CI1 was selected as a main focus for the 
actual research. The selection of challenges was decided upon after carefully looking 
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into the life of the CI1 and debating what challenges were the most influential for the 
fate of the CI1 with the involved members. The challenges met during the life of the 
CI1 are presented in Chapter 2 and are analyzed in Chapter 6-8. See table 3.2 for the 
labels.  
 
Table 3.2 Key Events 
Key Events in the Analysis of the CI1 
Event 1: Funding & public competition  
Event 2: Cluster competition – part one  
Event 3: Public regulation interference  
Event 4: Cluster competition – part two  
 
Organization of Data Material for Analysis Purpose  
The collected data material was organized to create a chronological history outline of 
the CI1 case, with an emphasis on happenings in the four events analyzed. The purpose 
of this outline was to provide a broad overview of the considerations and events in the 
case of the CI1. Geertz’ (1973) notion of ‘thick description’ was used to present the data 
material and provide a rich detail level. ‘Thick description’ is a description of the 
behavior or concrete issues at stake, as well as of the context of that behavior or 
concrete issue at stake. The purpose of using this form was to make the reader 
understand the researched phenomenon more thoroughly.  
 
According to Creswell & Clark (2007:7) mixing datasets helps the researcher in 
understanding the research focus further. The approach was initially to merge the 
datasets from observations and written materials together, and then at a later stage 
include mainly interviews as supportive background. Where important details were 
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missing in the original material, information from the interviews was built into the base 
material.  
 
3.4.5 Analyzing the Data Material 
In accordance with Grounded Theory, the unit for analysis was the case of the CI1, in 
reality narrowed down to four key events occurring in the life of the CI1 between 2007 
and 2010. All events touched upon relations towards the surrounding environment of 
the CI1. The general theme for the research was formulated early on: innovation and 
cluster initiation. The angle of the study did however change during the cause of 
research, as to what relevant data material presented itself and what kind of research 
was made possible.  
 
The first stage of analysis was identifying the anchors allowing key points of data to be 
gathered: coding. Four key challenges met during the life of the CI1 each became a 
code: ‘Event 1: Funding & public competition’; ‘Event 2: Cluster competition – part 
one’; ‘Event 3: Public regulation interference’, and; ‘Event 4: Cluster competition – part 
two’. Another set of codes to be identified was related to whether the data material was 
about issues inside the CI1, labeled ‘The formal cluster initiative’ or between the CI1 
and its surroundings, as a part of ‘The larger informal cluster arena.’ Further, involved 
organizations, formal cluster initiatives and people were identified and mapped in 
relation to the CI1, the four events and the surroundings. 
 
The second step was to look into each code, compare and see what kind of similar 
content was present. These issues were then developed into concepts. The first apparent 
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concept was ‘Conflict.’ The second one was ‘Interest.’ A third concept was 
‘Perceptions.’ Two more concepts were also identified: ‘Strategies,’ and ‘Power play.’ 
 
A third step was to develop the data into categories or broad groups of similar concepts, 
in order to generate a theory. At this stage, I specialized further into potential theoretical 
contributions and selected a set of already existing relevant theory material to support 
the identified data material. In this phase, the five concepts where developed into two. 
‘Interests’ and ‘Perceptions’ were grouped into the category ‘Features,’ while 
‘Conflicts,’ ‘Strategies’ and ‘Power play’ were grouped into the category ‘Behavior.’ A 
final important and distinctive pair of categories was ‘Action/business’ and 
‘Talk/politics.’    
 
To generate a theory, I organized the categories in an order that made sense for 
explaining the events in the life of the CI1, which led to the challenges in developing 
the Initiative. Through this, I developed an analytical model that provides the logic for 
this dissertation. This analytical model is presented in detail in Chapter 5, section 5.6.  
 
3.4.6 Writing Out the Analysis  
The language of a research project may be formal, informal or both. My perspective in 
this research has been to provide as clear and precise a language as possible. The 
audience for this dissertation is a research audience; I am, however, concerned with the 
opportunities of practitioners to be able to easily navigate in the dissertation and find 
use of whatever material seems relevant to them. I believe that the writing style in this 
study lies somewhere between a formal and informal tone (Creswell & Clark, 2007).  
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The collected data material on the CI1 has almost exclusively been in Norwegian. This 
has made translations into English necessary. In translations there are always 
possibilities for losing out information or misinterpreting meanings. Ideals of accuracy 
and precision have been important during the analysis and the process of writing out the 
dissertation. It is important to keep this in mind when reading the presented material.  
 
3.5 Challenges and Limitations of the Research 
How can trustworthiness be established in qualitative data and analysis? The terms 
‘reliability’ and ‘validity’ are commonly used in natural sciences, but are often avoided 
in flexible, qualitative research design (Robson, 2002:170). The following criteria for 
trustworthiness (Guba, 1981) have been chosen, which are appropriate to the conditions 
of this research: credibility; transferability; dependability and confirmability. In the 
coming sections, I will deal with key topics of importance to the dissertation and the 
research project.   
 
3.5.1 Credibility  
Validity has to do with accuracy, correctness or truth of the concepts being studied. As 
qualitative research rarely has opportunity to provide exact measurements, validity can 
be difficult and even sometimes impossible to obtain. A related tool is credibility, which 
deals with how a study can be trusted (Robson, 2002:170). In the following part, 
credibility tools related to different phases of research is presented, as to the relevance 
for this research project.  
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Ensuring Credibility in the Choice of Research Design 
Shenton (2004) suggests that the adoption of well established research methods in 
qualitative investigation may, to some extent, help ensure credibility. In the case of this 
dissertation, the research design is relatively well known. The approach of using a case 
study is common within social sciences, but comes with certain implications, such as 
issues of generalizability, which is dealt with in detail in section 3.5.2.  
 
Another and well-known tool to ensure credibility is triangulation. Triangulation of 
method has been actively used in the research, using observation, interviews and various 
sources of written material. In this study the observations have, depending on context, 
ranged from moderate participation, balancing the role of being an ‘insider’ with being 
an ‘outsider,’ to complete participation, where complete integration in the population of 
the study was possible. Mainly, the observations have been of a complete kind, as I was 
practically involved in and employed to work on the CI1 from the beginning. As most 
participants in the case have had multiple employments and business goals of their own, 
the duality of my position as an administrator and researcher seems to have been of little 
concern to the participants. 
 
When it comes to triangulation of sources it was relatively clear who it would be 
possible to interview. Two types of actors were selected. The first group to interview 
was the most active participants of the CI1. The second group to interview was the 
external representatives involved in the four defining events. The goal of interviewing 
both internal and external actors was to get diverse perspectives and viewpoints on the 
issues in question, and to be able to test assumptions and perceptions in the field. 
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Cluster research often has challenges with defining borders. As the CI1 initiative was a 
relatively small and formal arrangement, random sampling of individuals did not 
become a topic in this research.  
 
Ensuring Credibility in the Research Field While Collecting Data 
During the research, several measures were taken while collecting data. Active 
involvement in the environment researched is a key part of the research process. Some 
considerations on this are made in section 3.4.1. I was employed by the organization 
initiating the CI1 in which I later researched. In this respect, I was very much involved 
in the culture I was researching. This means that my professional judgment may have 
been influenced in terms of research. One of my concerns in this project was to be able 
to present varieties of perspectives in the process of initiating a cluster effort, which to a 
great degree have been absent in the literature. Obtaining one true perspective in this 
case has not been realistic, nor a goal (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Erlandson et al, 1993; 
Silverman, 2000).  
 
Ensuring honesty and free speech are important in all research. The tools available to 
secure this are not that many, apart from encouraging opinions and creating 
trustworthiness among the researcher and the researched. Only one actor decided not to 
participate in an interview. I did not pursue an explanation and was never offered one 
either. A part from that, I believe that all actors interviewed have been concerned with 
presenting their perspectives and reflections in the case of the CI1.  
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During the research period I was professionally a part of a group of cluster coordinators, 
which made reflections on various projects and approaches to cluster initiation. 
Meetings were not systematized, but offered valuable inputs when occurring. Peer 
scrutiny was to a large extent accessible and regular through my participation in the 
EDWOR II program. As the project underwent changes, important reflections made by 
peers along the way led to refinements.  
 
There as been a great value to look into notes and comments made during the research 
process, both in the form of personal memos and as a part of the interview process. For 
several reasons, a leave of absence from the research after collecting and organizing the 
data material made time for maturing of reflections and greater distance to the data and 
the field. Apart from potential benefits of distancing from the field, a longer absence 
from the research may also have disadvantages, such as losing some valuable inputs 
which were present but not yet recorded at previous moments (Shenton, 2004:66-67). 
 
Ensuring Credibility During Data Analysis 
Member checks involving informants checking the information they provided is the 
most important tool to secure credibility according to Lincoln & Guba (1985). It is, 
however not always easy to estimate whether one’s own perceptions resemble others. 
Informants reading transcripts from conversations in which they have participated in 
may find the wording to be fair and logical, but this does not secure that the researchers 
interpretation will provide the same account. Nevertheless, the opportunity for the 
informants to look into the material in which they participated is important. In this 
research, all interviewed actors had an opportunity to read the transcripts of the 
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interviews in order to correct any mistakes or delete or rephrase their sentences. They 
were given a time frame to review the information, with an opportunity to change 
deadline. Only a few used this opportunity.  
 
The detail level of the CI1 description is relatively rich, which was a key consideration 
in order to provide a thick description. Before the research has been finalized, a few 
external helpers have been asked to read through the data presentation and the analysis 
in order to review whether the information given is presented in a logic manner.  
 
Finally, a reader should be able to assess the researcher. Information on me as a 
researcher is provided in section 3.4.1. There are, however, no foolproof ways of 
guaranteeing credibility. The tools outlined are helpers in order to ensure a level of 
consideration for the research and the researched.  
 
3.5.2 Transferability  
External validity or generalizability refers to the extent to which the findings of one 
study can be applied to other situations beyond the setting studied. In case study 
research there is limited basis for scientific generalization. A case study can still be 
regarded as a contribution to development of theory, which helps in understanding other 
cases or situations (Robson, 2002:176-177). When it comes organizational studies, 
Brunsson & Olsen (1998:22-23) write:  
(…) the possibility of developing universal, law-like theories may be rather 
limited. It is unlikely that students of organizations ever will be able to capture 
the variety and complexity of contemporary organizational society in a single 
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grand theory. (…) The best we can do is, probably, to locate mechanisms or 
causal patterns that are frequent, and to point to some conditions that make 
them more or less likely (Mayntz 1997; Elster 1998).  
This aligns with the considerations made in this research.  
 
In this specific study, opportunities for transferability are an issue. During my years as a 
professional, I have observed a range of cluster initiation processes, and I believe the 
findings I present will be relevant also to other cases of cluster initiations. Some 
dimensions may be highly special and related to circumstances of the CI1. Knowledge 
derived from one context, may be of relevance also in other contexts. In order to take 
advantage of knowledge, one has to take respective contextual issues into account. The 
contextual issues must be considered, both in the situation where the research was 
carried out and where the relevant knowledge is to be applied, to understand whether 
the fundament of the two situations have sufficient similarities to actually take 
advantage of the new knowledge (Greenwood & Levin, 1998:79). In terms of 
transferability, I therefore believe that the reader must make considerations and search 
for perspectives of relevance to their respective field (Guba & Lincoln, 1995). 
 
3.5.3 Dependability  
Researchers using flexible designs need to examine the reliability of their methods and 
research practices. Dependability involves being thorough, careful and honest when 
carrying out the research. It also involves being able to show others that this is the case. 
During this research, plans and notes have been made and kept. The process has been 
documented and reflections have been written down, in relation to observations made in 
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the field and during interviews and meetings. Reflective notes have also been made 
when appropriate. A systematic account along with research is always encouraged by 
academic staff and supervisors. However, good systems are not always achieved until 
experience is made.    
 
3.5.4 Confirmability   
Previously in this chapter, issues of subjectivity and objectivity have been discussed. 
When it comes to objectivity, humans usually interfere, leading to inevitable biases. 
Confirmability is focused on ensuring that findings are the result of the experiences and 
ideas of the informants, rather than the characteristics and preferences of the researcher. 
The best tool to ensure this is triangulation, which is dealt with in section 3.5.1. Miles & 
Huberman (1994) emphasize that the researchers need to admit predispositions and 
beliefs. Reflective commentary and detailed methodological accounts are also a key 
solution to help ensure confirmability (Shenton, 2004:72). To the best possible extent, 
triangulation and details of predispositions and preferences, as well as logic of data, is 
presented in this research. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented the methodological perspectives of this research, linking 
the worldviews of constructivism with a more pragmatic approach. My concern has 
been to understand why the CI1 had not, with all its efforts, produced any outputs of 
relevance to its members. The research design is a qualitative case study, which is 
carried out with an abductive reasoning and with an application of Grounded Theory for 
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collecting, organizing and analyzing data. The research does not fulfill the requirements 
of an AR-scheme, but has been influenced by its thinking. Data has ranged from two 
years of participative observations, in addition to in-depth interviews with key 
stakeholders, in addition to various kinds of available written material. In sum, the data 
material available has been extensive and provided a solid fundament for analyzing and 
answering the research questions. As a single case study, there is no fundament for 
generalization of the research findings, nor is this a goal. I do however believe that 
findings in this case are of relevance in other cases of cluster initiation, although any 
applicability must be found by actors present in the field.      
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Chapter 4 – Cluster Theory 
4.1 Introduction  
Clusters provides both a theoretical and practical a fundament for this dissertation. 
The goal in this chapter is to contribute insights into the issues and debates influencing 
clusters. Cluster theory is concerned with new ways of increasing economic prosperity 
and gaining higher welfare within a region, which mainly goes through enhancing 
innovation.  
 
The theory is about how strong links between actors situated in close geographical 
proximity increase the opportunity for innovation. It describes the phenomenon of why 
similar, specialized businesses localize closely and take advantage of both competition 
and cooperation in developing products and services. An important aspect is to 
strengthen the ties between knowledge actors within research and business communities 
(Porter, 1998). This may be done through developing cluster initiatives, in order to 
increase the possibility for actors to exchange knowledge, information and ideas.  
 
The popularization of cluster theory has contributed to a new field of policy, applied at 
governmental levels in a variety of nations. Cluster strategies have become popularized 
and have developed into multiple directions. There are however many challenging 
aspects of clusters; the theories and strategies are under scrutiny, questioning both 
definitions and the proposed mechanisms of cluster cooperation and innovation 
enhancement.     
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The following chapter is divided into three parts. The first part gives a through 
presentation of innovation systems theory, with a main emphasis on Michael Porter’s 
theory on clusters. The second part concerns the main critiques towards cluster theory, 
highlighting some issues of importance for research. The final part is a presentation on 
how the cluster theory has become a field for strategy development in the public sector, 
turning into something of a fashion.  
 
4.2 Innovation Systems Theories  
The recent popularization of cluster and cluster-related theories has led to the 
development of a multi-disciplinary field. The different disciplines contribute with 
slightly different focus, propose different definitions and highlight different 
contributions. This makes it difficult to get a solid overview of the field. The following 
sections provide an outline of cluster and related innovation systems theories, covering 
National and Regional Innovation Systems (NIS/RIS), Triple Helix and clusters.   
 
4.2.1 The Emergence of Innovation Systems Theories  
In the past twenty to thirty years a new field of theories on economic performance have 
emerged and are increasingly dominating perspectives on innovation and regional 
development (see for instance Veggeland, 1996; Danson et al, 2000). The theories cover 
widely, but are more or less concerned with issues on how to achieve increased value-
creation within a business field, by taking advantage of various kinds of local 
opportunities and resources.  
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The origins of these theories can be traced back to the theory of comparative advantage, 
introduced by Adam Smith in 1770s (Smith, 1776) and elaborated on by David Ricardo 
half a century later6 (Ricardo, 1817). In 1890, Alfred Marshall published the book 
‘Principles of Economics,’ which was probably the first reflections on cluster thinking 
ever put in writing. 
 
In this book, Marshall presents considerations on specialized industrial localization and 
clusters. Marshall’s concern was how economic activity was unevenly distributed. He 
highlighted how related companies have a tendency to settle in geographic proximity to 
each other and form industrial districts. By locating closely, the enterprises could 
mutually benefit from each other, forming industrial production systems of larger 
scales. Such proximity could contribute to innovations of technical and organizational 
character, as both cooperators and competitors could be kept close, producing 
unanticipated spillover effects. In Marshall’s perspective, cooperation would drive 
knowledge creation and innovation, while competition would secure the industrial 
district. These dynamics would be beneficial to the whole system of companies, 
producing competitive advantage towards external competitors (Maskell & Kebir, 2005; 
Porter, 2000).  
 
Innovation systems theories over the past decades have gained ground within economic 
and geographical research communities. Newlands (2003:521) argues that 
contemporary theories on innovation systems and clusters are more concerned with 

6 The theory on comparative advantage refers to the ability of a party to produce a particular good or 
service at a lower marginal and opportunity cost over another. 
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collective action than the ones advocated by Marshall, and to a great degree neglect 
issues of competition. As new theories on innovation systems has been proposed, 
inconclusiveness among researchers on the theories and the relations between them has 
become more apparent. Various contemporary authors promote different contributions 
and actors, providing alternative sets of distinctions.  
  
The theory on National System of Innovation (NIS) was introduced by Christopher 
Freeman and Bengt-Åke Lundvall in the end of the 1980s (Lundvall, 1985; Freeman, 
1987). They highlighted how innovation relies upon the cooperation between a set of 
actors such as companies, knowledge organizations like universities, R&D-institutes, 
technology transfer agencies, business associations, and finance institutions. Freeman 
defined NIS as “a network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose 
activities and interactions initiate, import, and diffuse new technologies” (1987:1).  
 
Edquist (1997:14) later elaborated the definition of NIS to include “all important 
economic, social, political, organizational, institutional and other factors that influence 
the development, diffusion and use of innovations.” Innovation systems were further 
categorized into national innovation systems, local innovation systems, regional 
innovation systems, technological innovation systems and sectoral innovation systems 
by various authors.  
 
According to Cooke (1998:6) “hierarchical ‘top-down’ management of economy and 
society” has been “in retreat, especially with respect to the question of industrial 
coordination.” This has left room for new ways of organizing cooperation and 
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coordination among actors. Innovation system theory defines innovation and technology 
development to be a result of complex sets of relationships and interactions among 
actors in the system, and “the relations between organizations and institutions are 
important for innovation and for the operation of Systems of Innovations” (Edquist, 
2005:197). A system of innovation consists of the elements and the relationships 
between them. An innovation system is a social system, and innovations are the result 
of social interaction between economic actors. Furthermore, an innovation system is an 
open system, in interaction with its environment (Lundvall, 1992). 
 
Two somewhat different approaches to studying Innovation Systems were proposed by 
Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993) in the beginning of the 1990s. Lundvall’s focus was 
on developing a theoretical alternative to neo-classical economics, and the basis for 
relations between actors within the innovation systems. In this respect, a key element is 
learning between dependent actors, emphasizing both the importance of science 
institutions and commercial actors. For instance Argyris & Schon (1978) focus on 
companies’ capability of learning through a “double feedback loop,” which includes the 
ability to consider whether one is focusing on relevant issues, and taking advantage both 
of one’s own and others’ experience in a given situation. Such evolutionary theory also 
takes innovation and change effects into account. Relationships between companies has 
an inclusive and network like character, based on trust, custom and openness to 
learning. A critique of the neoclassical theory is that it fails to explain both why 
stakeholders choose satisficing as an alternative to optimal decisions, or why they get 
involved in networking or partnerships. Furthermore, uncertainty, conflicts and 
unexpected results are also phenomena that are not present in such theory (Cooke 1989; 
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Nelson 1995).  
 
Comparatively, Nelson’s concern was empirical case studies, with a main focus on 
national R&D studies. The structure of institutions such as universities, R&D, public 
organizations and business life is key to a country’s value creation. The present culture, 
ways of organizing, regulations, as well as informal and formal norms all influence a 
company’s ability to innovate and grow. Mariussen & Ørstavik (2005:22-23) notice that 
the institutional perspectives represented by Nelson have been the ones with the most 
influence:  
The idea that the institutional system in a country, the whole governmental 
pyramid, the public funding organizations as well as the research and innovation 
institutions and the cooperation and organizations within this system, is 
dependent for a country’s ability to realize economic growth, is decisive for the 
development in a range of nations.  
 
Both Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993) emphasize that the focus on national 
institutions is not absolute. The innovation system is understood as a set of institutions 
and their relations. Whether the institutions are “organizations” or “rules of the game,” 
such as norms and cultural accepted ways of acting and established practice, is not 
obvious. An important challenge in research on innovation systems is how to define the 
system and its surroundings (Edquist: 2005:183). 
 
Authors like Asheim (2001), Isaksen (2000) and Cooke (2001, 2002) have further added 
to the idea of national innovation systems, presenting the Regional Innovation System 
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(RIS). As the national framework was replaced with a regional one, the focus shifted 
toward the region and the institutions and organizations in such a geographical unit. A 
main theme is their contributions to the development of new technology and an 
organization’s ability to innovate.  
 
Triple Helix theory was introduced by Etzkowitz in 1993, and further developed by   
Etzkowitz & Leyesdorff  (1995, 2000), describing an institutionalization of 
collaboration between academia, industry and public government. They highlighted the 
role of the universities and research institutions in innovation enhancement. The theory 
represents a shift from an attention on industry-government relations and the industrial 
society, towards an attention on university-industry-government relations and the 
knowledge society.  
 
In addition to placing the university in a more prominent role in relation to innovation, 
the Triple Helix theory is concerned with the collaborative relationship between the 
spheres of the university, industry and government. Innovation policy is regarded as an 
outcome of interaction between the three spheres. A third element is the introduction of 
‘new roles’ of the institutions within all three spheres, which creates potential room for 
‘innovation in innovation.’   
 
A key concept in Triple Helix theory is the entrepreneurial university, where 
involvement in socio-economic development is a central mission. This type of 
university is pro-active in developing and applying new knowledge and acts in 
accordance to an interactive model of innovation, rather than a linear one. From mainly 
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being regarded as a source of knowledge and human resources, the universities are also 
being considered as a key source for technology. While the universities develop their 
networks, companies increase their levels of technology and engage in competence 
development and knowledge sharing, which again strengthens technological 
development and interaction among the institutional spheres. Furthermore, the 
government has found a new role as a public entrepreneur and venture capitalist. 
Innovation can no longer be considered an ‘in-house’ task of companies, but now also 
involves networks of companies, in addition to government and universities, institutions 
which traditionally have had no direct role in these processes.  
 
The role of universities in innovation enhancement has led to an emphasis on training 
students in entrepreneurship, and providing them with new ideas and skills. The scope 
of training is expanded and may offer opportunities for education in relation to 
incubation programmes, inter-disciplinary centres, science parks, spin-offs, incubators 
and venture capital companies. These recent developments have led to a re-orientation 
among the universities, which has inspired cooperation on research and forming of new 
companies among the Triple Helix partners. This again has shifted the role of the 
universities to become a source of regional economic development (Etzkowitz & 
Leyesdorff, 2000; The Triple Helix Research Group, 2013). 
 
4.2.2 Cluster Theory Under the Loop 
The perhaps most influential exponent of regional economics is Michael Porter. In 1990 
he published the book “The Competitive Advantage of Nations,” introducing industrial 
localization of business and cluster thinking as key concepts for strengthening a nation’s 
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economy. It was further elaborated in a number of publications (see for instance Porter, 
1995, 1998, 2000). Even if the cluster concept was not entirely new, Porter was the one 
to facilitate the grand export of clusters into the business strategy literature, not only 
promoting clusters as an analytical concept, but also introducing clustering as a key 
political tool (Martin & Sunley, 2003:6-7).  
 
Cluster theory is a theory about how localization and company agglomeration may 
contribute to the competitiveness and success of an entire business field within a region. 
Porter (2000:15) defines clusters as:  
Geographical concentrations of interconnected companies, specialized 
suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries, and associated 
institutions (e.g., universities, standards agencies, trade associations) in a 
particular field that compete but also cooperate.  
Along the lines of other contributions of innovation systems theory, cluster theory 
represents a shift in attention from state regulation towards a greater degree of self-
regulation by key groups in the socio-economy (Cooke, 1998:10-11).  
 
In searching for an understanding of where clusters can be found, Porter (2000:15) 
claims that the phenomena are present in practically all parts of the globe, in a variety of 
versions:  
Clusters, or critical masses of unusual competitive success in particular 
business areas, are a striking feature of virtually every national, regional, state 
and even metropolitan economy, especially in more advanced nations. The 
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geographic scope of clusters ranges from a region, a state, or even a single city 
to span nearby or neighboring countries.  
Many influential authors (see for instance Ohmae, 1995; Krugman, 1991) claim that 
globalization is increasing the importance of localization, rather than reducing it. This 
may be regarded as a paradox, as the introduction of new and improved technology has 
been thought to reduce the role of location. Companies benefiting from falling transport 
costs and trade barriers, may agglomerate with other firms within a geographically 
concentrated area. This in turn may lead to local innovation and productivity growth.  
 
Michael Porter (1998, 2000) elaborates his cluster theory by presenting a model of a 
competitive advantage, focusing on key aspects of influence to a company’s potential 
for competitiveness. The model is labeled the competitive diamond model (Porter, 
1998) and comprises four elements influencing each other:  
x Factor conditions can be divided into ‘basic factors,’ such as natural resources 
and unskilled labor, and ‘advanced factors’ such as highly competent labor. 
‘Advanced factors’ are unique in a cluster and proves difficult to imitate for 
actors outside the cluster. Consequently, a nation should put a focus in 
maintaining such factors;  
x Demand conditions are conditions reflecting the amount and sophistication of 
local demand, which again influence standards and innovation within a specific 
field;  
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x Related and supporting industries may take advantage of similar or identical 
technologies and develop cooperation which are both complementary, 
knowledge enhancing and cost effective;  
x Firm strategy, structure, and rivalry constitute a fundament for stimulating to 
innovation and upgrading.  
 
Model 5.1 Michael Porters Competitive Diamond  
 
 
In addition, the Government and chance play roles in a company’s potential for 
competitiveness. The Government ensures equal conditions and competition within the 
various business areas. It influences the four main elements in the diamond, creating the 
best conditions possible. Chance is always an element present in any business. The best 
way to deal with chance is to develop flexibility in a business field.   
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The diamond-model shows how externalities play a pivotal part in the success of a 
company. Concentrated and advanced interactions between the factors in the diamond, 
also contribute to increased productivity of the involved actors. Companies pursue 
interests in an environment where actions are uncoordinated. Hence, the prosperity of 
clusters must be regarded as a “combination of chance and the law of large numbers” 
Steinle et al (2007:236-237). 
 
Porter (2000) further highlights three factors important to the innovative capacity of a 
company. The first one is joint infrastructure for innovation, including various resources 
of research activity, education, regulation and public funding, available for companies 
to take advantage of. The second one is various conditions specific to the cluster. The 
final one is the quality of the relations between various present institutions and business 
life.  
 
In sum, the potential success of a cluster is conditioned by two types of factors. 
‘Hardware’ factors are related to the economy and market conditions. ‘Software’ factors 
are more time-dependent and relates to socio-cultural and institutional conditions, 
including information sharing, trust and entrepreneurial attitudes (Gertler 2004, in 
Mariussen & Ørstavik, 2005). The ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ factors play an equally 
important role in the cluster dynamic. 
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4.2.2.1 Clusters and Networks  
Although rarely specifically emphasized, the cluster must be regarded as a version of a 
network. The original contributions from Porter (1998b:226) contain two key elements. 
First, the companies belonging to a cluster must have some kind of connections in the 
form of networks and social relationships, producing benefits for the companies 
involved. These connections can be both vertical, focusing on buying and selling, and 
horizontal, focusing for instance on complementary products and services, the use of 
similar specialized inputs, technologies or institutions, and other linkages. Secondly, the 
companies are in relative geographic proximity, increasing frequency of contact, as well 
as impact of interaction.  
 
Consequently, the cluster can be regarded some kind of network of businesses with 
similar and/or competing interests. This view is supported by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1999, 2007:27), which argues that 
although networks are not necessarily limited by geographic proximity, networks and 
networking seems to describe the essence of cluster theory. Hamdouch (2008) suggests 
that a cluster may consist of several layers of networks. It is reasonable to assume that 
some networks in a cluster will be formalized, while others are of a more informal 
character, but may overlap with the formal ones. (See Chapter 3, section 3.4.2 for 
distinctions on clusters in this dissertation).  
 
4.2.2.2 Clustering  
Clustering can be defined as the sum of activities targeting the development of a cluster, 
carried out by people present in the cluster. Clustering is both a tool and a strategy, 
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developed for promoting clusters. Activities are usually performed by public 
government or facilitator organizations, but include both R&D and private companies 
within the relevant industry. The goal is to ‘tie’ business and R&D communities closer 
together, to support them in greater performances in the long run. Clustering is a highly 
complex task, and there may be a lot of time between visible results.  
 
Searching Porter’s cluster theory brings few concrete answers to what clusters actually 
do. Several succeeding contributions do however engage in the subject. Martin & 
Sunley (2003:24) identify four common tools or activities in clustering:  
(1) Creating cooperative networks and encouraging dialogue between companies 
and various organizations, in order to support information exchange, problem 
solving and sharing of resources (Lagendijk & Charles, 1999); 
(2) Develop collective marketing of special features of the industry and region in 
focus, in order to create awareness of its business strengths; 
(3) Develop local services for companies related to design, marketing and finance, 
targeted at the industry in focus; and  
(4) Identify weaknesses in the value chain of the cluster and work to strengthen and 
fill the gaps by attracting business and investors (Brown, 2000). 
 
In addition to various kinds of engagement of actors and collective services, which are 
covered by the points above, OECD (2007-14) emphasizes the initiation of larger-scale 
collaborative R&D-projects, where more than one research institution/university 
cooperates with several companies. Although of great benefit to local and regional 
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economies, such measurements do not necessarily need to be linked to the cluster 
framework: “There are many types of network policy that promote information sharing 
between firms which do not depend on a cluster framework and remit (see, for example, 
Cooke & Morgan, 1998)” (Martin & Sunley, 2003:24).  
 
4.2.2.3 Clusters – A Recipe for Success?  
Although concrete activities for cluster enhancement is not part of Porter’s cluster 
theory, he identifies a set of factors which are common for successful cluster initiatives, 
which provides some indications to what is regarded important:  
(1) In order to create a competitive advantage, participants need communication and 
a shared understanding of competitiveness and the role of clusters. It is key that 
the focus of this understanding is targeted towards productivity and innovation 
rather than how to reduce taxes, wages or keep control with currency; 
(2) Cluster participants need an ongoing discussion and reinforcement of goals of 
the cooperation, with a focus on removing obstacles and easing constraints to 
cluster upgrading;  
(3) The structure should embrace all clusters in a nation or state, meaning that the 
government should not prioritize any specific initiatives, but strive to encourage 
traditional, emerging and even declining clusters and let them create and 
develop their own fundament;  
(4) Appropriate cluster boundaries means that the boundaries of the cluster should 
reflect natural linkages between participants based on economic reality and not 
ones set by political measurements or sector definitions; 
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(5) Wide involvement of cluster participants and associated institutions emphasize 
that companies of various sizes, as well as key constituencies should be 
included. Such inclusion prevents ‘difficult’ stakeholders from strong 
opposition. The initiatives should prioritize development with actors who are 
concerned with improving conditions for all stakeholders;  
(6) Private sector leadership has a higher chance of success, compared to 
government-controlled activity. This does not exclude the possibility for active 
involvement by governments. A reason for this is that companies are closer to 
identifying key challenges and opportunities for the stakeholders. Porter 
(2000:30-32) writes:  
Letting the private sector lead also reduces the initiative’s political 
content while taking advantage of the private sector’s often superior 
implementation ability. (…) Cluster initiatives should be as nonpartisan 
as possible and should remain independent of any party or 
administration’s political agenda; 
(7) When speaking of close attention to personal leadership, the need for personal 
relationships and neutral facilitators for facilitating information sharing, 
communication and building of trust must be addressed; 
(8) Results must be the main motivation of a cluster initiative, derived from a broad 
vision of the future and a plan for concrete actions. This requires a bias towards 
action, and entrepreneurial leadership and involvement of opinion leaders is 
encouraged; and  
(9) As developing a cluster is a long-term project, institutionalization is required 
when it comes to both concept and relationships (Porter, 2000:30-32).  
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A complex set of factors is seemingly of importance for achieving success in clusters. 
The responsibility for the various factors seems to be distributed among different types 
of actors, ranging between public and private stakeholders, as well as between 
individuals, companies and governments. The opportunity to develop these aspects 
seems to require some kind of coordinating effort. In reality, such efforts encompass a 
wide set of challenges in terms of negotiating among participating actors, in order to 
ensure movements in the same directions. These issues have been touched upon less in 
the cluster literature.  
 
4.2.2.4 New and Additional Roles for Companies, Governments and Institutions  
One important aspect of the cluster thinking is that it challenges the roles of companies, 
various levels of government and other institutions in enhancing competitiveness. When 
addressing issues of competition and strategy, companies have traditionally been 
focused on what goes on inside the organization. The cluster understanding suggests 
that also the company’s location and its close environment is crucial for business 
opportunities. If such an approach should be successful among private companies, 
additional agendas must be adapted by management. This further means that involved 
stakeholders need new types of dialogues.  
 
The cluster has to be recognized, together with the company and the industry, as an 
important unit in the analysis of competition. Additionally the company needs to 
understand that location is important for the business environment, as its dynamic or 
lack thereof influence the company.   
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As for governments, cluster thinking demands both new focus and new roles for public 
agents. A priority should be on the micro level and on how to remove obstacles to the 
growth and upgrading of existing and emerging clusters. The clusters are important 
drivers for increasing export and attracting foreign investments. And as importantly, 
“Clusters represent an important forum in which new types of dialogue can take place 
among companies, government agencies and institutions such as schools, universities 
and public utilities” (Porter, 2000:16).    
 
Cluster participants are rarely direct competitors. Presence in a cluster gives 
opportunities for coordination and development in fields of common concern. By 
focusing on clusters, companies engage themselves in broader efforts they would 
usually remain distant towards. The dialogue between the Triple Helix actors (see 
section 4.2.1) moves to more concrete levels, making it easier to take action.  
 
4.2.2.5 Defining Innovation  
The theory field of innovation is large and widespread. The word innovation originates 
from the Latin word innovare which means “to make something new” (Oddane, 
2008:18). Joseph Schumpeter, an Austrian-American economist, argues that innovation 
is the critical dimension of economic change. He defines innovation in relation to five 
aspects (1934): 
(1) The introduction of a good (product), which is new to consumers, or one of 
higher quality than was available in the past; 
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(2) Methods of production, which are new to a particular branch of industry. These 
are not necessarily based on new scientific discoveries and may have, for 
example, already been used in other industrial sectors; 
(3) The opening of new markets; 
(4) The use of new sources of supply; and 
(5) New forms of competition, that leads to the restructuring of an industry. 
Schumpeter’s definition has had a considerable influence on innovation understanding.  
 
A more recent and widely used definition of innovation was proposed by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1981:  
Innovation consists of all those scientific, technical, commercial and financial 
steps necessary for the successful development and marketing of new or improved 
manufactured products, the commercial use of new or improved processes or 
equipment or the introduction of a new approach to a social service. R&D is only 
one of these steps.  
This definition highlights how innovation is relevant not only in a private economy and 
that there are several steps in the process of innovating.  
 
Value creation and innovation are key words in cluster theory. Michael Porter (1998:45) 
defines innovation to:  
Include both improvements in technology and better methods or ways of doing 
things. It can be manifested in product changes, process changes, new 
approaches to marketing, new forms of distribution, and new concepts of 
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scope… >innovation@ results as much from organizational learning as from 
formal R&D.  
Porter (1998:780) further emphasize that he regards innovation as “a new way of doing 
things (termed an invention by some authors) that is commercialized. The process of 
innovation cannot be separated from a firm’s strategic and competitive context.”  
 
Porter’s definition is close to both Schumpeter’s (1934) and OECDs (1981) definitions 
on innovation. OECD and Porter indicate that innovation may also stem from more than 
the R&D department, and Porter adds that organizational learning is an important 
source. Further, ‘novelty’ is a key concept in both Schumpeter’s and Porter’s 
definitions. According to Goffin & Mitchell (2010:9) the ‘perception of newness’ is 
more valuable than originality itself.     
 
The authors (opt. cit) identify that various definitions of innovation cover issues such 
as: What the change is about, which can be both product and process innovation; How 
much is changed, emphasizing that perceiving the idea as new is more important than 
perceiving it as original; The source of the change, arguing that innovation may take 
place outside the R&D environments and that for instance organizational learning can 
be innovation; and, The influence of a change, which for instance can be commercial or 
social. Consequently, Porter’s definition on innovation can be regarded wide, but within 
the frames of a modern understanding of the phenomenon.    
 
Goffin & Mitchel (2010:2-5) are concerned with factors driving innovation: 
Technological advancement, which is in a continuous acceleration; Changing customers 
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and needs, which alter the markets due to new demands; Intensified competition, due to 
new sources of competition, both related to geography and industry involvement; and, 
Changing business environments, due to a change in markets and openness in terms of 
regulation.  
 
Comparatively, Oddane (2008:1) distinguishes between five characteristics influencing 
innovation: Person, or individual characteristics which influence knowledge and skills 
promoting innovation; Conditions like work-environmental factors which influence 
creativity; Products, which are the characteristics of innovation; The process which 
characterizes innovation; and, Partnership, which makes innovation a social, collective 
process. According to her, all five facets must be taken into consideration in order to 
understand innovation. Research on innovation often rests on only one or two facets, 
which leads to simplified perspectives on innovation.  
 
It is highly complex to manage innovation and there are no easy ‘solutions’ for doing 
so. Ideas may be context bound to the environment it has been developed in, which 
means that changes must be made for adaption into new environments. Recent trends 
have expanded the focus of management from an attention towards cutting costs, 
creating lean processes and increasing efficiency towards an attention on developing 
new products and services. Consequently, continuous innovation is becoming a 
prerequisite, in a world where the life cycles of products are short (Goffin & Mitchel, 
2010:5). Although a variety of researchers have investigated the subject, identifying the 
success for achieving innovation has proven impossible.   
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Three versions of expectations may be present when it comes to how increased 
innovation should occur in a cluster: Firstly, cooperation in a cluster could directly lead 
to innovative results. Secondly, cluster cooperation could contribute to encouraging 
innovation among its members, which then occurs between one or a few participants 
who have developed a relation as a result of the cluster cooperative efforts (Pålshaugen, 
2011). Thirdly, cluster cooperation could contribute to encourage innovation, which in 
general leads to a higher awareness on innovation and trigger cooperative efforts at a 
regional level, but not necessarily linked to the cooperative effort or any of the 
companies involved directly. As the mechanisms of cluster cooperation’s are difficult to 
measure, precise findings seem to be limited. 
 
4.2.3 Summarizing Innovation Systems Theories   
Innovation systems theories have all gained ground within economic and geographical 
research communities over the past two decades. Although cluster theory stands out as 
the single most influential innovation systems theory in research communities and 
among practitioners, the field also includes a wide set of related concepts such as 
knowledge and learning economy (Lundvall & Johnson, 1994), industrial districts 
(Piore & Sabel, 1984), the network society (Castells, 2000), the creative class (Florida, 
2002), open innovation (Chesbrough, 2006) and so on. There are however a great deal 
of inconclusiveness among researchers on the theories and the relations between them. 
All in all, the labels are very much interlinked, and it is often difficult to distinguish one 
from another.  
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Arriving at a presentation of theories, there seems to be a striking correlation between 
analysis of innovation systems and analysis of clusters. The “concepts are different,” 
but in a more practical perspective, the differences should not be overestimated 
(Mariussen & Ørstavik, 2005:23-24; Norman, 2007:11). Highly generalized, Triple 
Helix theory is most concerned with the role of the university and research institutions, 
while the national and regional innovation systems (NIS/RIS) are more focused on the 
system of institutions in the field. Comparatively, cluster theory is concerned with 
company opportunity for economic enhancement, lacking perspectives on government 
involvement in the regional field.  
 
The fuzzy boundary between the innovation systems theories sometimes creates 
confusion. Consequently, the lack of unity in the field must be regarded a key challenge. 
Integration of theories seems mostly to have been bypassed by scholars.7 
Comparatively, various types of innovation systems theories seem to have been 
uncritically mixed together in the practical field. Either way, cluster theory has become 
a main driver in the theory and policy fields and its critiques will be presented in more 
detail in the following sections.   
 
4.3 Critiques of Cluster Theory and its Responses  
Along with the increasing popularity of cluster thinking, critiques towards the literature 
and strategies have developed. Authors claim that the concept is seductive, but with a 

7 A recent article by Ranga & Etzkowitz (2013) introduced an analytical framework of the Triple Helix 
System of Innovation. The purpose has been to apply to Triple Helix features into the format of 
innovation systems, in order to develop a systematic framework for the interaction between the 
institutional actors, widening the scope on knowledge flows.  
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range of problematic issues, related to concept, theory and empiric considerations (See 
for instance Held, 1996; Steiner, 1998). A large variety of analytical, theoretical and 
methodological approaches have been tested in the search for meaning. Some of the 
critiques are related to the cluster theory itself, and may also be relevant for the 
surrounding field of innovation systems. Other critiques are more related to what goes 
on in the practical field, meaning the strategic use of cluster theory in business and 
policy environments. In the following sections, some main critiques will be dealt with.  
 
4.3.1 A Multi-disciplinary Field  
As already touched upon, theories dealing with aspects of innovation systems are 
present in social science disciplines ranging from management, economics, business 
and strategy to sociology and social geography. In practice, this means that versions of 
cluster theory come in many disguises and with many names, making it almost pointless 
to label them. It is easy to become confused when trying to get an overview of the field. 
Many scholars characterize the field as “chaotic,” consisting of various traditions and 
contributions, as well as related theories. Hence, a unified understanding of clusters is 
not available (Maskell & Kebir, 2005).  
 
Although different understandings are employed by different academics, some aspects 
are common. All theories have a joint focus on actors, processes and systems creating a 
dynamic business development and growth, and they include a variety of groups of 
actors and territorial levels. Further, learning, innovation and knowledge development, 
as well as the understanding of these processes as interactive and social, is present in 
most disciplines.  
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According to Maskell & Kebir (2005:1) many contributions on cluster theory seem to 
be more concerned with empirical findings than sorting out theoretical difficulties. The 
tendency to introduce novelty and slight changes, in addition to integrate concepts from 
related disciplines without considering tensions of theoretical and methodological art, 
creates challenges in the field. More than one theorist has critically tried to “tidy up” the 
theoretical landscape and build bridges between the various schools, without any 
univocal success.  
 
Porter’s cluster theory seems to have the hegemony in policy making. Martin & Sunley 
(2003:17-18) argue that the cluster literature fails to adopt relevant and related literature 
fields, “Not only are clusters one possible form of source of regional economic growth, 
they tend to be analyzed as if they are separate from wider processes of regional 
development.” This ‘isolation’ of clusters in the theory field may be regarded a critique 
towards the theorists presenting the cluster theory, rather than a true state of the theory 
itself.      
 
4.3.1.1 Definitions  
The multi-discipline of cluster and innovation theories has influenced the lack of a 
unified theoretical framework, and produced a variety of definitions. An absence of 
precise definitions and solid specifications characterizes the field. Terms have been 
used differently by different theorists, referring to different things, and subsequently 
created conceptual and empirical confusion. (Maskell & Kebir, 2005:1; Edquist, 
2005:3) Consequently, what a cluster really is can be hard to grasp.  
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Porter (1998b:226) claims that a cluster is a form of network, occurring within a 
geographical area, but fails to make a distinction between the notion of clusters and the 
notion of networks. He argues that:  
The appropriate definition of a cluster can differ in different locations, 
depending on the segments in which the member companies compete and the 
strategies they employ. (…) The boundaries of clusters continually evolve as new 
firms and industries emerge, established industries shrink and local institutions 
develop and change (2000:18). 
 
Porter (1998b:204) also emphasizes that the presence of clusters can be found in both 
centers and peripheries, and be of various sizes ranging from cities, regions, nations and 
even neighboring countries. As a result, identifying a cluster for research, even in broad 
manners, becomes a relatively challenging task. Accordingly, clusters vary over time 
and space, and will take different shapes accordingly. 
 
Cluster definitions vary significantly in different texts. For instance, some have 
references to spatial boundaries, while others stress organizational and competitive 
borders rather than spatial ones. A key difficulty of cluster theory is to clearly define 
what boundaries are present, both in regards to industry and geography.  
 
The necessity of interconnectedness between companies and institutions in the 
interrelated industries that comprise the cluster is also highlighted in cluster theory. 
However, what features are necessary when defining ‘inter-industrial’ is not clear. The 
connecting links are of both a horizontal and vertical character. The linkages produce 
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social relationships and networks of benefit for the companies involved. The companies 
of a cluster must be in geographic proximity of each other, as closeness encourages 
interaction and value-creation between the companies. Social relations are however hard 
to measure. How a researcher should measure linkages and spillovers, what strength is 
necessary to be included, or where the line between strong and weak ties should be 
drawn, is not defined in cluster theory (Martin & Sunley, 2003:10-11; Hamdouch, 
2008:6).  
 
A related problem is the informal character of the links between the companies and 
organizations. The informality is by many cluster theorists regarded as a reason for the 
efficiency and flexibility promoted in clusters, but is way more difficult to define. 
Formal modes of industrial collaborations are often motors to successful industry and 
innovation-focused networks. This does not rule out the necessity of informal 
relationships.  
 
Questions concerning conditions for the emergence and evolution of clusters, what 
sectors, activities, level of industry aggregation or related industries should be included 
in analysis are all ‘less clear’ when it comes to cluster theory. Issues related to the 
strength of linkages and how economically specialized a concentration of companies 
have to be in order to constitute a cluster also remains undefined. Obviously, there are 
more questions to be answered. The cluster definition is vague (Fromhold-Eisebith & 
Eisebith, 2005), and Porter makes few distinctions in order to narrow the field down. 
Assumingly, the cluster concept is designed to fit universally, which somehow makes it 
even harder to make sense of it.  
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4.3.1.2 Lack of Unified Methods 
Closely related to the fact that cluster theories are represented by a specter of academic 
disciplines, which all have presented their own definitions on the phenomenon, is the 
problem that there are no agreed upon methods for researching clusters. This is true 
both for the identification of a cluster and for defining its boundaries. This variety, as 
well as a persistent segregation among disciplines, further contributes to the diffuseness 
of the cluster field (Hamdouch, 2008:2-3). Apparently, the use of inadequate 
methodological approaches is also common. For instance is static research designs used 
to study dynamic processes (Malmberg & Maskell, 2001; Markusen, 2003).    
 
A distinction goes between identifying a cluster with the attention of verifying its 
existence and analyzing the network relations within such constellations. In order to get 
a broader understanding of a cluster, multi-level analyses are suggested by Steinle et al 
(2007:240-243). This analysis would include a top-down perspective, identified by 
using a survey questionnaire, with the goal of obtaining an overview of the cluster as a 
whole. Secondly, a bottom-up perspective would be added, by choosing one or several 
firms for a more in-depth analysis. The authors argue that the multi-level analysis is a 
fruitful way for studying cluster phenomena in a broader manner.   
 
Within different disciplines, there are different rules on how to construct objects for 
analysis and how theories can be constructed and re-proved. In the cluster debate, there 
is a distinction between the ones believing that a cluster should converge toward “the 
one best practice” and the ones believing that a competitive economy can build on 
“several good practices” (Mariussen & Ørstavik, 2005:7). Porter’s perspective is in line 
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with the latter, while several of his hardest opponents are closer to a methodological 
understanding searching for an approach closer to universalism. Theorists near the 
practical field argue in favor of a pragmatic approach, with theory development close to 
the empirical development.  
 
4.3.2 Proving the Claimed Mechanisms  
Clusters are claimed to raise productivity and increase innovation, as well as 
competitiveness, profitability and job creation. This increase is to be present in the 
participating companies, the geographical area where the cluster is located, and in the 
national economy. “But what is the evidence for these claims?” Martin & Sunley 
(2003:22) ask, concluding that the positive association between clustering and 
innovation lacks consistency.  
 
Most empirical material is based on case studies, and the selection of cases seems to be 
quite biased, as the emphasis either lies on best cases in high-tech industries or on single 
case studies. Research validating the mechanisms proposed in cluster theory is lacking 
and there seems to be contradictory evidence in the present empirical research. 
 
Some evidence seems to confirm that clustered companies tend to be more innovative 
than non-clustered ones (Molina-Morales & Martínez-Fernández, 2003). An 
investigation made by Raines (2000, 2001, 2002) on several European cases concludes 
that the cluster concept only have a limited influence on regional economic promotion 
policies, comparing it to results from general institutional and strategic environments 
(Benneworth & Henry, 2004; Markusen, 2003). 
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A more recent study made by Fitjar & Rodriguez-Pose (2011), covering more than 1600 
companies in the Norwegian city regions, suggest that regional business cooperation has 
little or no effect on companies’ ability to innovate. The number of regional partners has 
no influence on the innovation capacity of a company. Innovation results are however 
linked to a company’s number of international partners. For each partner, the 
probability of value creation in a company is increased by twenty-one percent.  
 
Regional change, both in a public and private character, may take decades. As a 
relatively new line of research the lack of coherent work might be explainable. Rigorous 
empirical testing presupposes certain simplifications in a relatively complex field, 
which in itself may be regarded dubious (Malmberg & Maskell, 2001). Maskell & 
Kebir (2005:13) summarize: “(…) the role of policy in the development of cluster 
advantages can only be marginal, indirect and long-term. Results are measured in 
decades if measurable at all.” 
 
4.3.3 Summarizing Critiques of Cluster Theory 
The main critiques towards the cluster literature are quite closely related. Why are 
cluster theories are so difficult to frame? The critiques concern the multiplicity of the 
field, leading to a variety of definitions and methods, as well as a failure to identify the 
claimed mechanisms of a cluster. As the features of the field of cluster theories includes 
a diverse set of definitions and methodological approaches, making it difficult or almost 
impossible to measure and compare various research results, a joint stand within 
research communities is difficult.  
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Cluster theory avoids explaining how clusters can be constructed, although the 
emergence of a strategy field has led to a flourishing of cluster strategies for developing 
cluster initiatives. As the mechanisms between clusters and innovation are not explained 
properly, the theory cannot explain why innovation as an output of cluster cooperation 
may fail. Research on the cluster field must be regarded as relatively immature, at least 
in respect to studying long-term results of structural development within regions. 
Subsequently, patience may be a requirement for more defining explanations and 
conclusions.  
 
4.4 Cluster Strategy  
“It would be tempting to conclude that the notion of clusters has no real significance. 
Yet this is clearly at odds with the enormous policy popularity of the notion and the 
generous tolerance granted to the idea by a usually critical academic community,” 
Martin & Sunley (2003:29) write. Clusters and its surrounding theoretical field have not 
only become an important concept in academia the past two decades. Both policy and 
business makers have taken an interest in the phenomena and increasingly developed 
(public) strategies to enhance features of clusters at regional, national and international 
levels.   
 
Some scholars suggest that the spreading of the new versions of innovation and cluster 
theories came with great timing. It was a kind of “re-invention” of the regional level as 
crisis in mass production demanded new approaches to production (See for instance 
Whitford & Potter, 2007). This ‘solution’ was welcomed by the OECD, which already 
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in the end of the 1990s was eager to promote innovative growth combined with 
regionalism to its member countries.  
 
During the turn of the century, the OECD published several documents (1999, 2001) 
presenting the ideas of clusters and national innovation systems, encouraging countries 
to use cluster thinking as a starting point for boosting national competitiveness. This led 
to a strategic focus on clusters, and to development of active cluster policies, pursued by 
a range of governments and international organizations (See for instance Sölvell et al., 
2003). The goal was to boost national competitiveness, but the approach seems to have 
led to great varieties of outputs in recent years.  
 
4.4.1 The Extensive Applications of Cluster Theory – A Fad?  
Already one decade ago clusters were accused of being a worldwide fad targeting 
academics and policy makers. In the following years, cluster theory was promoted as an 
analytical concept and a policy tool simultaneously, aiming at international institutions 
as well as national and regional governmental levels. The interests mainly reached 
public actors, who were eager to identify success factors and instruments for enhancing 
the knowledge economy (Sölvell et al., 2003; Fromhold-Eisebith &Eisebith, 2005). The 
promotion of clusters was regarded as a cost-effective and convenient principle of 
organizing co-operative efforts across organizations (OECD, 2007:11).  
 
The popularization of cluster theory seems to have been influenced by new alliances 
between research environments and industry, where consultancy services have 
incorporated theory into their strategies in order to target the policy field (Normann, 
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2007:39). Michael Porter has more than once been pictured as the big ‘crook’ of 
consultancy services by critical academics. A former consultant and Doctor in 
Philosophy, Matthew Stewart (2009:210) argues that the cluster theory is valuable as a 
framework, but not as a strategy. He claims that the framework by many business 
practitioners is regarded idealistic. Although helpful in providing useful reminders and 
structuring discussion, it cannot be expected to serve outputs within the variety of 
context present in the real world.   
 
In addition to companies that potentially have experienced the participation in cluster 
cooperation as valuable, it seems like several groups have an agenda when it comes to 
clusters. As consultants and researchers are developing business on the popularization 
of clusters, policy makers are combining a strategy for putting innovation on the agenda 
with the application of cluster strategies as a useful tool for ‘doing something.’ Another 
group of actors with an obvious interest are cluster initiative facilitators, who are in 
search for continued funding of projects, despite the lack of evident outputs of cluster 
enhancement projects.  
 
The primary intention of Porter’s cluster theory has been to explain the success of 
companies within a region or nation: The theory was mainly aimed at managers and 
stakeholders in the business community. Comparatively, other innovation systems’ 
approaches are more concerned with explaining the success of a region. Respectively, 
the cluster theory has a business orientation, while other innovation systems approaches 
are oriented towards public policy (Steinle et al, 2007: 240; Maskell & Kebir, 2005). 
The considerations and evaluations of cluster strategies is usually linked to a group of 
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theoretical perspectives, with similar, but not necessarily the same outset. This 
potentially creates some perspectives on the opportunities and outcomes of clusters, 
which may not be rooted in the original theories.   
 
4.4.2 Versions of Cluster Initiatives  
Clusters have been used as a guide for developing economic policies, through relatively 
rough cluster ‘manuals’ of practical guidance (See for instance: Cluster Navigators Ltd., 
2001; Rosenfeld, 2002) (Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith: 2005, 2008). The OECD 
(2007:12-14) distinguishes between three types of cluster programs: (1) regional policy, 
usually linked to ‘lagging regions’, but also initiatives originating in other policies 
which have incorporated regional development dimensions; (2) science & technology 
policy, promoting collaborative R&D in the most promising technology sectors; and (3) 
industrial/enterprise policy, focusing on drivers on growth or the needs of the SMEs.  
 
All three policy areas seems to have moved its focus from a top-down, single-sector 
approach towards policies that favor cooperative, multi-actor approaches, usually more 
place-oriented. Most programs in the OECD countries are oriented towards several 
policy streams, implicitly or explicitly. Innovation has also become a policy goal 
beyond the science & technology field. Overall it does appear that the level of funding 
for the majority of these programs is relatively modest, although it may be used to 
leverage additional funding sources. 
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The cluster works as an umbrella-notion for a wider variety of initiatives, with different 
outset and different objectives. There are even initiatives which are considered clusters, 
which do not identify with or hold the label. Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith (2005:1242, 
1254) distinguish between explicit cluster initiatives and implicit cluster initiatives for 
cluster promotion. The explicit form is a top-down approach, implemented, financed 
and directed by authorities. The implicit form, which is a bottom-up approach, refers to 
the cluster idea “indirectly” and is organized and financed by groups of companies. The 
authors (op. cit) emphasize that drawing a line between the two can be challenging. 
“Cluster promotion” demands an involvement from private stakeholders in “activating, 
designing and implementing public efforts.” Private stakeholders rarely seem to 
implement cluster efforts without “some encouragement, small participation or (…) 
acceptance from public actors.”  
     
The strategy attention clusters have received over the past decade usually implies one 
out of three versions. The first one involves support of and/or some kind of intervention 
with already existing cluster initiatives which have developed naturally, for instance the 
‘Italian districts’ in the Northern part of Italy. The second version involves initiation of 
a cluster initiative in business and R&D environments that are already present and 
strong, but need assistance to develop further. This has been a common practice in the 
Norwegian context. A third version involves initiation of cluster initiatives without any 
previously established or successful business or R&D environments. This type is 
present in some Asian countries that have experienced industrialization in recent years 
(Koschatzky & Lo, 2007:6).   
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According to OECD (2007:14) several instruments are taken into advantage when 
handling cluster enhancement: Engagement of actors includes issues such as the role of 
facilitators, the level and type of interaction desired, the existence of formal cluster 
initiatives and spatial considerations of the clusters; Collective services includes 
business advice, skill development or joint marketing, the consideration is how to target 
services in a way that does not substitute for private provision; Larger-scale 
collaborative R&D involves more than one research institution or university in co-
operation with several firms, which often taps into external R&D funding sources and 
programs. The cluster goes through maturity phases and what instruments are activated, 
depend on what phase the cluster is in. 
 
4.4.3 Implications of Cluster Strategies as it Stands Today 
Many authors fail to be specific about the distinction between descriptive and normative 
aspects of clusters. This has been a somewhat confusing aspect when navigating in the 
innovation systems theories. It is important to make clear divisions between the cluster 
as a phenomenon (theoretical approach) and the cluster or clustering as an activity 
(strategy approach). In effect, the lack of clear distinction between the theorizing and 
strategizing of clusters and innovation theories has contributed to a further blurring of 
the field.  
 
The challenges addressed when it comes to cluster theory to a great extent seem to be 
addressed within the strategies as well, ranging from multiple perspective, slightly 
different attentions, confusion on approaches, to over-simplifications and lack of 
reflective evaluations.  The inflation in the use of strategies among public policy-
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holders has produced a fast-moving field, but not necessarily in the same direction or 
any viable results. Different nations seem to rely on a great variety of approaches 
(OECD, 2007) and many cluster supporters argue that the approach to clusters must 
take local differences in social, economic, legal and cultural conditions into account 
when developing clusters (Newlands, 2003:530). 
 
Differences in understanding drive the field. Cluster theory was introduced and 
popularized by Michal Porter, with an American approach. His intention was to present 
a theory with attention on the company and its opportunities to take advantage of 
externalities in increasing its competitiveness. Subsequently, cluster theory has in 
particular been adapted by a European environment and turned into strategies, strongly 
encouraged by the EU and the OECD. These versions are in addition influenced by 
theories on regional development and opportunities for economic enhancement at a 
macro level. The cluster concept is still in focus, but it seems like the application of the 
theory and its transformation into cluster strategy, largely moves attention from the 
company’s meso level to the regional macro level. In reality this leads to somewhat 
different considerations, which in turn leads to different approaches and goals.  
 
All in all, considerations, approaches and goals may often overlap in interactions 
between involved stakeholders, but this is no guarantee. A company’s meso-level 
considerations are related to a business focus, while the regions macro level attention is 
more related to policy thinking. This introduces (at least) two different cultures of 
interaction, with related, but not completely equal goals. This dynamic will be further 
dealt with in the analysis.  
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The theories of clusters and innovation are complex and it takes time to grasp what they 
are all about. Clusters have on many occasions been presented as a miracle medicine for 
regional development. Lack of reflections combined with an extensive use of the cluster 
notion may have been of provocation to leading critiques of clusters. In some respect, 
there has also been a misuse of cluster thinking both in policy and business contexts.    
 
A key challenge is the lack of robust measurement tools for evaluation, both related to 
the performance of a cluster initiative and evaluations of the impact of a particular 
policy intervention. In their evaluative efforts, OECDs report on Competitive Regional 
Clusters from 2007 (15-16, 138) emphasizes three key lessons: First, there must be an 
essential logic to why the cluster, as a policy tool, should be selected in favor of other 
policy tools, in particular the ones which are accessible to all types of companies. 
Secondly, there must be coherence between policies across and within government 
levels. As policies originate in several policy streams and at various levels of 
government, an overall knowledge and understanding of other present policies is 
necessary. Attitudes tending towards cooperation and correlation between policies are 
also of key importance. This point touches upon the findings in this study and will be 
further dealt with in the Chapters 6-9 on analysis and conclusion. Finally, there is 
always a risk for insufficient private sector engagement in cluster initiatives. It is 
important to make sure that public sector involvement is somewhat limited and that the 
plan for public sector withdrawal is realistic. Contributing to cooperation between 
private actors does not guarantee a continued success.  
 
In 2008 Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith pointed to the lack of good evaluations of cluster 
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initiatives. Accordingly, empirical evaluations of the effects of cluster initiatives are 
rarely published. Six years later, this is still a challenge. Outcomes are hard to measure, 
as it is difficult to know exactly what to measure, what to include and what to leave out, 
and whether the subjects of measurements really have to do with the phenomenon in 
focus (the cluster). The complexity of such measurements are very high and at the same 
time debatable. Innovation and value creation are slow processes, and structural 
improvements within a region may not lead to results on short term. As the 
implementation of cluster initiatives is relatively new, evaluations may still be 
somewhat premature.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
The past two decades there has been a development from solely observing cluster 
initiatives as a part of theory forming to creating public strategies for intervention and 
support. Matthew Stewart writes: 
Most successful strategies emerge through action; they become perspicuous only 
in hindsight. And this play-it-by-ear kind of strategy making does not result 
necessarily from a lack of foresight; it often stems from a healthy recognition 
that the world is generally too complex for our simple plans (2009:210).  
 
Cluster theory has been exposed to heavy critiques. Some of the critique deals with 
theoretical fundamentals such as the lack of clear definitions, the lack of clear 
boundaries, no unification when it comes to the use of methods and the lack of 
significant results proving that there is a link between cluster presence and higher 
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degrees of innovativeness. The debate has been heated for a long time. Yet, the theory 
on clusters has continued to gain ground, in a translated form of strategies for 
governments and business developers.  
 
The purpose of the cluster theory was originally to show a positive link between a 
firm’s ability to innovate and its presence and strategic involvement with competitors 
and cooperators within a geographically proximate region. Such involvement could 
benefit all parties. In addition to the advantages of the individual companies, joint 
engagement between actors within a region could contribute to economic prosperity and 
competitiveness towards other regions within similar business environments.  
 
The purpose of cluster strategy has developed into something a little bit more, or even a 
little bit different. The cluster strategy is not developed with the outset from a single 
company. The cluster strategy concerns itself with multiple companies and 
organizations located within a region, but with the overall attention on regional 
development. This means that the strategic attention mainly is on contributing to 
innovation on a regional level, rather than the organizational or company level.  
 
There are many dimensions of interest, both when it comes to cluster theory and cluster 
strategy. This study’s concern is with why cluster initiatives fail to produce the expected 
innovative outputs and the consequences of the ‘inflation’ of cluster strategy. The 
OECD’s report on Competitive Regional Clusters from 2007 (15-16) makes a note on 
how the escalations in cluster strategies across governance agencies and levels, 
potentially can contribute to inter-agency rivalries, but does not dwell on it. The case 
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presented in this study reveals a field where politics and rivalry both among inter-
agencies and cluster initiatives are present. The next chapter will present theories on 
power, politics and organizational behavior. These theories will contribute to an 
increased understanding of the practical field of clusters and serve as tools for the 
analysis. The chapter will also present the research questions in focus, as well as the 
model applied for analysis.  
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Chapter 5 – Politics and Organizational Theory  
5.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, theoretical tools and perspectives relevant for the analysis of the case in 
this study are provided. The main focus is how to understand a cluster initiative when 
concerned with issues of power and politics. The presentation of theory is followed by 
an outline of the analytical model developed for this study, as well as the proposition of 
research questions.  
 
The chapter is organized into five parts. The first part of the chapter presents network 
theory, which is important to understanding clusters and provides insight into all 
research questions. Networks can be regarded the main shape of a cluster, in addition to 
a main ‘tool’ used for enhancing cluster cooperation. When dealing with clusters, the 
divergences in understandings and goals must be taken into account. Politics, power and 
political features of clusters are major themes in this study, concretized into an 
emphasis on interests, perceptions, conflicts, strategies and power play. The second part 
of the chapter covers theory to answer research question number one, which may help 
explain key features of actors in clusters. The theoretical contributions are interests and 
perceptions.  
 
The third part of the chapter deals with the theory of importance to research question 
two, which may help explain types of behavior in clusters. The theoretical contributions 
are conflicts, strategies and power play. The fourth part of this chapter presents a 
contribution in organization theory, distinguishing two ideal types of organizations: the 
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action organization and the talk organization. The two ideal types represent highly 
different versions of thinking and acting in organizational life, and both versions may be 
present within the same organization. In this study the ideal types are applied into a 
cluster and network understanding, moving across organizational boundaries. The final 
part of the chapter is a presentation of the analytical model, which provides a fundament 
for proposing the research questions to be answered in this study.  
 
5.2 Understanding Clusters as Networks  
The following sections present theories on networks. As touched upon in the previous 
chapter, networks can be regarded as the main form of a cluster, in addition to being a 
‘tool’ used for enhancing cluster cooperation. Consequently, network theory is of 
importance for understanding clusters and provides insight in the fundament of the 
analysis.  
 
5.2.1 A Form of Governance Network?  
The popularization of cluster theories has led to an increase in cluster strategies. 
Networks are key tools for cluster development strategies, in the implementation of 
formal cluster initiatives, and as a form of interaction between actors of informal cluster 
arenas. Similar to cluster theory, versions of network theory are present in a variety of 
academic disciplines, such as social anthropology, sociology, geography, psychology 
and management theory. The various versions of network theory also seem to lack 
cross-disciplinary reference (Borgatti et al, 2009:893-893; Freeman, 2004, 2011:26-27).  
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Networks may take many forms and shapes. Jason Owen-Smith (2013) makes a 
(practical) distinction between (1) social networks among individuals, such as 
friendship, advice-seeking, romantic connections and acquaintanceship; (2) formal, 
contractual relationships among organizations, such as strategic alliances, buyer-
supplier contracts, joint ventures, etc; (3) “informal” inter-organizational relationships, 
which flows through people, such as director interlocks, employer mobility, social 
networks that cross organizational boundaries; and (4) affiliations, or shared 
memberships, suggesting some kind of connection, such as trade associations, 
committee memberships and co-authorships. Owen-Smith further emphasizes three key 
mechanisms, presenting networks as: (a) channels for information and resources; (b) 
status signaling and certification; and/or (c) social influence. He argues that some types 
of networks invite to more strategic manipulation than others, making them more useful 
to social and political players.  
 
Owen-Smith’s distinctions provide a general overview of how networks are perceived. 
Versions of social relationships, formal and contractual relationships, and informal 
inter-organizational relationships and affiliations may all overlap each other in clusters. 
The cluster may also be relevant for information- and resource channels, as well as for 
signaling status or social influence.  
 
Håkansson & Johanson (1998) argue that networks have structures of governance, 
providing a link between theories on Industrial Network and theories on Governance 
and Policy Networks. These networks have some kind of link to public government, and 
hold important features of politics related to issues of conflicts, power and perceptions.  
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Kickert et al. (1997) provides valuable contributions relevant for understanding network 
dynamics and issues of power and politics. Their attention lies mainly in how complex 
networks could be managed, defining policy networks as “(more or less) stable patterns 
of social relations between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy 
problems and/or policy programs” (1997:6). The focus is on the way networks 
influence making and implementation of public policy, through the collective action of 
inter-organizational, corporate actors. Policy networks form the context in which policy 
processes take place. In policy science, policy networks represent an attempt to analyze 
the relationship between context and process in policy making.   
 
The actors in policy networks can be various public and private individuals, coalitions, 
bureaus or organizations. Neither is regarded superior or is in a position to determine 
other actors’ strategies. In the network, the actors cooperate or deal with versions of 
non-cooperation. Usually the participants have different and quite often conflicting 
interests, strategies and rationalities. Goals are not set in advance, but are developed as 
the result of exchanges of information and trade-offs. In order for a policy to be 
successful some kind of collective action must be realized.  
 
According to Klijn (1997:31-32) three features are important in order to understand 
networks. First of all, changing interdependencies are a prerequisite for networks. 
Secondly, individual actors of networks have their own goals. Finally, relations between 
actors within a network are of a more or less lasting nature. The policy processes related 
to networks are complex and of an unpredictable character. Many actors are involved 
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and their preferences may change during interaction. This leads to a variety of strategies 
and goals and unpredictability in outcomes and realistic targets.  
 
Participation in networks must be oriented towards an understanding of collective 
actions. The actors in networks interact and participate in games related to their interests 
in order to achieve goals. Previous strategies of operating individually must be replaced 
by strategies of contingency, where action is oriented towards other actors’ behavior. 
The idea is to achieve win-win situations for participating, addressed as “converting 
zero-sum into zero-plus games.”  
 
Potential downsides of joint action are costs related to decision-making in the form of 
money, time and energy spent on interaction. Further, joint action usually means that 
certain compromises have to be made, causing external political costs. The sum of costs 
determines whether actors are willing to participate. Even if cooperation is in the 
interest of actors, theories on collective action and games claims that interaction 
situations have a structure which usually keeps actors to their non-cooperative strategies 
(Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997:40-41).  
 
Implications of Networks to Clusters 
‘Innovation’ has become a key word in public policy the past two decades. The 
emphasis is on how to strategically support economic growth by the support and 
development of clusters. As clusters have the form and characteristics of networks, key 
features of the cluster can be recognized in the theories presented on networks and 
public policy.  
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The Governance and Policy Network literature offers key insights into the 
understanding of power and political dynamics, rarely dealt with in literature on cluster 
theory. Understanding a network as a governance structure provides an opportunity to 
go more thoroughly in to aspects of power and politics present in and around networks. 
A key point is the reflexive relationship between the network and its surroundings. 
Changes may come about inside a network, but may as well be a result of external 
forces. The fundamental nature cluster theory is its concern with the company and its 
environment, focusing on how the two may take advantage of each other. When it 
comes to change, governance theories are concerned with both cooperation and non-
cooperation. As a result of different and sometimes conflicting interests and strategies, 
goals are developed and traded. Joint action leading to innovation is the focus of the 
cluster, but is not always the main concern of the actors involved. This may create 
issues of trust and difficulties with realizing the proposed joint goals.  
 
Various interests and perspectives are shaped by the actors’ status, ambitions, 
knowledge and history. The relationship between collective and individual interest and 
action is an important dynamic in networks. Håkansson & Johanson (1998) claim 
varieties between actors means that they cannot be seen as a joint force, even if they are 
influenced by each other. This ever-changing nature creates a dynamic between stability 
and change in the network, which creates opportunities to increase power for the actors 
involved. 
 
Comparing policy networks and governance with clusters, the key focus of cluster 
actors is not on policy-making, but on business development, economic enhancement 
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and innovation. Yet, a cluster initiative might have ‘policy influence’ on its agenda, to 
strengthen conditions for economic development and innovation. In the following 
sections, literature on interests and perceptions will be dealt with, covering key features 
of importance both for understanding and participating in cluster cooperative efforts. 
 
5.3 Key Features of Clusters  
Power in organizations is a theme engaging a variety of academics, especially in the 
fields of political science and sociology. Cluster arenas are mainly concerned with 
business development and innovation. Still, they are very much influenced by 
(organizational) politics and ways of behavior. Morgan (2006) has created an image of 
the organization as a political system. He is concerned with interests, conflicts and 
power play, all relevant issues in cluster arenas.  
 
Klijn & Teisman (1997:98) argue that policy-making processes cannot be controlled by 
any single actor. They identify four concepts for analyzing the policy-making process: 
First, an outcome depends on the strategic behavior of all the actors involved, which 
creates a game. Secondly, actors choose game strategies that seem rational in the 
context of the game they are in. They are based on the perceptions actors have of the 
game and the important choices that are to be made in it. Several games may develop 
simultaneously. Third, perceptions are constructed by actors and are inspired by the 
environment they are in. Finally, the network represents the environment in which a 
policy making process takes place.  
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The analytical model in this study takes into account the combined reflections of Klijn 
& Teisman (1997), who are concerned with governance networks, and Morgan (2006), 
who is concerned with politics in organization. In analyzing power and politics, the 
application of interests, perceptions, conflict, strategy and power play provides a 
theoretical fundament for analysis. The following sections touch upon literature of 
importance to understand with key features of cluster initiative, related to power and 
politics. The theory contributions in focus are interests and perceptions. 
 
5.3.1 Interests  
‘Interests’ means “predispositions embracing goals, values, desires, expectations, and 
other orientations and inclinations that lead a person to act in one way rather than 
another” (Morgan, 2006:157). One way of understanding interest in organizational 
politics is to investigate a person’s domains related to organizational tasks, career and 
personal life. Organizational tasks have to do with the work a person has to perform. A 
job also includes work life aspirations, visions for the future and independent career 
interests. Personal life includes personality and private attitudes, as well as values, 
preferences, beliefs and various kinds of commitments not related to a person’s work 
(extramural interests). This personal life also contributes to how people engage when it 
comes to tasks and career.  
 
An executive is ‘trapped’ between a set of different interests he or she wants to pursue. 
The tension between these interests makes the executive’s act ‘political’ even before 
taking into account other organizational members. How people orientate when it comes 
to these interests and tensions depends on the situations and the people involved. This 
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means that it might be possible to observe various styles of behavior related to these 
situations. The styles of behavior reflect a person’s preferences when it comes to 
dedication to organizational tasks, career and/or personal life. Identifying a person’s 
agenda underlying specific actions and activities consequently provides an important 
tool.  
 
Organizations are often regarded as rational and focused toward a common goal. 
Investigating organizations as political units provides a set of goggles which reveals that 
organizations can be fragmented and made up of coalitions, as well as representing a 
coalition toward its environment. Coalition building is a key dimension in almost all 
organizations.  
 
A distinction is sometimes made between cliques becoming aware of common goals 
and coalitions of two or more cliques who unite to pursue a joint interest, often working 
against a rival network. Pursuing one’s interests can be done as an individual, through 
specific interest groups or through a more general coalition. It is common that a 
dominant coalition controls important areas of policy within organizations. Usually, 
such coalitions are connected to key actors and/or management of the organization. The 
participants pay some kind of price in order to be a part of the coalition and needs to 
balance this out with the potential rewards by being a part of it. The balance is often 
influenced by factors such as age, organizational position, time spent in the 
organization, values and attitudes (Pfeffer, 1981; Culbert & McDonough, 1980; 
Morgan, 2006:157-162).  
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Implication of Interests to Clusters  
Clusters are composed of various actors, who represent their respective organizations, 
but who also have careers to take into consideration, as well as various types of private 
interests. These three fields influence how the actor behaves. To complicate things 
further, active stakeholders in clusters may have additional goals related to the cluster 
initiative itself. Various actors rank various interests differently. Sometimes interest-
fields compete and form ambiguous interests. As all actors have a set of interests they 
wish to pursue, on their own and on their companies behalf, as well as potentially on 
behalf of a cluster initiative, cluster environments will always be inherently political. 
Quite commonly, actors will form alliances with others who share their interests. Even 
if the interests of the cluster initiative seem to be united, a closer look may reveal a 
political environment, and topics competing for priority. In the following part, 
perceptions are presented, which may be influenced by interests.    
 
5.3.2 Perceptions  
According to Termeer & Koppenjan (1997:79) the blocking of a policy process may not 
only be caused by conflicts of interests or power relations, but also by actors’ 
perceptions of the situation. Perceptions consist of an actors’ definition of the 
surrounding world. This is the sum of problem definitions, images of surrounding 
actors, the nature of dependency of others, others’ dependency of the actor in focus, as 
well as to the advantages and disadvantages of cooperating. Perceptions are stable and 
difficult to change, but mutual adjustment is needed in order to achieve joint decision-
making, conflict solving or action.  
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Processes of problem solving can be frustrated by the existence of diverging or 
conflicting perceptions about the relevant problem, the best solutions and which actors 
should participate. Actors may disagree on goals and means, but also on the nature of 
disagreement. Sometimes policy processes become ‘dialogue of the deaf’ where 
participants don’t reflect on their arguments, but continue to repeat them and talk at 
cross-purposes.  
 
Perspectives on perceptions vary in the scientific community. A classic approach looks 
for the ‘best perception’ and argues that there is one true reality, existing independently 
of and outside the subjectivity of an observer. Perceptions, resources, problems and 
solutions are all variables in the process of policy making. There are cognitive processes 
and a true, real, but changing world. Right perceptions reflect the right and true reality, 
while wrong perceptions do not. An alternative approach, with a more relativistic 
fundament, which is more in line with the perspectives in this study (see Chapter 3, 
section 3.2), claims that actors construct their own worlds. In this approach, even 
‘impersonal’ or ‘objective’ forces, such as socio-demographic or economic change, 
have to be interpreted.  
 
Actors are surrounded by complex and ambiguous worlds. A perception is an image that 
helps an actor to make sense of these worlds, find strategies for action and develop 
problem definitions. A problem definition can be defined as an interpretation of the gap 
between the present or expected situation and a desired situation, and the instrumental 
relations between both (Dunn, 1981). The perception of the problem determines the 
theme of the interaction, the appropriate solutions and who will be involved.  
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Perceptions can be applied to problem definitions, but also causal assumptions and 
basic values. Basic values refer to a fundamental belief system defining a person’s 
underlying identity. The basic values are quite resistant to change. In addition there is 
an ‘outer’ policy core, consisting of basic strategies and policy positions, as well as 
secondary aspects, which consists of a multitude of instrumental decisions. The outer 
core and the secondary aspects are more easily changed (Sabatier, 1988:139).  
 
Perceptions originate in social interactions, where the perceptions are constructed and 
reconstructed. People usually prefer to interact with others who share their perceptions 
and their engagement in interactions depending on the perceptions they have. The 
interaction again influences the perception of the reality and the construction of it. 
Changes of perceptions are rare, because people keep interacting with shared perception 
holders, which again lead to a reaffirmation of perceptions.  
 
The stable interaction leads to social configurations of groups of actors with similar 
patterns and perceptions (Weick, 1979:35). Sometimes a social configuration can 
coincide with formal institutional arrangements and policy networks, but usually there 
is more than one configuration present. As a consequence, problem solving within a 
network or institution quite possibly will involve actors from different configurations, 
with different and potentially conflicting perspectives. In order to solve conflicts, 
perceptions originating in different configurations must be adjusted, if not, policy 
controversies might evolve.  
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In order to change perceptions actors must be confronted. But not all confrontations 
lead to change. A fundament for change must be the actors’ recognition of varieties of 
perceptions, and experience of any problems this causes and an interest in, as well as an 
ability to reflect on one’s own perceptions (Termeer & Koppenjan, 1997:80-85).  
 
Implication of Perceptions to Clusters  
The construction of reality is a necessary part of the play going on between actors in a 
cluster environment. The fundamental understanding in this dissertation coincides with 
a more relativistic understanding of reality, where actors both consciously and 
unconsciously construct their own worlds and interpret their surroundings. In the field 
of a cluster, a myriad of actors, events, challenges and facts must be taken into account 
at the same time. As the field usually is complex, actors often have to deal with brackets 
of information quickly, and may have to make decisions or take action without any full 
certainty. In such cases, perceptions come in quite handy. The environment of the 
informal cluster is a part of everyday life for most actors and will influence perceptions 
of the field almost imperceptibly.  
 
Versions of interpretations of what goes on in a cluster are not always tested against 
each other. Post-rationalization and constructions of a desired reality are relatively 
common traits in such environments. Moreover, individual actors may have more than 
one interest, which are not always mutually coherent. This reduces opportunities to 
predict the future.  
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A challenge in the cluster arenas may be that the involved actors are not always aware 
of the existence of different perceptions, and fail to investigate versions of 
understandings before acting on behalf of a larger group. This may lead to issues of 
trust and also conflict. As the strategic field of clusters in the real world is relatively 
new, the framework for and understanding of cooperation is not completely set and may 
cause additional challenges.  
 
In the previous sections, theories on interests and perceptions have been outlined. They 
deal with key features of clusters in terms of power and politics. In the following 
sections, theories on political- and power oriented behavior will be presented, 
characterizing actions of actors in clusters.  
 
5.4 Behavior in Clusters  
Features of politics such as interests and perceptions influence the behavior in clusters. 
Theories on conflict, strategy development and power play outline types of behavior 
present in cluster cooperation, of which is important for understanding its dynamic.   
 
5.4.1 Conflict  
Conflict usually occurs with divergent interests. According to Dahrendorf (1959:135), 
conflict concerns itself with divergence in goals, arguing that individuals who possess 
incompatible objectives, or a desire to obtain something which is not available to all, 
will lead to relations of social conflict. A further clarification, made by Schmidt & 
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Kochan (1972:361) is that the perception of incompatibility in goals is a precondition 
for conflict (Pfeffer, 1981:74-75).  
 
Looking at conditions for using power, Pfeffer (1981:68-69) identifies four potential 
sources to conflicts: Interdependence means that the happenings of one organizational 
actor affect the happenings of others. This ties the organizational participants together, 
as they share consequences and also provides a potential fundament for conflict; 
Inconsistent or heterogeneous goals may lead to different paths among interdependent 
actors; Scarcity of resources may to lead power games and investment in efforts to 
resolve a decision; and, Heterogeneous beliefs about technology may produce conflict. 
All conditions may produce conflict, but does not necessarily lead to political activity. 
This depends on the importance of the decision issue or resource and on the distribution 
of power.  
 
General level goal statements are a common tool to avoid disagreements, conflict and 
political activity in organizations. The object is to find the smallest denominator in 
order for all actors to agree on a joint goal. A consequence of the vagueness of goals is 
the blurring of organizational actions. Operative goals are necessary in order to secure 
action (Etzioni, 1964). The agreement on general goals may secure the absence of 
conflict on a general level, but move actual conflicts closer to where the operative goals 
are acted out. This move can potentially moderate the intensity of the conflict and have 
an integrative effect on participants.  
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Even if interdependence between actors, goal differences or varieties in perceptions of 
technology is present, these factors are not sufficient for developing conflicts that result 
in power and political behavior. Scarcity of resources is a necessary precondition. 
Schmidt and Kochan (1972:363, see Pfeffer, 1981:75, 79) argue that shared resources 
are one of the precursors to conflict. Political struggle occurs only when the resources 
are in short supply, as the incentives to engage increase.  
 
In order to analyze a conflict, it is necessary to understand the features of a specific 
conflict. Conflicts may occur between people, organizations or rival groups of 
coalitions. Sometimes conflicts are built into organizational structures, roles, attitudes or 
stereotypes. Bachrach & Baratz (1970) differ between overt and covert conflicts, and 
stress that the conflict must be observable. Lukes (2005:28) offers an additional 
dimension to this perspective, and argues that also latent conflict is of interest when 
studying power. Latent conflict occurs when there is a contradiction between the 
interests of those exercising power and the real interests of the ones they exclude.  
 
Organizational politics have the potential of becoming a highly complex affair. 
Personalities and personality clashes have a great potential for bringing conflict to life. 
Conflicts can be explicit and visible to the surroundings, or hidden but still influencing 
daily life in an organization. It is not uncommon that organizational members have 
concealed agendas, which may influence their ways of acting. Disputes may have roots 
in organizational history, but influencing present decisions and actions, even without 
actors being able to identify them. Sometimes conflicts can even be institutionalized 
within the organization, influencing attitudes, stereotypes, values, beliefs, rituals, and 
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other aspects of organizational culture, and creating huge challenges for breaking them 
down. Hence, the present can be shaped by history in subtle ways. To get beneath the 
surface in conflicting situations, the sources of politics and diversity of interests must be 
investigated (Morgan, 2006:165-166). 
 
Conflicts in the context of an organization have usually been regarded as dysfunctional 
and caused by some regrettable circumstances or causes. In more favorable 
circumstances, conflict would disappear. Pondy (1967, 1969) proposes an alternative 
view, regarding conflict as a natural condition, which should be accepted, as avoidance 
is impossible. He further argues in favor of a positive and functional attitude towards 
conflict, claiming that conflict may stimulate innovation and adaptability and be 
constructive.  
 
Burns (1961) argues that modern organizations are designed for simultaneously 
handling competition and collaboration, indirectly encouraging organizational politics. 
Even if people are working towards a common task, they are often competing for 
limited resources, status and career advancement. For instance, hierarchical 
organizations represent both a system of cooperation and a career ladder to motivate 
peoples’ advancement.  
 
Implications of Conflicts to Clusters  
Conflict is not a major topic in cluster theory (Porter, 1990). In the field, conflicts in 
clusters are a common experience. In clusters many types of actors are present. Some 
are interrelated in one way or another, and most will have one or several goals they 
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operate towards, which will be in competition with or incompatible with the goals of 
other actors present at the arena. Scarcity of resources is usually also a challenge, and 
can range from limited amounts of people and financing to time available for various 
activities, for example.  
 
In formal cluster initiatives it is common to formulate a joint goal among participating 
actors. Both in theory and in practice the overall goal is innovation. This means that 
innovation is expected to be an outcome of joint interaction. Usually the goal is 
somewhat more specific, but in the outset of an initiative, this is not always the case. 
Conflicts related to the execution of activities and more operative goals, will potentially 
occur, especially since limited resources are a common challenge. Another case that 
may evolve in to some kind of conflict is the variety of expectations of the actors 
involved. For instance, business- and action-oriented actors will demand more solid and 
apparent outcome, compared to more political- and talk-oriented actors. 
 
Conflicts in clusters may become relatively complex. In addition to perspectives on 
approaches and directions, clusters are ideal places for actors who wish to play out 
personality conflicts. These conflicts are often visible and loud, and relate to the idea of 
overt and observable conflicts. At the same time, there are usually ‘silent’ and less 
visible conflicts ongoing in the field, which may be covert towards the surroundings. 
Previous encounters, not necessarily linked to any cluster cooperation, may influence 
the actors’ perception and trust and lead to certain ways of acting. Latent conflicts may 
also be present in cluster environments, as not all actors are invited to participate or 
have an opportunity to influence. 
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When perceiving a cluster as a place for action and progress, conflict may seem highly 
dysfunctional. Actors with business- and action-oriented perspectives will often try to 
avoid conflict and be concerned with how to perceive the desired action. 
Comparatively, actors with more political- and talk-oriented perspectives may regard a 
conflict as a way to play out certain issues that are not resolved. In the latter 
perspective, conflict is a natural part of a process and may propose new opportunities 
within an environment. In certain theories, the idea of conflict leading to innovation 
stands strong. Yet, conflicts may be destructive in cluster cooperation, preventing a 
focus on innovation, and therefore opportunities for value creation. The nature of a 
conflict determines opportunities for cooperation on innovation.  
 
According to Porter (2000), cooperation and competition both have important functions 
of clusters. This leads to an assumption that clusters are designed to deal with both. 
Porter does however avoid perspectives on governmental influence, and conflicts 
playing out among public actors. In Burns’ (1961) perspective, the duality of 
cooperation and competition will encourage some kind of political behavior, as 
resources are scarce. Compared to organizations, cluster cooperation is however not 
hierarchically organized, and actors’ motivation for achieving some kind of joint 
advancement is not necessarily the case. In the following section, strategy development 
for achieving actors’ goals in a political environment will be presented.  
 
5.4.2 Strategy  
A common strategy made for exercising power is focused on making the use of less 
obtrusive power. This may legitimize and rationalize the decision that is to be made and 
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put focus on decision process, decision outcomes and power and influence itself 
(Pfeffer, 1981:137). A distinction goes between the analysis of behavior as an 
instrument for reaching a goal and behavior in terms of its strategic characteristics. 
Klijn & Teisman (1997:101-102) are mainly concerned with the latter. They define a 
strategy as “the set of decisions taken by one actor which reflects the combination of 
resources and targets they bring into play.” Three strategies for coordination within 
networks can be identified: Corporate strategy coordination is realized by formal rules, 
a central authority and collective goals; Alliances are realized by negotiation and mutual 
agreements; and Mutual adjustment is realized by the prevailing of autonomous goals 
and mutual influences.  
 
According to the policy network approach, policy processes are highly interactive and 
take place in institutional contexts. Therefore, institutional factors must be taken into 
account when dealing with management of networks. Factors might be 
interdependencies between actors, their relationships, the rules that guide their 
interactions and so on. Management strategies should be concerned with two types of 
strategies. One type for directly influencing the interaction processes, labeled game 
management, and one type for influencing the institutional context, structure and culture 
of a network, labeled network structuring. The latter one may improve conditions for 
cooperation indirectly, and be of great importance. Independent of management 
strategy, questions on content, players, their strategies and the institutional 
arrangements have to be considered.  
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The steering of interaction processes in the form of game management may involve a 
series of activities. First of all, network activation involves initiating interaction 
processes or games for goal achievement or problem solving. When it comes to 
activating the actors occupying ‘nodal positions,’ who gets involved and who doesn’t is 
an important issue. The invited ‘nodes’ must be willing to invest time and resources in 
to the issues in focus. At the same time, the actors who are not invited must bear to be 
on the sidelines.  
 
Secondly, arranging is a key task. In order to solve problems jointly, actors need to 
participate in games. A risk in cooperation is to be exposed for free-riders or actors who 
pull out prematurely. If these risks are reduced, cooperation is easier. One way to 
achieve reduced risk is to arrange some kind of agreement, contract or joint venture, to 
regulate interaction. The arrangement should for instance provide regulating 
mechanisms to handle conflict. Game management potentially invites facilitators to 
facilitate interaction processes through ad hoc arrangements, directed towards 
supporting particular games. It is important to make a distinction between arranging 
and network structuring, which has permanent modifications in focus, through 
influencing the structure of a network.  
 
Brokerage or matching of problems, solutions and actors involves someone taking the 
role of a ‘broker’ or intermediary in order to manage a network. Policy processes have 
become increasingly fragmented. Problems, solutions and participation seem to develop 
independently of each other and must be brought together. The broker takes advantage 
of the diversity of ideas, insights and solutions available in a network, which would not 
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be mobilized without the brokers help. This makes the role of the broker important, but 
potentially conflicting.  
 
Facilitation of interaction is related to creating conditions for a successful development 
of a consensus building. The network manager must act as a facilitator or process 
manager, including a vast number of procedural activities. In order to foster conditions 
for consensus building, the facilitator may employ techniques, such as organizing 
workshops, conducting surveys, organizing brainstorming sessions, initiating role play 
and promoting collective image building (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987:154). These 
activities contribute towards increasing an understanding of the issues at stake, the 
diversity of ideas, the ability to appreciate each other’s viewpoint and the dedication to 
joint problem solving.  
 
The difference between facilitation and mediation and arbitration is that the latter is 
implemented at a time when conflict is present and the process of interaction is locked. 
The parties involved are responsible for researching a particular outcome. The mediator 
is not involved in the conflict and should not have any ties to the involved parties. 
Arbitration involves a third party who intervenes and imposes a solution if conflict 
cannot be handled.  
 
Network structuring can be regarded as a kind of institutionalization process. If the 
existing network is not able to handle problems, a modification of the network might be 
a solution.  
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According to Sharpf (1978:363) the structure of an organization rarely corresponds 
ideally to its task. Therefore, he does not recommend reorganization, as they usually are 
time-consuming and expensive. Structuring a network is challenging. While some 
scholars have more faith in the use of networks for influence, others are more concerned 
with the management of networks as a way of mobilizing and bringing conflict up to the 
surface. Existing networks may be disrupted by new coalitions or issue networks, which 
may change balance within the network (Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997:44-53, Klijn & 
Teisman, 1997:105).  
 
Implications of Strategies to Clusters  
Both explicit and more implicit strategies are developed in a cluster arena. Some 
strategies will be focused on a joint approach, while others will be targeted more toward 
achieving some kind of individual goals. The latter ones will usually not be explicitly 
communicated toward the surroundings.  
 
When it comes to game management, all pointers as presented by Kickert & Koppenjan 
(1997) may be present in the cluster arenas. Activating networks through some kind of 
interaction process is a common strategy for achieving a goal. When it comes to 
formalized cluster cooperation, usually network activation is carried out by (public) 
facilitator organizations. This is however not always the case, and it is considered a 
great advantage if actors in a ‘nodal position’ facilitate the cooperation. Arranging 
seems to be a kind of extension of activating a network, where more articulated 
agreements are made, but targeted towards a certain goal rather than towards structuring 
a network.  
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A brokerage may become necessary during a cluster development process. This may 
happen in both formalized and informal cluster arenas. Who takes this role, and whether 
it leads to successful results without increased levels of conflict, vary by case. Further, 
facilitation is key for the actors of cluster arenas to participate. Most actors are limited 
by hectic schedules and need structure and relevant information for active involvement. 
Good facilitation is however not a sufficient condition for involvement, and the 
engagement and capacity needed by a facilitator in order to get an overview of the field 
in focus is not always present.  
 
In a situation where conflict occurs, mediation or arbitration is usually needed in order 
to solve an issue. This is highly relevant in the case of clusters, where conflict occurs 
between more or less seemingly voluntary and independent actors. As some actors may 
have an interest in keeping a conflict alive, this might be a challenging task. As in 
brokerage, who takes the role as mediator and arbitrator is not irrelevant. In clusters, the 
same actors may occur as both brokers, facilitators and mediators, which may create a 
blurring of roles and trust issues toward surroundings.        
 
Network structuring can relate mainly to the formalized cluster arenas. As pointed out 
by Kickert & Koppenjan (1997:53) networks, or in this case formal cluster initiatives, 
may bring conflict up to the surface. Furthermore, the fact that one network or formal 
cluster arena might disrupt or be disrupted by the environment may rebalance the whole 
field. In the following section power play and games are presented as key processes of 
networks. 
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5.4.3 Power Play  
The process of policy-making can be analyzed as if it were a game. A game is defined 
as:  
an ongoing, sequential chain of (strategic) actions between different players 
(actors), governed by the players’ perceptions and by existing formal and 
informal rules, which develop around issues or decision in which the actors are 
interested (Klijn & Teisman, 1997:99, 101).  
The result of a game comes from the sum of strategies and interactions of the actors 
involved. The game is continuously changing, as both players and their strategies 
evolve. The strategies are formed by the perceptions of the involved actors, who 
construct their realities and contribute to the dynamics of the game.  
 
Actors’ perceptions are constructed within the institutional characteristics of the 
network. They encounter each other in more than one game, which means that strategies 
in one game can be influenced by other games involving the same network. In this 
sense, the relation patterns that have developed within the network over time (as a result 
of a series of interaction) influence both strategies and game outcomes.  
   
Klijn & Teisman (1997:90-91, 100) emphasize that there has been little attention paid to 
the context of the game. According to them, analysis should focus on identifying the 
games, the players and their perceptions and interests. In addition there is a need to 
focus on potential coalitions and if there are compromises made in the game.   
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Games are not played at random. Winning the game is a main objective. The rules 
structuring the game can be formal or informal and involves interactive decision-
making. The game is activated when ‘new’ challenges are brought up and action is 
called upon. When the issues in focus are no longer important, a game ends. Sometimes 
game players lose interest, as other issues become more pressing or if the opportunities 
to win the game are low. Consequently, the managers of networks must make sure to 
choose the right games, in addition to acting in accordance with the game (Lynn, 
1981:144-145).  
 
When operating within settings with multiple actors, there is a varying degree of 
freedom and flexibility of action. It is commonly assumed that involved actors will try 
to constrain each other, while keeping as much freedom as possible for themselves. 
Actors may extend the present freedom by developing strategies that fit within the 
context of the game. The resources that are divided between several actors are used to 
balance power in games. The games contain uncertainty, which cannot be controlled by 
any individual actor, but partly be influenced by a group of actors. Consequently, this 
uncertainty can be seen as a resource.  
 
As similar or the same types of games are carried out repeatedly, the actors’ relations 
develop patterns that reflect the games (Giddens, 1979, 1984). This leads to constantly 
(re)producing of the network, through changes in the concrete games. Over time, actors 
develop expectations on other actors’ behavior, which also influences further 
interactions. In concrete games, the actors try to identify what rules are appropriate in 
the current situation and what resources can be used to reach their goals, participate in 
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current situations or even create new ones. To what extent actors in games are 
concerned with other actors’ strategies, or the structure of the networks and games that 
they are involved in, and whether the actions of different actors are interconnected will 
probably vary.   
 
Consequences of interactions and games are not always possible to anticipate. Neither 
the consequences of future strategic actions or reviews of former ones can be 
acknowledged or recognized in current and future actions. This leads to uncertainties 
about consequences and the impact of actors’ behavior. Often, the goal of an actor 
participating in the game is defined or redefined during interaction.  
 
Actors construct ideas on what the game involves during the interaction process (Guba, 
1990; Van Twist & Termeer, 1991). Hence, the perceived realities of the actors become 
important, mediating between a complex reality and behavior. As noted, perceptions are 
relatively stable, but may develop during interaction and confrontations. This may lead 
to certain changes in the policy outcomes. Interactions sometimes cause major changes 
in the perceptions of actors, termed ‘a paradigmatic change’ (Rein & Schön, 1986). If 
paradigmatic changes occur, it leads to substantial changes in policies.  
 
Four sources of changes in perceptions can be identified. First of all, changes may occur 
due to interactions within a game, or in allied games that are played simultaneously. 
Secondly, the entrance of new players into the game introduces other perceptions and 
can cause changes in game interactions and patterns. Thirdly, perceptions can be 
changed by the (un)foreseen consequences of former games which bring about a change 
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in the game situation and subsequently lead actors to interpret their situation differently. 
Finally, the consequences of other games outside the network can change perceptions 
and patterns within the network. Thus, the games within the housing policy network can 
be influenced by games in for example infrastructure networks (Klijn & Teisman, 
1997:100-104).  
 
Implications of Power Play to Clusters  
As for policy networks, clusters are influenced by games. The games take place 
between actors within formal cluster initiatives and between actors or formalized cluster 
initiatives and the surroundings. As a result, it is not always easy to distinguish who is 
really a part of the game strategy or controversy. Some decisions are joint, some are 
individual and some are just blockings of others strategies.   
 
In clusters, the context of the game seems to be of great importance, as it influences 
what moves are possible to make. Compromises may be present, but not all actions will 
be known or visible to the involved actors. Rules in formal cluster initiatives might be 
formalized, but do not need to be. In informal cluster arenas, rules are rarely a topic. 
Norms will however be present in both places, but do not need to be shared by all 
stakeholders involved.  
 
Problems are continuously debated among the actors present in clusters. Debates on 
problems can start off games. When the problem in focus is no longer important, the 
game is regarded as finalized. Sometimes actors lose interest in the game, for instance 
when there are difficult to achieve results or when other games seem to be of greater 
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importance. As there will always be new topics or games to be involved in, what games 
to choose to invest time and resources in is a continuous challenge, both for the 
facilitators in cluster arenas, and for all actors involved. Furthermore, all games involve 
uncertainty, which is not possible to control at an individual level. Sometimes, games 
can be influenced by a group of actors, as for instance a formal cluster initiative, where 
actors are coordinated. The uncertainty related to such games can be a resource, but will 
always bring about challenges.   
 
Similar or the same types of games are carried out repeatedly, and actors develop 
patterns that reflect the games. This contributes to the reproduction of the cluster 
initiatives, as a consequence of changes in the concrete games. Actors in clusters also 
grow expectations on how other actors will behave, influencing the interaction and 
strategies made for the future. Some actors will develop strategies dependent on 
anticipations of how other actors may come to act, and make assumptions on whether 
other actors are interconnected. Sometimes, the perceptions on the interconnectedness 
of different actions and actors mean that conspiracy theories may flourish in the cluster 
environments. However, not all actors perceive their presence and actions in a cluster 
arena as part of one or more games.  
 
Consequences of games in clusters are difficult to anticipate, and there are will always 
be uncertainties connected to action. This calls for continuous improvisation, and may 
also alter the actors’ understandings of what their goals are. The game is sometimes 
bigger or has a different fit than the respective cluster, involving issues of relevance to 
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other kinds of participants. This again leads to challenges in orientation and 
expectations of the future. 
 
In the previous sections, theories on conflict, strategy and power play have been 
presented, which are key behaviors in networks and organizations. In the following 
sections, theories on types of organizational focus will be outlined. These theories are of 
relevance to looking into consequences of features and behavior among actors in 
clusters.  
 
5.5 Organizational Attention - Implications for Clusters   
In organizational theory, organizations are sometimes regarded as networks. Networks 
share important features with the organization. This makes organizational theory 
potentially relevant when looking into characteristics of networks and consequently also 
characteristics of clusters. In understanding networks and organizations, a distinction 
can be drawn between an orientation towards action and business versus an orientation 
towards talk and politics. According to Brunsson (1989), each represents two ideal 
types of organizational focus.  
 
Action and business are features that are often put in relation to the private sphere. 
Comparatively, talk and politics are often put in relation to a public sphere. These 
distinctions are not mutually exclusive and organizations may contain elements from 
both kinds of features. In clusters, actors from both public and private environments 
occur. This means that action/business- and talk/politics-orientation are present 
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simultaneously. The cluster becomes a meeting place for great varieties in culture, and 
may potentially produce challenges in understandings and approaches to goals. In the 
following sections, a theory on ideal types of organizations are presented, outlining 
issues of consequence for cluster cooperation and subsequently also for achieving the 
expected outcomes of such cooperation.  
 
5.5.1 Institutional Environments and Inconsistency  
Collective action is often regarded as the main function of an organization. This means 
that organizations are usually evaluated on their ability to act and produce some kind of 
product. There are however organizations that rarely generate coordinated action or 
develop products, but are still accepted by their environments. In fact, some 
organizations are less interested in nor even know what they are producing. Relevant 
examples can for instance be schools or universities.  
 
Conditions for coordinated action efficiently may change faster than the fashions in 
organizational development. The consequence may be that the institutional norms of an 
organization are out of step with the organization’s requirements for action. If this is the 
case, a dual set of organizational structures are developed, consequently targeting either 
institutional or action-oriented norms. The institutional norms represent the formal 
organization and are often presented in organizational charts. The action-oriented norms 
represent the informal organization, how things are done in ‘reality’ and are rarely 
available in written form.  
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As a consequence, the organizational processes are divided into ones that generate 
action and ones that do not, but only the latter remain on display toward the 
environment. Two façades are developed, one internally and one externally. This can be 
labeled ‘double standards’ or ‘double talk.’ An example is when the goals of the 
organization are presented differently to the outside world than to the workforce. 
Consequently, those on the inside of the organization and those on the outside get 
divergent ideas on how the organization should be understood and managed.  
 
A division in understanding is often present between various professional groups within 
the organization. It is common that organizations put great emphasis into avoidance of 
exposing conflicting norms and demands. Alternatively they might put an emphasis on 
the norms and demands shared by relevant groups. Some organizations develop an 
alternative approach, emphasizing and reflecting its inconsistencies in order to gain 
support, legitimacy and resources. This is for instance common for public organizations 
such as parliaments or multi-party organizations. Such organizations work to satisfy 
several environments, exposing their inconsistencies, while often still expected to 
produce some kind of organized action.  
 
For a greater understanding of an organization’s special features, both the features and 
the processes creating them must be investigated. It is key to understand how 
organizations and their members present themselves internally and externally, and to 
what extent there is a gap in this presentation. Failure to act may create issues of 
legitimacy towards the surroundings. Both actions and perceptions of the actions must 
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be researched in order to understand behavior and specific circumstances of action 
(Brunsson, 1989:4-14).  
 
Implications of Institutional Inconsistencies to Clusters  
The cluster is, as presented by Porter (1990, 1998), fundamentally concerned with 
collective action, although individual actors and organizations may have additional 
agendas. The goal of collective action is growth and innovation, both at an 
organizational and a regional level. As there are no easy recipes for innovation, what 
actually comes out of cluster cooperation is relatively uncertain.  
 
The communicated goal of a formal cluster initiative, both internally and externally, is 
some kind of innovation enhancement. The understanding on how this should be 
approached varies. Outcomes of such cooperative initiatives may not be as visible or 
grand as expected. As a result, the legitimacy of the initiative may decline, both among 
its members and toward the surroundings. This may however not necessarily happen. 
The unity among the members is usually ‘less set’ and the understanding of the goal 
among them will diverge, both due to the expectations of the cluster initiative, and due 
to the actual outcomes produced. Following this, a kind of ‘double standard’ may 
emerge, as two organizational structures are developed and applied to different actors 
simultaneously, one expecting action while the other does not.  
 
Brunsson (1998) distinguishes between two ideal types of organizations. One promotes 
action, while the other promotes politics. In the coming sections, the two ideal types 
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will be presented, potentially promoting some key aspects also present in cluster 
cooperation.  
 
5.5.2 The Action Organization: Agreements as a Principle  
Organizations structured in order to deal with action are concerned with how to avoid 
conflict. Situations with conflict should be resolved as soon as possible. Goals and 
purposes should be shared, both when it comes to recruitment and in terms of the 
organization’s ongoing work. The organizational hierarchy helps conflict solving, as the 
ones in charge decide on what is ‘right,’ what should be done and by whom, and by this 
process generates organized action.  
 
Similarly, a strong organizational ideology, where members possess the same ideas and 
values, helps with structuring and making sure that actors operate in an organized 
manner. Sometimes rules are less helpful in solving situations in a variable and 
unpredictable environment, and a more abstracted ideology might be necessary. A 
strong ideology can make it obvious what action should be taken, and put less emphasis 
on alternatives. The organizations devoted to action usually have strong and conclusive 
ideologies, with high degrees of consistency, meaning that there is coherence between 
what is said and done. 
 
Action organizations are pragmatic and more focused on solutions than problems. 
Suppression of conflict is common when the ideology is strong. Quite often, the 
perspectives of people within such organizations conflict extensively with the 
perspectives from the outside. As confidence of an organization affects its capacity for 
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action, and the insider is dependent on generating some kind of action, the insider 
cannot develop skeptical and critical perspectives to the same extent as an outsider. The 
action organization cultivates unitary perspectives about itself and the environment, but 
is not necessarily regarded rational. Its goal is to create enthusiasm, and it does not deal 
well with criticism. In action organizations, the processes of decision- and action-
making are usually short (Brunsson, 1989:15-19).  
 
Implications of the Action Organization to Clusters  
The action organization is close to what can be perceived ideal of a formalized cluster 
initiative, as presented in public strategies and in actual efforts. The expectation is that 
the cluster is focused on innovation as a relatively clear outcome of cooperation. 
Subsequently some kind of action is needed to achieve it. Organization and rules in 
clusters are rarely well developed, and there might be a range of conflicting goals and 
purposes among actors. Action organizations are less equipped for dealing with 
conflicting and unpredictable environments. Larger and informal cluster environments 
operate without any agreed upon regulations. This is usually also the case for more 
formalized cluster initiatives. Although equipped to handle conflict, this may not create 
ideal environments for developing cooperation on innovation. 
 
5.5.3 The Political Organization: Structure as a Principle  
The opposite of the action organization is the political organization. ‘Politics’ are used 
to describe when different groups with diverging interests interact with one another in 
various bargaining or blackmailing processes. Various groups exchange resources and 
power in order to maintain their own interests. The political organization is legitimized 
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by reflecting inconsistent norms, ideas and demands, and has no need to produce 
coordinated action. By reflecting inconsistencies, it satisfies the expectations of diverse 
groups in its environment, who then provide support. Structures and processes are 
demonstrated to the organization’s environment in order to demonstrate its ability to 
attend to its inconsistent demands.  
 
A fundament for the political organization is conflict. Member’s attachment to the 
organization is rooted in differences in perspectives on what the organization should do. 
Usually the members are representatives of various groups in the organization’s 
environment, while management usually reflects various groups internally. The goal of 
the political organization is to maintain conflicts, both to legitimize itself and its 
members. As the tendency to become and think more alike is common inside 
organizations, this is an important and challenging task. A tool to maintain differences 
is to develop several organizational ideologies, reflecting a complex environment with 
inconsistent ideas. The conflicts of the organization must be demonstrated to the outside 
world in order to keep the organization’s legitimacy. The members often view 
themselves primarily as representatives of interest groups or organizations with single 
ideologies (for instance political parties), rather than as representatives of the political 
organization.  
 
Mistrust and skepticism is accepted in the political organization. According to Brunsson 
(1989:24) “freedom of thought can be greater when it does not have to be subjected to 
the demands of common action. It is difficult simultaneously to promote free, visionary 
and innovative thinking and free, visionary and innovative action.” The political 
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organization embraces several ideologies and is prepared to understand the complex and 
ever-changing world. It is however more concerned with problems rather than solutions.  
 
Outputs of political organizations can be talk, decisions or physical products. Outputs 
can be used to reflect inconsistent norms in the environment, or in talk and decision. 
Inconsistency is a natural and expected output of the political organization, both 
between and within in the separate areas of outputs, talk and products. Hypocrisy is a 
fundamental type of behavior in the political organization, where talk may satisfy one 
demand, a decision may satisfy another and supplying a product may satisfy a third. As 
action takes place in the present, while talk and decisions are about the future, the latter 
are sometimes exploited as a compensation for the absence of productions or products 
favoring other interests. This may not necessarily be a conscious tactic by the involved 
parties, who might just have inconsistent values, interests and ideas. While 
inconsistencies in talk are related to variations in interests of involved parties, 
inconsistencies in decisions and productions are often a result of compromises. 
Inconsistencies may arise between the various outputs (Brunsson, 1989:19-29).  
 
Implications of the Political Organization to Clusters  
The political organization is concerned with diverging interests and is used to dealing 
with inconsistencies in terms of norms, ideas and demands. Talk is more important than 
action in such organization. The political organization is used to conflict and may even 
embrace it, as it reflects its variety. Conflicts are maintained in order to legitimize the 
existence of the organization and its members, and several ideologies are developed 
simultaneously. The members often represent other organizations or interest groups and 
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regard themselves as representatives for these views toward the political organization. 
This perspective works well with the nature of clusters, where the actors represent 
themselves and/or some organization. The representatives hold very little loyalty to the 
cluster, but use it as an arena to achieve their own, and not necessarily joint goals. 
Mistrust is common, as actors over time have learned that other actors are strategic 
players, and so they adapt and change in order to survive. As the political organization’s 
output may be talk or decisions, and not necessarily products, the expectations of their 
outcomes is quite different to an action organization.  
 
The mandate of a cluster initiative is innovation enhancement. They are in essence 
supposed to be less concerned with politics, conflicts and inconsistencies and more with 
action and visible results. Clusters are composed of a mix of public and private actors 
and become arenas where politics- and talk-oriented and business- and action-oriented 
cultures are brought together. Public and private actors usually have different 
perceptions of goals, as well as on approaches to processes and acceptable outcomes. In 
this sense, time might become a factor. While political oriented actors can deal with and 
identify conflicts, talk and issues of institutionalization are in their perspective a natural 
part of a development process. Comparatively, business oriented actors easily become 
impatient and expect faster and more tangible results. In itself, this culture clash may 
potentially create conflict.  
 
Quite often cluster initiatives are managed by public actors, which in nature are more 
oriented towards political organizational culture. A formalized cluster initiative is 
supposed to be a unit, someone joining forces in order to achieve innovation. At the 
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same time, the ones joining forces are expected to compete in order to achieve result. 
This duality is a complex, if not impossible task, and may definitely create some kind of 
hypocrisy for the actors involved. The subjects of politics and conflict of cluster 
cooperation are rarely dealt with in the academic literature or in strategic documents, 
but are highly present in practical efforts.     
 
5.5.4 Organizations – Business and Politics   
Organizational action can be linked to coordination, integration and uniformity and 
promote organizational structures, processes and outputs. Comparatively, organizational 
politics reflects inconsistencies and disintegration. Brunsson (1989:32) argues that 
theories about the political organization in nature conflict with theories on organizing 
for action. However, in order to understand the organizations in practice, both make out 
necessary contributions.  
 
Traditionally, public organizations such as governments are familiar with building 
legitimacy around a mix of action and politics. In comparison, business organizations 
are mainly concerned with action. Politics and inconsistency are becoming an 
increasingly important skill also for companies, a point made by both Brunsson 
(1989:33) and Porter (2000). Porter claims that companies must understand themselves 
in the context of their environments, and take other companies and the government into 
account when making decisions.  
 
Political behavior is usually quite difficult to disguise from interested observers. 
Explanations related to how such behavior contributes to external support are mainly 
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related to results (e.g. functional explanations) rather than to behavior (e.g. causal 
explanations). Surviving organizations are likely to have a certain measure of conflict, 
depression and hypocrisy. A causal explanation might be combined with the functional, 
assuming that individuals believe that ‘political’ measures will ensure the survival of 
the organization, that the opportunity to do so is present and that actors intend to do so 
in favor of pursuing more personal interests. This creates a strategic explanation. Not all 
causal explanations need to be strategic. Most organizational members place their 
organization close to the action ideal model, while political nature seldom is 
understood. Subsequently, if only one or a few people behave in order to help their own 
or some external group’s situation, this contributes to an unintended influence of the 
behavior of the organization as a whole (Brunsson, 1989:38-41).  
 
Features and behavior of power and politics influence opportunities in the cluster field. 
In this chapter theory on interests, perceptions, conflict, strategy development and 
power play have been presented, outlining key concerns in cluster cooperation. This 
outline was followed by a presentation of two ideal models of organizations, in which 
each represents logic that is brought together in clusters. In sum, the theories presented 
provide a fundament for looking into consequences of cluster cooperation and lead to 
answering and concluding on the main research question. In the following sections, the 
proposed research questions and the analytical model of this study is proposed, 
providing a key framework for the research. 
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5.6 Analytical Model and Research Questions  
According to Michael Porter (1990, 1998), increased productivity and innovation is an 
outcome of clusters. This assumption has led to the initiation of public cluster strategies, 
whose main goal is to enhance innovation by active engagement in cluster development. 
Data from the case in focus - the CI1, as well as observations from other cluster 
initiatives, made over the past decade, suggest that innovation as an outcome of initiated 
cluster cooperation rarely is case. 
 
Porter (1998:45) defines innovation “to include both improvements in technology and 
better methods or ways of doing things. It can be manifested in product changes, 
process changes, new approaches to marketing, new forms of distribution, and new 
concepts of scope.” This can be regarded a relatively wide, but currently relevant 
definition. In this study, a second premise has for practical purposes been added: The 
output must be regarded an innovation by the involved actors in the cluster initiative in 
order to qualify as innovation.  
 
This study seeks to show why innovation is fundamentally difficult to achieve in 
initiated cluster cooperation, using the following interlinked observations and 
arguments:  
- Actors in clusters come from both public and private environments. They have a 
variety of goals, interests and perceptions. This leads to a ‘clash of cultures’ that 
challenges the focus on innovation. This can be labeled the feature argument;   
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- The mix of interest and perceptions among actors in clusters further leads to 
conflicting behaviors, strategies and games, resulting in issues of trust, which 
challenges the focus on innovation. This can be labeled the behavior argument;    
- The process of developing a cluster while taking the features and behavior of 
actors in to account is underestimated. Although both business/action and 
politics/talk oriented actors are involved, talk/politics seems to dominate cluster 
cooperation, which creates issues of legitimization and challenges the focus on 
innovation. This can be labeled the politics argument. 
 
These arguments suggest that the clusters have some features that may challenge the 
opportunities for achieving innovation as a result of cluster cooperation. Subsequently, 
the main research question proposed in this study is:  
 
Why does cluster cooperation seldom result in innovation?  
 
 
The main research question rests on two premises. The first one is that there has been a 
development and popularization of cluster and innovation theories the past two decades. 
The second one is that this popularization has led to the development of both public and 
private cluster strategies for innovation enhancement. In other words, these cluster 
strategies are present both at governmental and organizational levels. This means that 
clusters are promoted toward the audiences of research, business and government 
strategists, either in the form of extended business opportunities or in the form of 
overall regional development.  
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In a European context, over the past two decades innovation has entered the stage of 
public awareness, with an emphasis on how to achieve and support development 
processes with strategic efforts. The term ‘cluster’ is used on two types of regional 
arenas for interaction, information sharing and debates. This creates confusion in theory 
and the practical field. The cluster strategies have led to the initiation of formalized 
cluster initiatives, which are arenas actively used as tools in regional development. The 
larger and informal cluster arena usually provides a fundament for the formal cluster 
initiatives, and has emerged more naturally over time. Both are in the shape of some 
kind of network.   
 
The initiated, formalized cluster initiative is a smaller type of network constellation that 
is usually developed into some kind of organization. The formalized cluster consists of 
representatives from the target business or businesses and R&D. It is however often 
initiated, facilitated and/or financed by or with support from public governments. These 
cluster initiatives are definable through a formalized member-base. Who is involved 
will vary depending on the actual focus, who is admitted, who is interested, etc. Ideally, 
these formal arenas should be driven by business stakeholders, who increase their 
legitimacy through knowing the field and its challenges. More commonly, they are 
initiated and ‘held up’ by some kind of institution or public government organ, which 
usually is the case for Norwegian cluster arenas.  
 
The goals of these formal cluster initiatives are usually relatively precise and targeted 
toward the interests of the members, concerned with concrete cooperation among the 
involved members and steps for taking action when it comes to innovation cooperation. 
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Consequently, the formal cluster arenas are expected to deal with some kind of issues of 
innovation, business development, with a focus on action.  
 
The informal cluster arena is a larger arena, a network of interconnected actors, 
surrounding one or more formal cluster initiatives. This arena is not initiated, but has 
naturally grown into its state. It relates to a business field and its surroundings, and 
includes the sum of public and private actors involved in the field, as well as the various 
formal cluster arenas that may be present. Due to its fluctuating features, it is more 
difficult to define and delineate who are the representatives in this arena. The informal 
cluster arena becomes important, as there is a need for conversations related to 
innovation and cluster development and how the field should be organized. As a result, 
this arena is more concerned with structural problems of regional development and the 
politics of innovation.  
 
Innovation enhancement is the main goal of cluster strategizing. A more precise 
distinction between the goals of the actors involved in clusters can be made: Business 
organizations focus mainly on meso level considerations or business development 
aspects, while the governmental focus is mainly on macro level considerations or 
regional development. 
 
The research rests on a working hypothesis suggesting that power and politics in and 
around clusters deflects the original focus of the cluster. This leads to competition and 
rivalry among the actors present. In order to answer the main research questions, the 
following analytical model has been proposed, explaining how the features and 
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behaviors of actors in clusters ‘disturbs’ actors attention on innovation towards talk and 
politics: 
 
Conceptual Framework 5.1 
 
Cluster theories 
p 
Cluster strategies 
p 
Initiation of one or more formal cluster initiatives (n) 
Surrounding informal cluster arena 
                                                                          p 
RQ1: 
Complex features of actors  
Diverse/multiple interests Diverse/multiple perceptions 
    p 
RQ2: 
Complex behavior among actors 
Conflict Strategy development Power play 
                                                                          p 
RQ3: 
 Strong features of politics/talk 
   p 
Challenges opportunities for business/action 
   p 
Poor environment for innovation 
   p 
Cluster struggles/cannibalism/death 
 
The analytical model rests on the proposition of the following sub-research questions:  
  
Research question 1 
When observing cluster initiatives as key outcomes of cluster strategy implementation;  
What features characterizes the actors of clusters? 
 
Clusters are complex due to their network-like features. This leads to challenges in 
organizing the field and consequently also in the attention on innovation. In clusters, 
actors from both public and private environments meet. They have a variety in 
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expectations, interests and perceptions, which leads to a culture clash and challenges the 
focus on innovation. This makes out the feature argument.  
 
The formal and informal cluster arenas are in the shape of a network, and includes 
multiple and diverse stakeholders, from both public and private organizations (Kickert 
et al, 1997). Although innovation is a joint goal in clusters, these arenas are different to 
many other types of network constellations, as the involved actors in general have 
various and diverse interests and perceptions (Pfeffer 1981; Morgan 2006).  
 
The expressed goal of the cluster is innovation and economic enhancement (Porter, 
1990, 1998), which in essence demands some kind of action and business focus 
(Brunsson, 1989). Simultaneously, politics and talk are key components in both the 
formal and informal cluster fields. The proportion of action- and talk-orientation will 
differ between cluster arenas, depending on culture and specific circumstances. The 
diversity in interests of the actors present in the cluster, which further lead to diversity 
in understandings and perceptions of the actors present in the cluster. 
 
The formal cluster initiative can be regarded as a hybrid organization, accommodating a 
range of expectations and goals. The hybrid form and the actors’ diversities in goals 
make commitment hard. Involved actors have an overall expectation on outcomes of 
innovation. Simultaneously, two types of attentions seem to collide: A regional 
development orientation, which is more policy and talk focused; and a business 
development orientation, which is more business and action focused. Actors who have a 
214
 
focus on business (action) will usually be in majority in the formal clusters, but are not 
necessarily the dominating force.   
 
Participation in formal clusters is mainly a secondary activity for involved parties. This 
has influence on interests and prioritizing. Activity and commitment resembles 
‘voluntary’ efforts and the actual drivers of cluster development are usually few. As the 
formal cluster initiatives represent a range of actors with different views and 
perceptions (Termeer & Koppenjan, 1997), the actors who are perceived as the most 
influential usually become the ‘drivers’ and ‘agenda holders’ of the cluster initiative. 
They can get this position for various reasons, such as financial assistance, facilitation 
or professional competence. The drivers of a cluster initiative holds power over its 
development, and may through their domination cause conflict of interests internally, 
towards the informal cluster arena or other formal cluster arenas. 
 
Research question 2 
When observing the complex features of clusters;  
What behavior characterizes the actors of clusters? 
 
The clusters are characterized by complexity, due to their network-like features, mix of 
public and private culture, and issues of diversity in interests and perceptions, which 
leads to behavior of conflict, strategy development and power play among actors. This 
is the sum of the feature argument and the behavior argument. 
 
The clusters experience conflicting issues and visible and invisible conflicts, both 
internally and towards the surroundings (Pfeffer, 1981; Morgan, 2006). As a result, 
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strategies for achieving various types of goals (Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997) are 
developed and issues of trust are tested in power play or games (Pfeffer 1981; Klijn & 
Teisman 1997). This may lead to competition and/or difficulties with cooperation 
among actors. The power plays and games are often characterized by a ‘cowboy style’ 
approach to dealing with issues of conflict. This usually heats up the conflict level. 
Consequently, conflict, strategies and power play leads to difficulties in cooperation. 
This again leads to attention on political issues rather than business issues, which lead 
to competition among and between formal cluster initiatives and their facilitators, 
mainly related to issues on how to organize the field, rather than actual attention related 
to innovation. A distinction goes between issues of game management, which relates to 
organizing strategies in relation to political field, and issues of network structuring, 
which relates to the institutionalization process of a cluster. 
 
Research question 3  
When taking the features and behavior of cluster actors into account;  
What are the consequences of cooperation on innovation in clusters?  
 
 
The increase in application of cluster strategies has led to the establishment of several 
formal cluster initiatives. The result is that several formal initiatives end up in a 
competing or partly competing situation, for instance targeting the same actors and 
funding. In both the formal and informal cluster arena there is a distinction between 
what seems to concern public actors and private actors. The stakeholders have (at least) 
two differing types of interest, which shapes their understandings and approaches in 
these arenas: politics (talk) and business (action) (Brunsson, 1989).  
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The formal cluster initiatives are individually concerned with action, business and 
innovation thinking. The conditions surrounding the formal cluster initiatives lead to a 
reinforced emphasis on features such as multiple interests and multiple perceptions, 
increasing the orientation towards politics and talk. Consequently, public actors, who 
are trained in talk and politics, are much more present and dominating in the cluster 
field. The political features contribute to increased levels of conflict and competition, 
strategy development and power play present both within the formal and informal 
cluster. This means that the attention on innovation as a direct outcome of cluster 
cooperation becomes increasingly challenging.  
 
A set of actors wish to influence the field of clusters. They are present both at the 
smaller, formalized cluster initiatives and at the larger informal arenas of clusters. The 
clusters are characterized by: (1) Actors from both public and private environments, 
with a variety of expectations, interests and perceptions, which leads to a ‘clash of 
cultures’ that challenges the focus on innovation; (2) A mix of interest and perceptions, 
which leads to behaviors of conflicts, strategies and power play or games between 
actors that result in issues of trust and challenge the focus on innovation; and (3) A 
process of developing clusters that seems to be underestimated. Although both 
business/action and talk/politics oriented actors are involved, talk/politics in features 
and behaviors seems to dominate cluster cooperation, creating issues of legitimization 
and challenging the focus on innovation.  
 
The arguments outlined make out the sum of the feature argument, the behavior 
argument and the politics argument. Together they lead to great disturbances in the 
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development of formal cluster initiatives. These circumstances produce conflict within 
and between various cluster initiatives, as well as between other actors present in the 
informal arenas of clusters.  
 
As several cluster initiatives are oriented towards the same resources, ‘political’ aspects 
of such cooperation are strengthened. In the longer run, some cluster initiatives are 
enlarged, some are merged, while others are closed down. In this study, these 
phenomena are called cluster cannibalism.     
 
Not all actors perceive the goal of innovation as a reachable goal within the formal 
arenas. Consequently, they participate for various other reasons, which are rarely 
communicated. These observed features suggest that the cluster arenas have some 
challenging issues in achieving innovation, but may be useful for other purposes. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter presents theoretical contributions related to politics and organization 
theory, which may help explain key features and behavior in cluster cooperation, but is 
not presented in the cluster theory itself. The cluster can be regarded as a kind of 
network of interrelated actors with both similar and competing interests. ‘Politics’ is 
understood as the interaction process between different groups with diverging interests, 
where the mix of interests and perceptions leads to a behavior of conflict and 
competition, strategy development and power play among actors. The presentation of 
theory leads up to the introduction of an analytical research model, proposed to answer 
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the main research question: Why does cluster cooperation seldom result in innovation? 
The following chapter introduces the analysis and deals with key features of actors in 
cluster cooperation.  
219
 
 
220
 
Chapter 6 – Features in Clusters 
6.1 Introducing Research Question One  
The goal of this dissertation is to explain why cluster cooperation seldom result in 
innovation. The main research question rests on the preconditions that the 
popularization of cluster theories has led to an introduction of cluster strategies that 
again has lead to the establishment and emergence of new arenas for interaction among 
public and private actors, of both formal and informal character. 
 
In order to answer the main research question, data from the case of the CI1 is 
highlighted, investigating both how the CI1 has been perceived as a formal cluster 
initiative and how it has interacted with its surrounding environment, the informal 
cluster arena, in pivotal affairs. The data used for analysis in the following three 
chapters are four key events in the life of the CI1: Event 1: Funding & public 
competition; Event 2: Cluster competition – part one; Event 3: Public regulation 
interference, and; Event 4: Cluster competition – part two.  
 
The analysis is concerned with how power and politics influence cluster cooperation 
and subsequently deals with features of actors in clusters, behavior of actors in clusters, 
and what this leads to. In this chapter sub-research question one is proposed for 
analysis: When observing cluster initiatives as key outcomes of cluster strategy 
implementation; What features characterize the actors of clusters? 
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The previous chapters have dealt with theories on clusters and innovation systems, as 
well as a selection of organizational theories on power and politics. In order to answer 
research question one, theories dealing with features of actors will be applied to the 
analysis, with a focus on issues related to interests and perceptions. In the following 
sections, the analytical framework for the first part of the analysis is presented.  
 
6.1.2 Analytical Framework  
The meeting between public and private actors within the arenas of clusters exhibits 
varieties in interests and perceptions. This again leads to cultural clashes and challenges 
the attention on innovation. This presents the feature argument, as outlined in the 
presentation of the analytical model in Chapter 5, section 5.6. Research question one is 
proposed to deal with key features of actors in clusters, which are presented in the 
following part of the analytical model: 
 
Model 6.1 Part of Analytical Model Relevant for Research Question One  
 
Cluster arenas 
p 
RQ1: 
Complex features of actors  
Diverse/multiple interests Diverse/multiple perceptions 
 
 
Both the formal initiatives and informal cluster arenas, which are shaped as various 
types of networks, include multiple and diverse stakeholders, from both public and 
private organizations (Kickert et al:1997). Although innovation is a joint goal in 
clusters, these arenas are different to many other types of network constellations, as the 
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involved actors in general have various and diverse interests (Pfeffer, 1981; Morgan, 
2006). The analysis of interests will be dealt with in part 6.2.  
 
The expressed goal of clusters is innovation and economic enhancement (Porter, 1990; 
1998), which presupposes some kind of action and business focus (Brunsson, 1989). 
Furthermore, politics and talk are key components in clusters. The proportion of action- 
and talk-orientation will differ between cluster arenas, depending on culture and 
specific circumstances. The diversity in interests of the actors present in the cluster, 
which further lead to diversity in understandings and perceptions of the actors present in 
the cluster (Termeer & Koppenjan, 1997). The analysis of perceptions will be dealt with 
in section 6.3. 
 
The formal cluster arenas can be regarded as hybrid organizations, accommodating a 
range of expectations and goals. The hybrid form and actors’ diversities in goals make 
commitment hard. Involved actors have an overall expectation on outcomes of 
innovation. Simultaneously, two types of attentions seem to collide: A regional 
development orientation, which is more policy and talk focused; and a business 
development orientation, which is more business and action focused. Actors who have a 
focus on business will usually be in the majority in the formal cluster arenas, but are not 
necessarily the dominating force.   
 
Participation in formal clusters is mainly a secondary activity for involved parties. This 
has influence on interests and prioritizing. Activity and commitment resembles 
‘voluntary’ efforts and the actual drivers of cluster development are usually few. As the 
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formal cluster initiatives represent a range of actors with different views and 
perceptions (Termeer & Koppenjan, 1997), the actors who are perceived as the most 
influential usually become the ‘drivers’ and ‘agenda holders’ of the cluster initiative. 
They can get this position for various reasons, such as financial assistance, facilitation 
or professional competence. The drivers of a cluster initiative holds power over its 
development, and may through their domination cause conflict of interests internally, 
towards the informal cluster arena or other formal cluster arenas. 
 
The following sections deal with the analysis of the four identified main events in the 
life of the CI1. The main focus of the analysis is on the identification of characteristic 
features of the formal and informal cluster arenas: interests and perceptions.  
 
6.2 Analysis of Interests  
The following sections deal with the analysis of interests in relation to Event 1: Funding 
& public competition; Event 2: Cluster competition – part one; Event 3: Public 
regulation interference, and; Event 4: Cluster competition – part two. Interests of actors 
make out a key feature of relevance when looking at cluster cooperation in relation to 
power and politics.  
 
6.2.1 Event 1: Funding & Public Competition  
Looking into the explanations on why the ‘announced’ financial support from the NGO 
never became a reality, or rather, what happened during August 2007 and November 
2008, several interests are involved, which might have influenced the process of the 
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application. The obvious actors who might have had an interest in the outcome of the 
funding application was the CI1, the RBF and the NGO, in addition to various and 
potentially competing initiatives which were already affiliated with the NGO.  
 
The application for funding concerned the initiation and development of the CI1. 
Funding would provide necessary resources in order to get the initiative started, and at 
the same time it would contribute with public legitimacy. The Initiator and the CI1 
members had an obvious interest in making this happen. As most of this situation 
occurred, the CI1 was still in an early phase, meaning that few people were involved in 
any issues related to the CI1. In reality, only the Initiator had involvement in the 
application process, and his role was highly limited related the events occurring.  
The CI1 pilot had become a project under the umbrella of the RBF. The RBF had an 
active facilitator role in developing the CI1 and had taken charge of developing the 
application for funding. The facilitator tasks were filled by the Project Manager and 
myself, who were employed by the RBF to work on the CI1. We would form the CI1 
Working Group in the following months. In this respect, both the RBF as an 
organization, as well as the Project Manager and myself had an interest in success for 
the CI1 pilot and consequently also the application for funding.  
 
Initially, a NGO representative had, on behalf of the NGO organization, expressed an 
interest in funding the CI1 pilot. Some time later, another NGO representative 
articulated concern due to potential competition related to other projects in his area of 
responsibility. It is possible to argue that the two representatives had diverging interests, 
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or at least, diverging perspectives which led to different priorities in terms of the CI1 
application.     
 
Both the NGO and the RBF had an interest in supporting and/or facilitating the most 
sustainable and strong projects available in this business field. Whether the quality of 
the CI1 pilot project was good enough was never a mutual topic of conversation. At this 
point in time, the proposal for the CI1 pilot was reviewed by one of the NGO 
representatives, and the suggested comments were taken into account when developing 
the application. On this basis, the assumption was that the quality of the application for 
a pilot was up to expected standards.  
 
The NGO and the RBF had the same overall goal of enhancing innovation within the 
Oslo region. At the same time there seemed to be different understandings on how the 
goals should be approached and who should be involved. In reality the two 
organizations definitely had overlapping interests, but these interests could also turn 
into competition, in terms of who would be credited for success, and also in terms of 
steering approaches and professional perspectives.  
 
Further, the RBF, but the NGO in particular, had additional projects and goals to take 
into account, which increased the complexity when deciding what priorities to make. 
The NGO had several other initiatives, of more of less competitive character in their 
portfolio. These initiatives might have had interests in accessing the same funding, but 
were to anyone’s knowledge, not involved in the events playing out between August 
2007 and November 2008. Inside the NGO there also seemed to be differing opinions as 
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to whether there was any real competition between the proposed CI1 pilot and other 
projects affiliated with the NGO.  
 
According to various sources, the managers of the RBF and the NGO had a somewhat 
challenging relationship. This did not help the communication or the general 
cooperative climate between the two organizations, but emphasized the potential 
diversified interests and competitive climate. Whether it actually influenced the 
situation related to the CI1 application is difficult to estimate. As the relationship 
between the two organizations became increasingly tense, it definitely had an impact on 
opportunities for solving any misunderstandings. The sum of interests of potential 
relevance in the case of the application for funding of the CI1 is relatively extensive. 
Key interests can be summarized in table 6.1: 
 
Table 6.1 Interests - Event 1 
Organizations/cluster initiatives: Overall interests: 
The CI1  Realize the CI1 pilot, with a focus on creating 
business opportunities and solve problems for public 
actors. Secure funding and legitimacy for the CI1  
The RBF Develop successful cluster projects in the RBF 
portfolio, in accordance with the RBF philosophy: 
Realize the CI1 pilot and secure funding and 
legitimacy for the CI1 in the longer run 
The NGO  Support the best cluster projects available. 
Secure power over professional development in 
field, in accordance with the NGO philosophy 
Various potentially competing 
initiatives affiliated with the NGO 
Secure funding, secure legitimacy 
 
 
In the situation developing in relation to the financial application, it seems like there 
was more than one issue occurring simultaneously. During interviews, several 
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explanations were proposed to make sense of what might have caused the reluctant 
process between the NGO, the CI1 and the RBF. A majority of the explanations then 
seemed to be related to other interests than the actual application of the CI1.  
 
The data material shows that the communication seemed to develop at several ‘levels’ 
within the organizations. This means that there was one conversation going on between 
the CI1 management and the NGO, a second conversation going on between various 
representatives in the RBF and the NGO, as well as a third conversation developing 
between the management of the RBF and the NGO. When dealing with ‘loose’ 
organizational and network structures, where there are somewhat unclear boundaries 
between who is responsible for what, this seems to be a prevalent outcome.  
 
6.2.2 Event 2: Cluster Competition – Part One  
In the events and happenings leading up to the dispute between the CI1, the BFO and 
the CI2, several sets of overlapping and competing interests revealed themselves. First 
of all, the PDC had an interest in developing successful business projects. In relation to 
such goal, the company had, among a range of other projects, involved themselves and 
dedicated time and resources to the CI1 pilot. Inside the PDC, the responsibility of the 
CI1 was mainly the Initiators’. A couple of months into the initiation of the CI1 pilot, 
the CI1 Project Manager was hired by the PDC to contribute to another project. Both 
the Initiator and the Project Manager had an interest in making their project with the 
PDC as successful as possible. Simultaneously, they were engaged with developing the 
CI1 in the best way. At this point in time, there seemed to be dual and overlapping 
interests between the CI1 and the PDC.  
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Comparatively, the BFO and its representative had an interest in developing the CI2 in 
accordance to their plans and philosophy. This included attracting (new) members and 
securing a competitive profile in the making. Additionally, the BFO had an interest in 
being credited for their contributions in cooperative projects, and the lack thereof 
became a paramount reason for the fall-out between the BFO/CI2 Facilitator and the 
CI1 management a few months later. Overall, the BFO and the CI2 seemed to have truly 
overlapping interests.  
 
Finally, all actors, and in particular the representatives from the CI1 and the CI2, had an 
interest in being kept well informed about initiatives and opportunities developing in the 
field, which could influence the development of their activities. Potentially, they may 
also have had an interest in holding information back, which could secure their 
competitive position. The sum of interests of potential relevance in the case of the inter 
cluster competition can be summarized in table 6.2: 
 
Table 6.2 Interests – Event 2 
Organizations/cluster initiatives: Overall interests: 
The PDC Overall attention: Create successful business projects.  
Contributing to realizing the CI1 pilot, with a focus on 
creating business opportunities for the company, as 
well as valuable contacts 
The CI1 Realize the CI1 pilot, with a focus on creating 
business opportunities and problem solving for public 
actors. Securing external visibility in order to achieve 
legitimacy and attract members in the long run 
The BFO Represent members and issues of importance. Secure 
funding for maintaining the organization. 
Secure power over professional development in field, 
in accordance with BFOs philosophy. Realize the CI2  
The CI2  Realize the CI2, with a focus on representing key 
members’ interest. Secure an active and interested 
member base, as well as funding and legitimacy. 
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Looking at the situation related to the encounter between the CI1 and the BFO, data 
shows that experienced competition and colliding interests seemed to be a main source 
of conflict. Competition was increasing, due to an increased interest in the business 
field, and consequently an interest in accessing the same key actors, resources and time. 
Even if the two initiatives were focusing on different goals, competition became the 
focus, probably related to the access of various types of (potential) resources. Increasing 
distrust also appeared and created problems for developing a cooperative platform.    
 
6.2.3 Event 3: Public Regulation Interference  
Several organizations seemed to have interests in the issues occurring between the GDO 
and the CI1. First of all, the CI1 had several active interests. Beyond the overall goal of 
creating a stable and successful initiative, with well-developed innovation projects, the 
CI1 was interested in being legitimized by the GDO. Initially, this had not been a topic, 
but as the GDO had (increasing) influence over the public organizations involved in the 
CI1, and the organizational landscape was changing in the direction of more influence 
to the GDO, this was becoming key for providing a successful initiative. The clue was 
to make sure that the public organizations would remain actively involved in the CI1 in 
order for the innovation projects to be further developed. The presence of the public 
organizations was also pivotal in recruiting new members to the CI1.  
 
The GDO on the other hand had an active interest in making sure that the procurement 
policy was followed and that the demander organizations realized the importance of 
keeping strictly to it. Furthermore, the public organizations individually had an interest 
in keeping their autonomy. This was a matter of principle, as they wanted their 
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participation in various types of inter-organizational activities to be decided by their 
own discretion, rather than by regulations made by the GDO.  
 
Finally, the RBF had an interest in securing the development of the CI1 and the 
investments already carried out. These interests were of less relevance in the actual 
situation occurring between the GDO and the CI1, but made the RBF play a role in 
searching for information in order to find out details in the reactions of the GDO. The 
sum of interests has been summarized in table 6.3: 
 
Table 6.3 Interests – Event 3 
Organizations/cluster initiatives: Overall interests: 
The CI1  Realize the CI1 pilot 
Secure funding and legitimacy for the CI1.  
Secure participation from key members of the CI1 
The GDO Secure regulations and GDO philosophy 
Keep power and visibility towards the public 
organizations under GDO jurisdiction  
The public organizations, 
affiliated with the GDO and 
members of the CI1 
Secure problem solving  
Access and knowledge to development in business 
field, in order to make the best possible choices  
Keeping autonomy 
The RBF Secure legitimacy for projects in the RBF portfolio  
 
 
The events occurring in relation to the GDOs ‘disapproval’ of the CI1 came to have 
large consequences for the life of the CI1. The GDO operated with a set of official 
reasons in addition to a set of unofficial reasons for the negative reactions towards the 
CI1. Potentially both had relevance for the events developing.  
 
6.2.4 Event 4: Cluster Competition – Part Two  
Looking into the communication and interactions between the CI1 and the CI3, and how 
it developed during summer and autumn 2009, it is possible to identify a set of colliding 
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interests, both between the two initiatives and the surroundings involved. Initially, the 
CI1 did not believe that the CI3 would cause any form of competition. In the starting 
phase, the business focus was different and the CI1 and the CI3 seemed to have 
diverging interests. After some time, the CI3 changed its focus and developed in a 
direction closer to the CI1. At this point the interests of the CI1 and the CI3 became 
more similar, but also increased the competitive elements, as they were focused towards 
a similar member base and resources.    
 
At the time the meetings between the CI1 and the CI3 were held, the CI3 was 
developing its initiative and had an interest in providing a solid member-base as well as 
legitimacy for its organization. Some of the members that were interested in engaging 
were already involved in the CI1. Accordingly, the CI3 was not aware of this when they 
started their recruitment process.  
 
As facilitators, both the RBF and PDFO had an interest in making their respective 
cluster initiatives succeed. This would also secure a professional development of the 
field in line with their diverging philosophies. Somewhat simplified, the main actors 
who had had an interest in the development and fate of the CI1 and CI3 initiatives are 
summarized in table 6.4: 
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Table 6.4 Interests – Event 4 
Organizations/cluster initiatives: Overall interests: 
The CI1  Realize the CI1 pilot, with a focus on creating 
business opportunities and problem solving for public 
actors  
Secure funding and legitimacy for the CI1  
Be the initiative of choice to the actors in the field  
The RBF Develop successful cluster projects in the RBF 
portfolio, in accordance with the RBF philosophy. 
Realize the CI1 and secure funding and legitimacy  
The PDFO Secure power over professional development in field, 
in accordance with the NGO philosophy  
The CI3  Secure funding, secure legitimacy 
Be the initiative of choice to the actors in the field 
 
Looking at the situation developing for the CI1, the presence of the CI3 was causing a 
new major challenge in terms of competition.  As the CI1 faced new difficulties, the 
most relevant option seemed to be to suggest cooperation between the two initiatives. 
For several reasons, the CI3 rejected this opportunity. During interviews, various (and 
potentially pretty farfetched) perceptions on what might have caused the rejection, were 
proposed by actors close to the CI1.  
 
6.2.5 Summary of Interests 
The previous sections show how a range of interests among actors were at stake in the 
four events analyzed. Key interests were related to developing the CI1 as an initiative, 
to developing other cluster initiatives, or alternatively to hindering competition or the 
presence of the CI1 or another cluster initiative. Additionally, actors close to the cluster 
initiatives, such as the ‘facilitator organizations’ RBF, BFO and PDFO had interests 
related to ensuring their own position, using their respective cluster initiatives as tools 
in fights. Finally, ranges of interests related to the involved actors and organizations of 
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the cluster initiatives were present, of which the data in this analysis is not able to say 
too much about.  
 
The analysis shows a fuzzy overview of the landscape where a variety of actors 
represent more than one interest. All in all, the opportunity to keep track of these 
interests when participating in a cluster seems to be limited and will potentially cloud 
actors’ involvement. The multiple and diverging interests among actors potentially leads 
to multiple and diverse perceptions. In the next part of this chapter, perceptions related 
to the four events of the CI1 are analyzed.   
 
6.3 Analysis of Perceptions 
The following sections deal with the analysis of perceptions of actors in relation to 
Event 1: Funding & public competition; Event 2: Cluster competition – part one; Event 
3: Public regulation interference, and; Event 4: Cluster competition – part two. 
Perceptions of actors make out a key feature of relevance when looking at cluster 
cooperation in relation to power and politics.  
 
6.3.1 Event 1: Funding & Public Competition  
The perceptions in the case of the CI1 funding application can be distinguished into 
three main categories, with subsequent sub-explanations:   
 
1) The relationship between the NGO and the RBF 
a) General (competitive) climate between the facilitators in the regional field  
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b) Different professional perspectives related to the development of the cluster field 
c) Poor communication between the NGO and the RBF 
d) A challenging relationship between the managers of the NGO and the RBF 
 
2) Issues related to the NGO 
a) Challenged systems for handling of proceedings inside the NGO 
b) Internal debates/conflicts on what projects to support by the NGO 
 
3) Sensitivity related to the CI1 itself   
a) Sensitivity of the project and the project idea - competition 
b) Issues related to how the CI1 was designed 
c) Sensitivity related to the Initiators role in the project 
 
The perceptions revealed targeted the understanding of the specific actors and the 
involved organizations, as well as the understanding of the actions occurring, where 
some seemed to be interlinked. Some of the interpretations also seemed to be related to 
previous experiences of cooperative efforts and conflicts, rather than on actual events 
occurring during the case of the application.  
 
For instance, in the period between August 2007 and November 2008, the trust between 
the NGO and the RBF seemed to be declining. The two organizations had, previous to 
this time period, had several encounters challenging their relationship, mainly related to 
different professional perspectives on approaches and developments in the field.  
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A key perception among the CI1-engaged actors was that the financial resources 
seemed to be held back due to controversies related to certain elements of the RBF or 
the CI1. This was not possible to prove, but the perception seemed to hold strong and 
shape an understanding about NGOs unwillingness to participate with financial support 
or legitimacy.  
 
Apart from perceptions related to the relationship between the NGO and the RBF, both 
internal issues related to the NGO and issues related to the CI1 itself were offered as 
explanations.  
 
There is little reason to suggest any single dominating explanation of the perceptions 
presented. They may all have had some relevance for the situation occurring, and could 
have occurred simultaneously, as neither can be regarded mutually excluding. Different 
perceptions were proposed by different people, both during the events occurring and 
during the reflective interviews in relation to this research. In retrospect, it seemed like 
several of the actors involved favored more ‘conspiring’ explanations, an element which 
will repeat itself in the following analysis.   
 
A relatively long list of perceptions related to how the funding situation developed was 
revealed, both during interviews and in observations. These perceptions contributed to a 
distrustful environment, and led to a more competitive and less cooperative climate 
between the NGO and the RBF.  
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6.3.2 Event 2: Cluster Competition – Part One  
Interviewing the involved parties, it seemed like the CI1 management was convinced 
that the strong reactions of the BFO/CI2 Facilitator were strictly connected to the 
potentially competitive aspects of the newly established CI1 and the planned CI2. The 
BFO/CI2 Facilitator did not reject the competitive aspect.  
 
The BFO/CI2 Facilitator perception was (partly) that the CI1 representatives had been 
holding back information about the establishment of the initiative intentionally, while 
they had a chance to learn more about the CI2s plan of action. The Facilitator did not 
however reject the idea that the whole situation was rooted in a somewhat untidy 
handling.  
 
As a result of the confrontation occurring, the BFO/CI2 Facilitator had become 
increasingly concerned with searching for potentially ulterior motives related to the CI1. 
A key motive was found as the most important company involved in the CI2 turned out 
to be a major competitor to the PDC’s subsidiary company. This would potentially 
increase the competition between the CI2 and the CI1 further, as they were 
subsequently representing two competing companies. As both the Initiator and the 
Project Manager, key representatives for the CI1, was now representing both the CI1 
and the PDC, it was possible to regard the CI1 as a tool for the PDC and their subsidiary 
company.  
 
The CI1 and the CI2 had overlapping interests, which led to a conflict of interest, 
mainly related to who would get access to actors and resources. In addition, several 
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actors were operating with more than one ‘hat,’ which created an untidy impression 
externally and consequently perceptions about motivations for disclosing information. 
In comparison to the other events analyzed in this study, the CI1 here seems to be the 
one ‘offending’ another party. Consequently, the data available includes less 
perceptions and speculations than what is found for the other events analyzed.  
 
6.3.3 Event 3: Public Regulation Interference  
The main perceptions in this case relate to the various agendas of the GDO and the CI1, 
in addition to the agendas of the Initiator in particular. The GDO had expressed the 
importance of the procurement policy and the demander organizations involvement in 
inter-organizational initiatives. This became their ‘formal reasons’ for the negative 
attitudes towards the CI1.  
 
A perception revealed during interviews was that the GDO had an increasing need to 
position and show their power towards the public organizations. The case with the CI1, 
where the GDO eventually demanded that the public organizations be kept away from 
the Initiative, might have been an exemplification of this.  
 
Another perception mentioned by several key sources both on and off the record, was 
related to the GDO’s suspicions toward the Initiator of the CI1. The Initiator’s former 
involvement in a conflicted case was suggested as the main reason. During this process 
he had become a contested figure in parts of the business, and the history of this process 
had followed his name. His engagement in the CI1 could potentially lead to new similar 
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challenging situations for public regulations, something that was assumed the GDO 
wanted to avoid.  
 
During interviews, it seemed like the GDO had missed out on the project fundament of 
the CI1, where the innovative projects, suggested by the involved CI1 members had 
been the main focus. Rather, the GDO had concentrated their attention on what was a 
suggested project related to influence over the procurement policy. This project was 
never realized. The CI1 had initially suggested this project in order to get the demanders 
and the GDO involved. Eventually, the GDO seemed to have put all emphasis on this 
suggested project in order to reason the negative attitudes towards the CI1. 
Simultaneously they had ignored the original intentions of the CI1. The biases toward 
the Initiator were never openly discussed, but by many parties it was assumed that this 
was the main reason. The fact that a similar initiative with the same constellation of 
actors as the CI1 was allowed to continue their activities, supported this perception.  
 
The events in the relationship between the CI1 and the GDO were influenced by 
previous negative experiences between key actors. The situation also seemed to be 
characterized by a personal focus, and ulterior arguments seemed to be used in the 
formal communication between parties. When it comes to dealing with cluster 
development, the importance of previous experiences of key actors is pivotal. In order 
to develop activities and achieve results, legitimacy and trust both inside a cluster 
initiative and toward the environment must be taken into account. The previous 
experience and use of ulterior arguments combined led to distrust between the involved 
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parties and was strengthened by development of various perceptions on motives and 
interests. 
 
6.3.4 Event 4: Cluster Competition – Part Two  
Looking into interests and why things ‘went wrong’ in the situation developing between 
the CI1 and the CI3, a range of perceptions were presented by the stakeholders involved 
with CI1. First of all, there were several theories related to why the CI3 did not want to 
involve the CI1 in their business. The CI3’s official explanation was related to the fact 
that as a new initiative they had to keep to their core focus. Additionally, they were 
concerned with keeping the design approved by their financial contributors. The CI1 
management had perceived a negative attitude toward the CI3 and did not completely 
believe the formal explanation. 
 
During interviews, the CI3 made an admission about the reluctance to cooperate, which 
was related to the reduced legitimacy of the CI1. The CI3 was worried about inheriting 
the bad relationships in which had developed between the CI1 and its surroundings, 
such as the GDO and the NGO. This fact had already been confirmed by sources close 
to the CI3, but was never articulated formally.   
 
Interviews and conversations with the RBF Manager did however reveal additional 
perceptions about the development of events. The CI3 was facilitated by the PDFO who 
was also engaged in other regional cluster projects. As the RBF had made the funding 
situation challenging for one of the other regional projects, it was assumed that the 
PDFO had influenced the CI3’s decision. Both the RBF and the CI1 had become 
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increasingly aware that the ‘goodwill’ toward them was limited. Furthermore, the RBF 
had previously been engaged in negative encounters with one of the owners of the 
PDFO, as well as the former employer of the CI3 Facilitator. These situations may have 
influenced negative attitudes and definitely provided ‘growth’ to perceptions about an 
active opposition against both the CI1 and the RBF.   
 
Looking at the situation developing for the CI1, the presence of the CI3 was causing a 
new major challenge in terms of competition. As the CI1 faced new difficulties, the 
most relevant option seemed to be to suggest cooperation between the two initiatives. 
For several reasons, the CI3 rejected this opportunity. During interviews, various (and 
potentially pretty farfetched) perceptions on what might have caused the rejection were 
proposed by actors close to the CI1. As the CI1 was closing down, these perceptions 
had little influence on the events of the Initiative.  
 
6.3.5 Summary of Perceptions  
In the case of the CI1 and the four events analyzed, the multiple and diverging interests 
of actors led to multiple and diverse perceptions of actors. The previous sections show 
how perceptions were present in all four events related to the CI1. From the interviews, 
it seems like the perceptions of the CI1 supporters were stronger in the three events 
where the CI1 experienced the ‘losing’ part. In the events occurring with the BFO and 
CI2, it appeared to be easier for the CI1 parties to analyze the situation as competition 
without presenting any additional ‘conspiracy’ theories. The perceptions present in the 
events of the CI1 were mainly related to ulterior motives of the parties involved, which 
led to actions working in disfavor of the CI1. Perceptions on ulterior motives also 
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seemed to ‘stick’ to the actors who had previous negative encounters, even if the 
encounters had been sorted out.    
 
6.4 Conclusion 
When observing cluster initiatives as key outcomes of cluster strategy implementation, 
What features characterize the actors of clusters? The multiple and diverging interests 
of actors led to multiple and diverse perceptions of actors, which both became 
influential features of the interaction among the actors related to the CI1 when looking 
at cluster cooperation in relation to power and politics.  
 
The analysis of research question one, searching for key features of actors in clusters, 
investigated four events related to the case of the CI1. They revealed the meeting of a 
variety of interests and perceptions in the interaction in and around the arenas of the 
CI1. The feature argument of the analytical model argues that the mixed culture of 
public and private actors leads to highly different expectations, varieties in 
understandings and goals, as well as in the approach to goals. This again leads to a 
culture clash and challenges the focus on innovation. Consequently, features of interests 
and perceptions of the actors in the cluster influenced opportunities for innovation.  
 
The data showed that actors’ interests and perceptions diverged in many directions, at 
the people level, the organizational level and at the ‘regional’ level. All in all, this made 
it difficult to keep an overview of the field, which created elements of conspiracy 
thinking and distrust. The multiple and diverging interests and perceptions of the actors 
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in the CI1 further influenced the behavior of actors in the clusters. In the following 
chapter, research question two will deal with characteristics of behavior of actors in 
clusters. The attention is focused on issues of conflict, strategy and power play.  
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Chapter 7 – Behavior in Clusters  
7.1 Introducing Research Question Two 
The goal of this dissertation is to explain why cluster cooperation seldom result in 
innovation. The analysis is concerned with how power and politics influence cluster 
cooperation and deals with features of actors in clusters, behavior of actors in clusters, 
and consequences of actors’ features and behavior in practical cluster efforts. In this 
chapter sub-research question two is proposed for analysis: When observing the complex 
features of actors in clusters; What behavior characterizes the actors of clusters? 
 
The previous chapter dealt with an analysis of features of actors in clusters. The chapter 
concluded that multiple interests and multiple perceptions are key features of actors 
present in a cluster. This conclusion rests on data from the case of the CI1.  
 
In order to answer research question two, theories dealing with behavior of actors in 
clusters will be applied to the analysis, with a focus on issues related to conflict, 
strategy development and power play in clusters. Data from the same four events of CI1 
will be used during the analysis: Event 1: Funding & public competition; Event 2: 
Cluster competition – part one; Event 3: Public regulation interference, and; Event 4: 
Cluster competition – part two. In the following section, the analytical framework for 
the second part of the analysis is presented.  
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7.1.1 Analytical Framework  
The formal and informal arenas of clusters are characterized by complexity, due to their 
network-like features, mix of public and private cultures, and issues of diversity in 
interests and perceptions. This leads to political behavior such as conflicts, strategy and 
power play between involved actors, which challenges the attention on innovation. This 
makes out the sum of the feature argument and the behavior argument, as outlined in 
the presentation of the analytical model, Chapter 5, section 5.6. Research question two 
is proposed to deal with key behavior of actors in clusters, which are presented in the 
following part of the analytical model: 
 
Model 7.1. Part of Analytical Model Relevant for Research Question Two 
 
Cluster arenas  
p 
RQ2: 
Complex behavior among actors 
Conflict Strategy development Power play 
 
 
The clusters experience conflicting issues and visible and invisible conflicts, both 
internally and towards the surroundings (Pfeffer, 1981; Morgan, 2006). As a result, 
strategies for achieving various types of goals (Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997) are 
developed and issues of trust are tested in power play (Pfeffer 1981; Klijn & Teisman 
1997). This may lead to competition and/or difficulties with cooperation among actors. 
The power plays and games are often characterized by a ‘cowboy style’ approach to 
dealing with issues of conflict. This usually heats up the conflict level. The analysis of 
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conflict will be dealt with in 7.2, the analysis of strategy will be dealt with in part 7.3, 
while the analysis of power play will be deal with in part 7.4.  
 
Consequently, conflict, strategy development and power play leads to difficulties in 
cooperation. This again leads to attention on political issues rather than business issues, 
which lead to competition among and between formal cluster initiatives and their 
facilitators, mainly related to issues on how to organize the field, rather than actual 
attention related to innovation. A distinction goes between issues of game management, 
which relates to organizing strategies in relation to political field, and issues of network 
structuring, which relates to the institutionalization process of a cluster. 
 
The following sections deals with the analysis of the four identified main events in the 
life of the CI1. The main focus of the analysis is on characteristic behavior in cluster 
arenas: conflict, strategy development and power play. As the three categories were 
interrelated in the field, there will be some overlaps in the analytical discussions.  
 
7.2 Analysis of Conflict  
The following sections deal with the analysis of conflict in relation to Event 1: Funding 
& public competition; Event 2: Cluster competition – part one; Event 3: Public 
regulation interference, and; Event 4: Cluster competition – part two.  Conflict between 
actors makes out a key behavior when looking at cluster cooperation in relation to 
power and politics.  
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7.2.1 Event 1: Funding & Public Competition  
The proposed CI1 pilot identified some goals and concepts which several other actors 
and initiatives also were pursuing, either partly or wholly. This may have caused 
conflicts of interests between the CI1 and similar initiatives. The CI1 was not however 
aware of this at the time when the application was filed or in the months following. 
Certain representatives of the NGO had suggested a (potentially) competitive situation 
between some national projects and the regional CI1, while other NGO representatives 
had denied that this was an actual dilemma. The experience and perception of 
competition among cluster initiatives would increase in the time to follow, and also 
increasingly become a source of conflict, but at the time when the financial application 
was filed, the CI1 was in general perceived as a new initiative by its supporters.   
 
Issues related to how the CI1 was designed may have influenced the NGOs interest in 
the time of the application. At the time of the application, the design was not set. In the 
following months, the NGO suggested certain changes in communication with the RBF. 
These were related to both the change of name and a change of involved actors. For 
practical reasons, the suggested changes were not taken into account at the time of 
suggestion, and as the relationship between the NGO and the RBF declined, this 
‘avoidance’ may have been interpreted as lack of good will and flexibility.  
 
Another potential source of conflict was the role of the Initiator of the CI1. He was 
regarded as a controversial figure in the business field. However, neither the NGO nor 
the RBF had any extensive knowledge on his status in the field at the time of the 
application. At the present time, he was perceived as a resourceful and motivated driver 
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for building a cluster initiative, equipped with a good network of connections and 
highly relevant goals for making it happen. Hence, using the controversy of the Initiator 
as an explanation for the challenging situation around the funding application would 
seem less likely. Consequently, there are reasons to pursue other factors in order to 
explain the increasingly tense atmosphere. 
 
Events occurring in and around the CI1 application process illustrate the general 
cooperative climate between key actors in the national and regional innovation system. 
In this time period, the RBF and the NGO were increasingly experiencing an overlap in 
tasks and interests. As the two organizations did not seem to find an optimal form for 
cooperation, a competitive climate seemed to increase. But the NGO and the RBF were 
in reality only partly competitors. In certain projects, they were cooperating, and in 
others, they were either a part of the development chain or in no direct competition.  
 
Different professional perspectives related to the development of the cluster field could 
have influenced the CI1 application process. Divergent approaches to the field between 
the RBF and the NGO may have strengthened the reluctance to cooperate. As the 
approach to the pilot was not finally set when the CI1 pilot was kicked off, any 
reluctance among the NGO representatives must have been potentially rooted in 
previous experiences with the RBF and not the CI1 pilot design itself. In the early phase 
the NGO was also invited to be an active participant in the CI1 with potential influence 
on the design and approach to the project. The data material revealed NGO’s attempt to 
‘correct’ certain elements of the CI1 design after the project was kicked off, through 
communication with the RBF. In the end, neither the RBF nor the CI1 corresponded to 
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these ‘corrections,’ which may have influenced NGO’s reluctance to get further 
involved with the CI1.  
 
Poor communication between the NGO and the RBF also seems to be a relevant point 
when it comes to the process and outcome of the application of the CI1. Most 
information seemed to go through informal channels, leading to few binding agreements 
or information which could be counted on. A challenging relationship between the 
managers of the NGO and the RBF did not help the communication or the general 
cooperative climate. Whether it actually influenced the situation of the application is 
difficult to answer. It is however quite probable that the issue of bad communication 
was a result of the challenges in the relationship between the NGO and the RBF. 
 
Conflict of interests and competition related to concrete project development was 
emerging between the NGO and the RBF. As the NGO was in charge of funding and 
had a role of granting developmental projects within the region, they were suspected of 
using this power to make it more difficult for successful projects related to the RBF. 
This was a strong allegation, which had no real proof. The climate between the two 
organizations had developed negatively over the past years, resulting in several 
conflicting situations, as well as re-negotiations and suspected power plays. The CI1 
situation seemed to strengthen these suspicions, as previous experiences suggested a 
lack of trust.  
 
In the final phases, the relationship between the NGO and the RBF became heated. It 
may seem farfetched that the discount or even the mishandling of an application for a 
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cluster initiative should lead to conflict between two such experienced public actors. 
The increased experience of competition and lack of trust may explain the context of the 
situation, if not necessarily the actual outcome. Most of the points presented may have 
some explanatory force. The multiplicity of explanations reveals a complex situation in 
the regional landscape, in this case mainly between the NGO and the RBF, which in the 
end may have had an effect on the opportunities of the CI1.  
 
The back and forth of feedback on the CI1 application from the NGO resulted in an 
increase in conflict between the NGO and the RBF. The conflict may have had its sole 
source in what occurred in the case of the CI1. Still, in the past years the NGO and the 
RBF had increased its competition level, which may have caused the CI1 to be used in a 
conflict or game going on between the two public actors. Hence, the CI1 itself may have 
had less to do with how events developed. Either way, the trust level between the 
stakeholders of the NGO and the RBF seemed to decline over time, due to other events 
and due to what happened in the case of the CI1. This may have lead to a reduction of 
opportunities of related projects and cluster initiatives.     
 
 
7.2.2 Event 2: Cluster Competition – Part One  
In the situation occurring between the BFO/CI2 and the CI1, there seemed to be an 
obvious conflict of interest. Even if the two initiatives only had partly overlapping 
agendas and apparently had the opportunity to cooperate, there would still be elements 
of competition between them. The competition would be related to access to companies, 
as well as people’s time, resources and activities. Additionally, there were issues of 
credibility for the facilitator organizations (in this case the BFO and the RBF), as 
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maintaining successful initiatives would be important for developing other 
opportunities.   
 
However, at the point when these events occurred, neither the Initiator nor the Project 
Manager seemed to be appreciably worried about potential competition. The CI1 was 
already established and a group of key stakeholders had committed themselves to 
involvement in the pilot phase. From the BFO’s perspective, it seemed like several of 
the companies relevant for membership in the CI2, were already involved in the CI1. 
This could lead to difficulties in engaging important companies, and competition related 
to the use of their time and resources. At this point it seemed like the CI1 was a step a 
head of the CI2 and more concerned with executing their planned actions, rather than 
with the potential competition.   
 
During the interactions between the BFO/CI2 Facilitator and the CI1 Project Manager 
and Initiator, a blurring of roles definitely became an issue. The CI1 Project Manager 
and the Initiator were operating with two hats at the same time, representing both the 
PDC and the CI1 simultaneously, but without being explicit about it. The members of 
the CI1 had early on been made aware of the double role of the Project Manager, 
information which was also available in minutes from meetings, so the double (and 
overlapping) agenda was not purposely hidden. 
 
Either way, this information was not in the hands of the BFO/CI2 Facilitator and the 
blurring of roles led to a lowering degree of trust and difficulties with clearing the air 
after the following confrontation between the CI1 and the BFO/CI2. Emphasis was 
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made from both sides, but did not result in any real reconciliation. The fact that the CI1 
management had taken credit for work that the PDC had been involved in, without the 
mentioning of them, probably provided less ground for renewed cooperative efforts, 
even if this did not seem to be a pivotal point.    
 
In relation to the events developing in the first encounter between the CI1 and the CI2, 
data shows how the blurring of roles led to issues of trust and consequently conflict and 
competition rather than cooperation. The experience of competition was highly present 
from the BFO’s perspective, even if the CI1 and the CI2 actually had somewhat 
different interests. They could potentially also have created opportunities for 
cooperation. As the CI1 representatives seemed to be mixing agendas and blurring 
roles, accordingly without any awareness of how it looked from the outside, they 
contributed to creating issues of trust, which probably also led to a greater focus on the 
competitive parts of the initiatives and consequently direct conflict. Emphasis to clear 
out the discussions between the CI1 and the CI2 did not result in any long-term 
agreement or cooperation. This lack of binding commitment after emphasis to sort out 
an encounter also seems to be a pattern in the data material repeating itself.  
 
7.2.3 Event 3: Public Regulation Interference  
In relation to the events developing as a result of the situation between the CI1 and the 
GDO, data shows how the reduction in public legitimacy had a major impact on how 
the CI1 could develop. During spring 2009, the CI1 encountered challenges with the 
GDO. After experiencing positive feedback in January 2009, the feedback from the 
meeting in April 2009, was highly negative. The GDO was concerned with the 
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constellations of actors involved in the CI1 and how they played a role toward 
regulations of impartiality. They emphasized the (potential) blurring of roles. They 
further instructed the public actors to keep away from the CI1, which made operations 
more difficult. At a later stage, the negative bias toward the Initiator was communicated 
off the record to several parties.  
 
Data shows that the conflict never played out into any open encounters, which means 
that the amount of data related to direct discussions are limited. Compared to the other 
events, there was never any competition related to these events, which means that the 
conflict had somewhat different sources.  
 
7.2.4 Event 4: Cluster Competition – Part Two  
In relation to the events developing between the CI1 and the CI3, data shows how 
competition and strategic play in the end led to the downfall of the CI1. CI3 and CI1 
became competitors first during the phase when CI3 was reinvigorated and changed 
direction towards something closer to the CI1. This occurred mainly in the second half 
of 2009. A conflict of interest emerged, as the two initiatives were targeting similar 
goals, as well as (potentially) the same business and organizational environment and 
financial resources. The CI3 may possibly have had their attention on other potentially 
competing initiatives, but this is not revealed by the available data. Further, the 
competition was probably much more noticed by the CI1, who had struggled with both 
development and conflicts over some time. The competition never played out to the 
extent that it caused any actual encounters between the two initiatives.  
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7.2.5 Summary of Conflict  
The previous sections show how conflicts occurred in the four events analyzed, and 
how they played out in two of the events analyzed. Two types of interrelated conflicts 
seemed to occur simultaneously: Competition between the cluster initiatives and 
competition between public or institutional actors, both dominated by the public and 
institutional actors.  
 
Data shows that conflict occurred somewhat differently in the four events analyzed. In 
the events related to the financial application, conflict played out between the two 
facilitator organizations - the RBF and the NGO - mainly due to competition. With 
close links to the RBF, the CI1 seemed to suffer due to the relationship between the 
facilitator organizations. In Event 2 conflict due to competition was also present. This 
played out between two key actors present in the CI1 and the Facilitator of the 
CI2/BFO. At the present time, the CI1 did not experience the competition as threatening 
and made less ‘fuzz’ about the events occurring. This conflict may relate to what Pfeffer 
(1981) identifies as scarcity of resources. In the events that played out with the GDO, 
there was an experience of conflict, but this was not related to competition. The events 
never materialized into any direct encounters. Comparatively, Event 2 playing out 
between CI1 and CI2 involved major competition, but did not result in any direct 
conflict encounter.  
 
All in all, conflict and the experience of competition became a major issue for the CI1. 
Sorting conflicts and competition out occupied a lot of time, which took focus away 
from the planned tasks of the CI1. The conflicts seemed to be more present among the 
255
 
public and institutional actors than among the private companies. The conflicts and the 
experienced increase of competition among actors related to the case of the CI1 led to a 
development of strategies, also including perceptions on other actors’ strategies. In the 
next sections, an analysis of strategies in relation to the four events in the case of the 
CI1 is presented.   
 
7.3 Analysis of Strategy Development 
The following sections deal with the analysis of strategy development in relation to 
Event 1: Funding & public competition; Event 2: Cluster competition – part one; Event 
3: Public regulation interference, and; Event 4: Cluster competition – part two. Strategy 
is key for understanding behavior in cluster cooperation when looking at issues of 
power and politics.  
 
7.3.1 Event 1: Funding & Public Competition  
In relation to the events developing in the financial application involving the NGO, the 
CI1 and the RBF, data shows a mix of perceptions related to strategies played out 
behind the scenes and actual encounters and conflict. In the surroundings related to the 
CI1 application, more than one strategy was present. As previously mentioned, both the 
RBF and the NGO had explicit strategies and public mandates related to developing 
cluster initiatives, but with somewhat different perspectives, approaches and 
opportunities to carry them out.   
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Extended from the RBF strategy, the development and activation of the CI1 as a formal 
cluster initiative became a new and explicit strategy. Here there was a focus on a joint 
approach involving a set of key stakeholders in the field. The strategy of developing the 
CI1 was carried out by the RBF in the role as a public facilitator organization.  
 
When it comes to the situation related to the application, various implicit strategies may 
have been developed by the involved actors in order to influence the outcome. In 
relation to the application, there were no implicit strategies made by the CI1 as far as to 
what is found and known through data collection. The data material can not reveal much 
information on implicit strategy development of the RBF or the NGO, even if the 
material exposes a great deal of perceptions on strategies carried out by the 
‘counterpart.’ Mainly, ongoing conversations along the research, as well as interviews, 
exposed that representatives of the CI1 and the RBF had perceptions about an active 
strategic approach by the NGO.   
 
Theory suggests that strategies are influenced by patterns of relations. Some kind of 
pattern between the NGO and the RBF seemed to have been established even before the 
presence of the CI1, leading to distrust and challenges of cooperation. Whether the 
strategies were developed beforehand or were just a result of post-rationalization is 
definitely a topic. In relation to the theory touched upon, the events occurring between 
the NGO and the RBF may be characterized as game-related rather than connected to 
the institutionalization process.   
 
 
257
 
7.3.2 Event 2: Cluster Competition – Part One 
The PDC, the CI1, the BFO and the CI2 all had explicit strategies for making their 
respective goals come true. Both the CI1 and the CI2 had a goal of engaging key 
business players in their cooperative efforts. The PDC and the BFO also had agendas 
for engaging key business players in various activities, but had no competitive agendas, 
apart from succeeding with the activities they were involved in, which turned out to 
overlap.  
 
The respective actors’ goals were not necessarily known by the other actors involved in 
the encounters, but would be accessible if they were sought out. The BFO did not 
however learn about the existence of the CI1 in the early phases, which made the 
BFO/CI2 Facilitator increasingly suspicious. It is doubtful whether this lack of 
knowledge was a result of an intentional strategy to hold back information made by the 
CI1 actors. However, this was not possible to determine by the BFO/CI2 and the 
perception created trust issues. In developing both the CI1 and the CI2, there was an 
obvious interest in keeping informed about what was going on in the field and a 
temptation to keep information back to make sure that the initiatives were competitive. 
This awareness probably contributed to a different kind of behavior, and potentially also 
to a different kind of strategy development along the way.  
 
The explicit strategies related to the development of the cluster initiatives probably led 
to more detailed implicit strategies, which were formed in order to achieve a specific set 
of goals. The goals of the CI2 and the CI1 seemed to be partly colliding. However, any 
details on strategies are not available in the data material.  
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In relation to the events developing in the first encounter between the CI1 and the CI2, 
data shows how the blurring of roles led to issues of trust. Consequently, the BFO/CI2 
Facilitator assumed that the CI1 actors were proposing strong competition rather than 
cooperation. This again led to difficulties in sorting out the conflicts and probably 
increased the level of strategic planning from the BFOs part. Even if the core of 
conflicts was related to issues of institutionalization and network structuring, the 
strategies playing out seemed to be more connected to a game.  
 
7.3.3 Event 3: Public Regulation Interference 
In relation to the events developing as a result of the situation between the CI1 and the 
GDO, data shows how the reduction in public legitimacy had a major impact on how 
the CI1 could develop. During February 2009, the CI1 was established as a formal 
organization. The CI1’s strategy had been to involve the GDO in the development of the 
Initiative. This would secure legitimacy and provide a wider institutional involvement, 
which had previously been a request by the NGO.  
 
In order to get the GDO engaged and to provide new activities in a period where the 
public actors seemed to be disengaging, a special project was proposed related to 
procurement policies. This suggested project was diverging from the originally intended 
projects and was an effort to get the public actors re-engaged. The GDO later used this 
project proposal as an argument against CI1, arguing that the roles inside the CI1 were 
blurred. Furthermore, they made sure that the public organizations had to withdraw 
from the Initiative, which made the fundament for the CI1 substantially weakened. The 
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CI1s legitimacy was reduced and consequently the attractiveness of the supplier 
organizations likewise. As a result, a conflict was emerging.   
 
Eventually, the case of the CI1 and the GDO became a conflicting situation where the 
CI1 had the feeling of loosing favor to another initiative. Whether this was due to a 
misunderstanding related to the CI1s suggested project or an actual strategy to hinder 
the development of the CI1 is not possible to determine. But the suspicion about active 
strategy play by the parties involved in the CI1 remained long after the initiative was 
closed down.  
 
7.3.4 Event 4: Cluster Competition – Part Two  
In relation to the events developing between the CI1 and the CI3, data shows how 
competition and strategic play in the end led to the downfall of the CI1. At some point, 
the CI1 started to realize that the Oslo region was somewhat too small for the existence 
of two cluster initiatives with so many similarities. At the time, at least three different 
strategic solutions were possible in the relationship between the CI1 and the CI3. The 
first one was a continuation of activities from both initiatives, ‘ignoring’ the other 
initiatives’ action. This was the line in which was first chosen by the CI1. At this point 
the CI3 assumingly was unaware of the CI1’s existence, which means that they did not 
have any strategies directed towards the CI1. In the following months, the CI3 was 
approaching several of the members of the CI1, meaning that the initial strategy seemed 
to have created greater competition between the two initiatives.  
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A second strategy was to secure closer cooperation between the two initiatives. As the 
competition increased, the CI1 suggested closer cooperation, in order to make sure that 
the development in the two initiatives was coordinated. When the CI3, for various 
reasons, turned this invitation down, only a third obvious final strategy seemed realistic: 
One of the initiatives had to shut down or give in to the other.   
 
During its reinvigoration phase, the CI3 positioned itself much more strategically and 
successfully than the CI1 had managed in the previous phases. First of all, they 
managed to create legitimacy towards the GDO, which the CI1 lacked. Secondly, the 
CI3 managed to secure funding through a tailored program from the NGO, which would 
provide resources for the Initiative over several years. As the CI3 was in a flow, both in 
terms of legitimacy and in terms of funding, the CI1 realized that a continuation of 
activities for their own part would make little sense. The CI3 would more easily be able 
to offer what the CI1 was struggling with. This made the decision about closing down 
easier and offering whatever was left of the initiative to their competitors.  
 
The CI1 may have made a pivotal decision when deciding not to get in engaged in the 
CI3 application during spring 2009. But based on the previous year’s experiences with 
both bureaucratic delays and various kinds of conflicts, taking up important time and 
hindering a focus on developing the innovation projects, this decision seemed sensible 
at the time. This was not the first time the CI1 was coming across initiatives with 
similar and competing agendas, but the meeting with the CI3 became the most urgent 
one. In reality, the competition was targeting the same resources such as organizations, 
time and funding. Apart from the turndown and the actions and considerations made 
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around that time, there are few actual indications that the CI3 strategically positioned 
itself in relation of the CI1 or was engaging in any power game.  
 
7.3.5 Summary of Strategy Development  
The previous sections analyzed strategy development in relation to four pivotal events 
in the life of the CI1. Implicit and explicit strategy is at some level a part of any 
organization, and is developed between various actors. In theory, a distinction between 
issues linked to game management, which relates to organizing strategies in the political 
field, and issues linked to network structuring, which relates to the institutionalization 
process, is made. In the events of the financial application, it may seem like both the 
RBF and the NGO eventually developed strategies for achieving what they wanted. 
Consequently the CI1 became a tool for a strategic play between two public actors in 
competition in a form of game management. The CI1 on the other hand was at the 
present time more concerned with network structuring.  
 
In the events playing out between actors in the CI1 and the representative of the BFO, 
the BFO experienced the actions related to the CI1 as strategy maneuvers in order to get 
competitive advantages. It is probable that this conflict was mainly related to network 
structuring concerns, as the institutionalization process was challenged, although a form 
of game management between the involved actors took place. In the third event 
analyzed, the situation occurring between the CI1 and the GDO was experienced by the 
CI1 as a strategic play of the GDO targeting the CI1. Initially, the CI1 had developed a 
strategy to attracting the interest of the GDO, but this strategy must have backfired in 
conduction. The strategy can be regarded as a form of game management, as the 
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concern again was more ‘politicized.’ Data occurring in relation to the CI3 events, 
revealed a set of interchangeable strategies from the CI1’s side related to network 
structuring, as well as perceptions on strategic play from the CI3, which may be 
regarded as closer to a game management perspective.   
 
All in all, it seems like the accusations and perceptions on strategy among the actors 
was a challenge for the involved parties in the analyzed events, as little was known on 
the other actors’ plans, but much was assumed. What can be regarded as an actual 
strategic maneuver and what can be the regarded as an output of mere chance of events 
seems to be less possible to determine. The conflicts and the experienced increase of 
competition among actors related to the case of the CI1, led to a development of 
strategies, also including perceptions on other actors’ strategies. The strategy 
development further led to power play among the strategic actors. In the next sections, 
an analysis of power play related to the four events in the case of the CI1 is presented.   
 
7.4 Analysis of Power Play  
The following sections deal with the analysis of power play and games in relation to 
Event 1: Funding & public competition; Event 2: Cluster competition – part one; Event 
3: Public regulation interference, and; Event 4: Cluster competition – part two. Power 
play and games are key to understanding behavior in cluster cooperation when looking 
at issues of power and politics.  
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7.4.1 Event 1: Funding & Public Competition  
During its existence, the CI1 and its surrounding environment were influenced by 
several power plays and games. The events related to the financial application may be 
regarded as a single game between representatives of the CI1, the RBF and the NGO. 
Hence, the game was going on between actors representing a formal cluster initiative, 
the CI1 and actors representing actors in the larger surrounding cluster arena, the RBF 
and the NGO. At the time, the CI1 management experienced it as challenging to get an 
overview of who was really a part of the controversy or game, but more so to 
understand what it was really about. In other words, to the CI1 management, the 
situation made little sense.  
 
During interviews, it was easy for the involved stakeholders to make assumptions that 
the situation had become relevant due to an already (partly) strained relationship 
between the NGO and the RBF. The perceptions of the CI1 management and the RBF 
representatives seemed to lean toward an understanding of an active game strategy 
against the CI1 development. The conclusion was that the game was really about the 
two organizations, and that the CI1 was used as a piece in this ongoing game. The 
perceptions on the interconnectedness of different actions and actors mean that 
conspiracy theory had a position in the presented assumptions. It is however important 
to emphasize that not all actors perceived their presence and actions in the cluster arena 
as part of one or more games. Also, certain strategies seem to be expressed only in the 
aftermath of events.  
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It can only be speculated on whether the representatives of the NGO acted jointly or 
individually, as a blocking of the RBF strategy or just as a cause of misfortunate 
coincidences with no planned strategy. Two alternative explanations were offered, 
which had little to do with any strategic behavior. The first explanation was related to 
internal proceedings in the NGO, which might have created confusion on who was in 
charge and what information to give out to the applicants. The second explanation is 
related to internal conflicts in the NGO on what projects to support. In the following 
period, there were several relevant projects presenting themselves with similar 
frameworks and content. Informal information given to the representatives of the CI1 
and the RBF by a selection of NGO representatives revealed different opinions on 
whether the CI1 should receive funding. Potentially, games and strategies may have 
been going on inside the NGO as well, presenting an additional aspect. 
 
Seemingly, any presence of a game related to the CI1 application ceased to exist by the 
end of 2008, where the CI1 had received funding from other sources and had closed the 
communication with the NGO related to this case. The debates and controversies 
between the NGO and the RBF did however continue, on and off, in the following 
period. The two actors had been involved in several games over the years, and their 
involvement may have influenced the outcome of the CI1 funding application.  
 
Theory suggests that the outcome of games and power play are influenced by patterns 
of relations. Some kind of pattern between the NGO and the RBF seemed to have been 
established even before the presence of the CI1, leading to mistrust and challenges in 
cooperation. In cluster arenas, the context of the game seems to be of great importance, 
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as it influences what moves it is possible to make. The NGO and the RBF should be 
regarded as a key context of the CI1, in addition to being players in the larger and 
informal cluster arena.   
 
7.4.2 Event 2: Cluster Competition – Part One  
During the happenings occurring in the relation between the CI1 and the BFO, data 
shows how actors experienced a fast moving field. The activities in the businesses were 
developing quickly and it was difficult to keep an account of relevant information. This 
may have influenced the experience of the other parties playing games and sitting with 
more information. The BFO/CI2 Facilitator may have experienced that the CI1 
representatives were using information in order to get a competitive advantage, while 
keeping information on their own activities back. The encounter between the involved 
actors resulted in a temporary solution, which was never actually carried out. In the end, 
the actors individually decided to keep away from each others activities, and 
cooperation was never carried out.    
 
 
7.4.3 Event 3: Public Regulation Interference  
In relation to the events developing as a result of the situation between the CI1 and the 
GDO, data shows how the reduction in public legitimacy had a major impact on how 
the CI1 could develop. In retrospect, ambiguous communication between the GDO and 
the CI1, in this case represented by the Initiator, may have led to the commencing 
downfall of the CI1.  
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The involved actors in CI1 were concerned with the possibility that an active power 
play had been staged by the GDO in order to stop the development of the CI1. This 
perception was supported by the fact that another similar initiative was allowed to 
continue their activities, with a basis similar to the CI1’s. Uncertainty about whether the 
GDO had hindered the public actors in involvement even before the procurement 
project was suggested remained and led to tenacious perceptions that the GDO had 
created a strategy against the CI1 and played out games to hinder the continuation of the 
Initiative. Either way, the relationship between the GDO and the CI1 became damaging 
for the CI1.  
 
The events between the CI1 and the GDO are probably the most unique events in this 
analysis. The relationship between the CI1 and the GDO was influenced by previous 
experience between key actors and person focus. The events were characterized by 
politics and limitations of legislation that influenced the opportunities of the CI1 in the 
long run. Probably, this is not a situation often encountered when dealing with cluster 
development. Still, power play and games targeted at hindering specific activities of a 
cluster initiative, or dominating actors, is potentially more common in clusters.  
 
7.4.4 Event 4: Cluster Competition – Part Two  
In relation to the events developing between the CI1 and the CI3, data shows how 
competition and strategic play in the end led to the downfall of the CI1. Conflict of 
interests and competition occurred, but no direct conflict played out. As previously dealt 
with, the GDO, which was involved in legitimizing the CI3, may have had some kind of 
power play toward the CI1, but this was beyond the CI3 handling.  
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The CI1 had increasingly struggled with legitimacy. Important institutional actors in the 
environment were skeptic or negative towards the Initiative and key actors involved 
were hindered from participating. Whether this was related to misunderstandings of the 
CI1 agenda, perceptions on a hidden ‘political’ agenda or pay back for previous 
encounters with specific members or organizations, is difficult to estimate. Possibly all 
are relevant and viable explanations. The CI3 probably had no power play in mind, but 
was concerned with securing own development. Nevertheless, the situation developed 
in a way making it more difficult to develop the CI1s planned innovation project. Key 
actors, time, resources and legitimacy were lacking.  
 
As the CI3 emerged, with both stronger financial resources and institutional legitimacy, 
they became a relevant competitor and source for cluster development in the Oslo 
region. At the point where they received institutional funding, they were, for several 
reasons, less interested in cooperation with surrounding initiatives.  
 
The CI1 management on the other hand was exhausted after dealing with a range of 
issues of quarrelling and power play, which only indirectly related to the development 
of the innovation projects. After experiencing a series of challenges over an eighteen-
month period, the CI1 chose to close down the initiative, leaving the development to a 
greater equipped cluster initiative.  
 
During its two years of activities, the CI1 experienced a series of challenging events. 
Some were active efforts of game and power play, while others probably can be 
regarded a result of ‘coinciding’ events. While the CI3 probably did not intend to play 
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any games, the presence and development of the CI1 became a great challenge for the 
involved actors, in the end resulting in the closing down of the Initiative. The CI1 was 
in the end ‘defeated’ by a competitor.  
 
7.4.5 Summary of Power Play  
The previous sections analyzed power play in relation to four pivotal events in the life 
of the CI1. Data shows that power play and games occurred somewhat differently in the 
four events. The events occurring between the CI1, the RBF and the NGO can 
potentially be regarded as active games and power play by the RBF and the NGO in 
order to achieve desired results. Comparatively, data in relation to Event 2, indicates 
less active game and power play, at least as experienced by the actors involved in the 
CI1. Event 3 had stronger indication of power play, at least as perceived by the CI1 
members, as GDO actors both directly and indirectly hindered the CI1s proceedings. 
Finally, the events with the CI3 probably shows limited power plays and games, even if 
the assumptions as reported by the CI1 actors and its supporters suggest otherwise.   
 
Over time, actors seemed to develop expectations on other actors’ behavior, which may 
have influenced further interactions and the development of strategies and power play. 
The use of power play and games in order to achieve a result is probably highly 
common in and around clusters. Consequently, it must be taken into account when it 
comes to actions in clusters.  
 
The conflicts and the experienced increase of competition among actors related to the 
case of the CI1 led to a development of strategies, also including perceptions on other 
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actors’ strategies. The strategy development further led to power play among the 
strategic actors. All in all, conflict, strategy development and power play seems to 
important features of the events playing out in relation to the CI1.   
 
7.5 Conclusion  
When observing the complex features of actors in clusters, What behavior characterizes 
the actors of clusters? The multiple and diverging features of actors, such as interests 
and perceptions, led to various types of conflicts between actors in the case of the CI1. 
This further led to strategy development between actors who were eager to dominate the 
development of the field, which again led to power play among participants. This makes 
out the sum of the feature argument and the behavior argument, as outlined in the 
analytical model in Chapter 5, section 5.6.   
 
The analysis of research question two shows that conflict, strategy and power play were 
important elements of behavior in the key events experienced by the CI1. Competition 
was a source of conflict, present in all three of the four events of CI1 analyzed in this 
chapter. The competition was mainly experienced as a challenge among public and 
institutional actors, as well as between the cluster initiatives these actors were 
facilitating.   
 
A distinction between what concerns public actors and private actors in the field of 
clusters should be made. The public and institutional actors dominance of agendas in 
this field may in turn have ‘driven’ private actors away. Public and institutional actors, 
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who are trained in talk and politics oriented thinking and behavior, seemed to dictate the 
cluster field, both at the formal and the informal arena. They were also usually the 
drivers of conflicts and political behavior.  
 
In addition to conflicts with the surroundings, there will always be some kinds of 
internal conflicts in formal cluster initiatives. They are however perceived as a natural 
consequence of cluster cooperation and more extensively dealt with in the traditional 
cluster literature.  
 
The multiple and diverging features of the actors in the CI1 influenced the behavior of 
actors in the cluster, leading to conflicts, strategy development and power play. This 
took away resources and consequently also the attention on innovation enhancement 
within the CI1. In the following chapter, research question three will deal with 
consequences of political features and behavior of actors in clusters.  
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Chapter 8 – Consequences of Cluster Initiation 
  
8.1 Introducing Research Question Three  
The main research question of this dissertation is concerned with why cluster 
cooperation seldom result in innovation. In Chapters 6 and 7, analysis has shown how 
features and behavior of power and politics are relevant when it comes to cluster 
cooperation. In this chapter, research question three is proposed for analysis, asking: 
When taking features and behavior of cluster actors into account, what are the 
consequences of cooperation on innovation in clusters? By this, research question three 
proposes a summary of the analysis of research questions one and two, while pointing 
toward some implications for such cooperation, related to the question of innovation.   
 
Data from the same four events of CI1 will be used during the analysis: Event 1: 
Funding & public competition; Event 2: Cluster competition – part one; Event 3: Public 
regulation interference, and; Event 4: Cluster competition – part two. In the following 
section, a reminder of the analytical framework relevant for the third research question 
is outlined.  
 
8.1.1 Analytical Framework  
The formal and informal arenas of clusters are characterized by complexity, due to their 
network-like features, mix of public and private cultures, and issues of diversity in 
interests and perceptions. This again leads to political behavior such as conflict, strategy 
development and power play between actors. The processes of developing cluster 
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arenas, taking these issues into account seems to have been underestimated. Although 
both business/action and talk/politics oriented actors are involved, talk/politics in 
features and behaviors seems to dominate cluster cooperation, creating issues of 
legitimization and challenge the focus on innovation. Consequently, innovation as a 
direct outcome of cluster cooperation becomes difficult, and cluster arenas compete and 
either grow, die or get eaten, which can be labeled cluster cannibalism. This makes out 
the sum of the feature argument, the behavior argument, and the politics argument, as 
outlined in the presentation of the analytical model, in Chapter 5, section 5.6. Research 
question three is proposed to deal with consequences of features and behaviors in 
clusters, which provides a summary of the analytical model:  
 
Model 8.1 A Summary of the Analytical Model 
 
Cluster theories 
p 
Cluster strategies 
p 
Cluster initiatives and surrounding cluster arenas  
p 
RQ1: 
Complex political oriented features of a actors: Diverse/multiple interests & perceptions  
p 
RQ2: 
Complex political oriented behavior of actors: Conflicts, strategy development, power 
play 
p 
RQ3: 
Strong features of politics/talk 
   p 
Challenges opportunities for business/action 
   p 
Poor environment for innovation 
   p 
Cluster struggles/cannibalism/death 
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A set of actors wishes to influence the field of clusters. They are present both at the 
smaller, formalized arenas and at the larger informal arenas of clusters. The arenas are 
characterized by:  
- Actors in cluster cooperation come from both public and private environments. 
They have a variety of expectations, interests and perceptions. This leads to a 
‘clash of cultures’ that challenges the focus on innovation. This can be labeled 
the feature argument;   
- The mix of interest and perceptions leads to behaviors of conflicts, strategy 
development and games between actors, resulting in issues of trust and 
challenging the focus on innovation. This can be labeled the behavior argument; 
and   
- The process of developing cluster arenas while taking the features and behaviors 
of actors into account seem to be underestimated. Although both business/action 
and politics/talk oriented actors are involved, politics/talk in features and 
behaviors seems to dominate cluster cooperation, creating issues of 
legitimization and challenging the focus on innovation. This can be labeled the 
politics argument. 
The sum of the feature argument, the behavior argument and the politics argument 
leads to great disturbances in the development of concrete/formal arenas for clusters. 
These circumstances produce conflict within and between various cluster initiatives, as 
well as between other actors present in the informal arenas of clusters.  
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In both the formal and informal cluster arena there is a distinction between what seems 
to concern public actors and private actors. The stakeholders have (at least) two 
differing types of interest, which shape their understandings and approaches in these 
arenas: politics (talk) and business (action) (Brunsson, 1989).  
 
The formal cluster initiatives are individually intended for action, business and 
innovation thinking. The conditions surrounding such initiatives do however lead to a 
reinforced emphasis on features such as multiple interests and multiple perceptions, 
increasing the orientation towards politics and talk (Brunsson, 1989). The political 
features contribute to increased levels of conflict and competition, strategy development 
and power play present both within the formal and informal initiatives. This means that 
innovation as a direct outcome of cluster cooperation becomes increasingly challenging. 
The analysis of political versus business orientation related to the formal and informal 
cluster arenas will be presented in section 8.2. 
 
Not all actors perceive the goal of innovation as a reachable goal within the formal 
arenas. Consequently, they participate for various other reasons, which are rarely 
communicated. This suggests that the cluster arenas have some challenges in achieving 
innovation, but may still be useful for other purposes. 
 
The following sections deals with an analysis of the four identified main events in the 
life of the CI1, The main focus of the analysis is on the identification of consequences 
of the cooperation on innovation within clusters, taking previous findings into account 
in addition to looking at actors’ orientation toward business and politics.  
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8.2. Analysis of Business/action & Politics/talk 
Cooperation in clusters is targeted toward innovation and business development. 
Simultaneously, key features and behaviors among actors present in these arenas seems 
to be related to an orientation toward power and politics. The following sections deal 
with the analysis of business/action and politics/talk in relation to Event 1: Funding & 
public competition; Event 2: Cluster competition – part one; Event 3: Public regulation 
interference, and; Event 4: Cluster competition – part two, showing how the attention of 
the CI1 was diverted from its original focus.  
 
8.2.1 Event 1: Funding & Public Competition  
The issues dealt with in the events occurring in regards to the CI1 application seems to 
be more closely related to Brunsson’s (1989) features of political and talk organizations 
than to any features representing business and action oriented organizational 
environments. Apart from the CI1, the main actors involved, the NGO and the RBF, 
were public organizations that were used to dealing with politics and talk, even if both 
were established to contribute to and facilitate business- and action-related 
environments. This contrast might in itself create a challenge, as the culture these public 
organizations represent, as well as the culture they are assigned to handle, are relatively 
divergent, both in approaches and in goals.  
 
During the months dealing with the application, talk - but also lack of talk - seemed to 
characterize the interaction between the NGO and the RBF. An increasingly conflicting 
landscape between two organizations was about to reveal itself. As previously 
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mentioned, the NGO and the RBF seemed to have several interests which could be 
regarded as mutually cohesive, but also potentially competitive and conflicting. During 
interviews, the perceptions of the involved parties seemed to indicate the latter. The 
increased competition led to a conflicting landscape and power play, as the conflict 
between the NGO and the RBF played out. At this point the CI1 as an initiative was in a 
starting phase and it was apparent that the public actors were dominating the ground.  
 
8.2.2 Event 2: Cluster Competition – Part One  
When it comes to the events occurring between the CI1 and the BFO/CI2, the actors 
involved were mainly focused on developing opportunities for joint cooperation for the 
companies and organizations they were representing. But while the CI1 was established 
in order to develop innovation projects and action, which relates to the attention of an 
action organization, the CI2 was more concerned with politically focused agendas, 
related to a talk and politics organizational behavior. In this respect the CI1 and the CI2 
had some fundamental differences in perspectives. The BFO, as the facilitator 
organization, was used to dealing with politics, both concerning a divergent internal 
member base and in communications with the surroundings. In reality the BFO was 
closer to the features of a political organization, which was reflected in the actions of 
the CI2.   
 
The situation occurring between the management of the CI1 and the Facilitator of the 
CI2 had features of divergent interests as a result of competition, in addition to 
negatively developing perceptions. This again led to decreasing trust among the actors. 
The conflict of interests due to (potential) competition resulted in a conflict among the 
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involved actors. Even if a solution to this conflict was proposed and agreed upon, both 
parties seemed to withdraw when the actual solution was to be carried out. The 
incentives to contribute to cooperation were limited.  
 
In summary, the interaction between the BFO/CI2 and the CI1 had characteristics of 
what can be characterized as organizational talk and politics, where diverging interests 
and conflict was highly present.  
 
8.2.3 Event 3: Public Regulation Interference 
Even if the CI1 was concerned with the opportunity to develop business and focus on 
action, the events occurring between the GDO and the CI1 was characterized by and 
mainly influenced by political features. In many respects, the GDO as a public 
organization functioned as a link between talk and action within the public field, and 
was used to dealing with politics. The organization also had experience in handling 
conflicting issues. The management of the CI1 on the other hand, was less experienced 
with such organizational focus and behavior, and the framework of the Initiative was 
not set toward handling it. The communication also involved the PDC, who was 
oriented towards business and action and had less interest in politics and talk.  
 
Both interests and perceptions among the involved actors were divergent. In the long 
run, the GDO intentionally made sure that key participants of the CI1 were hindered 
from participating, consequently from developing the initiative further. Whether this 
was related to the principle sides of the procurement policies, rooted in worry that the 
CI1 would overstep regulations, or the actual bias against actors in the CI1, is not 
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possible to determine. Potentially, all arguments could be simultaneously viable. Either 
way, the interaction between the two parties had strong characteristics of politics, much 
to the frustration of the CI1 management and the PDC.  
 
8.2.4 Event 4: Cluster Competition – Part Two 
Both the formal cluster initiatives of CI1 and CI3 were developed for enhancing action 
and innovation within their specific business field. This relates to what Brunsson (1989) 
labels action organizations. The expectation is that cluster initiatives are focused on 
innovation as a relatively clear outcome and consequently oriented toward the kinds of 
action to achieve it. Action organizations are less equipped for dealing with variable and 
unpredictable environments, which the regional cluster field can be easily regarded.   
 
The environment surrounding the CI1 was developing fast and proved to be more 
unpredictable than assumed. The CI1 management was put in a position where they had 
to deal with multiple interests in the informal cluster surroundings. In the case with the 
newly emerged CI3, interests quite quickly collided. This further led to a range of 
perceptions that influenced decision-making and varieties of more or less realistic 
explanations for why things developed the way they did.  
 
In reality, the CI1 and the CI3 had become competitors, targeting many of the same 
available resources and actors. But even if the two organizations had a conflict of 
interest, conflicts never developed. As the CI1 was losing ground, the board tried to 
develop a strategy for survival, suggesting a cooperative effort with the CI3. After much 
back and forth talk, the CI3 formally turned the offer down, arguing that they were in a 
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phase where efforts had to be focused on internal development and making sure that the 
funding sources were satisfied. Sources later claimed that the actual reason was the CI1s 
loss in legitimacy and politically sensitive status.  
 
The characteristics of the environment the CI1 was dealing with in relation to the CI3 
have great features of politics and positioning. Even if the formal cluster initiatives had 
goals which related to a business focused organization, both its facilitator and its 
environment was focused politically, increasingly dealing with diverging interests and 
inconsistencies in norms, ideas and demands, rather than action. The actors involved 
had experience from handling politics and conflicts of interest. These actors were of 
public or institutional character, with time to handle issues of political importance. 
 
8.2.5 Summary of Business/action & Politics/talk 
The previous sections have analyzed how talk and politics have dominated the 
interaction in the four events in the life of the CI1, even if action and business to a main 
degree was the objective of the cluster initiatives. The features of interaction between 
the various actors involved in the four events have some differences. Still, all represent 
examples of a talk and politics orientation in the fields and clusters, rather than an 
action and business orientation. Potentially, interaction between organizations will 
always have such characteristics, in particular when public actors are involved. 
Independently, the events developing in relation to the CI1 and the CI1 itself, may also 
have opened the initiative to this kind of politics and power orientation.  
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The four events analyzed occupy a majority of the resources and time spent on 
developing the CI1. These events also illustrate how talk and politics influence the daily 
life and whereabouts of a cluster initiative and how easily attention was placed on 
things other than cooperation on innovation. Features of politics may be a natural and 
necessary part of any formal or informal cluster arena. A byproduct of such orientation 
may however be that talk and politics contribute to reduce legitimacy of the formal 
initiatives towards the business-oriented actors. Action and business-oriented 
stakeholders will expect more attention toward action and innovation than toward talk 
and politics. 
 
Furthermore, talk, politics and disagreements among actors is time consuming. The 
public facilitator actors in the field surrounding the CI1, seemed to have both more 
experience, focus toward and time to handle such political issues. Comparatively, the 
private actors close to the CI1 had less interest in such issues, and were mainly 
concerned with how to gain quick wins from the cluster cooperation. As long as cluster 
arenas are influenced and steered by public and facilitator actors, the relationship 
between the goal of innovation/action/business and the presence of talk/politics will 
probably continue to be a paradox.   
 
8.3 Conclusion  
When taking features and behavior of cluster actors into account, what are the 
consequences of cooperation on innovation in clusters? Multiple interests and 
perceptions of actors in clusters further leads to conflicts, strategy development and 
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power play among the actors in clusters, which challenges attention toward innovation 
in favor of a focus on power and politics. This makes out the sum of the feature 
argument, the behavior argument and the politics argument, as outlined in Chapter 5, 
section 5.6. The increased popularity of cluster enhancement projects, combined with 
the (misled) focus on power and politics, leads to increased competition among cluster 
initiatives and public and institutional facilitators and creates a kind of cluster 
cannibalism in the field.  
 
The field surrounding the CI1 was strongly influenced by the popularization of cluster 
strategies that emerged in the first decade of 2000. The data material shows the 
complexity in the field of clusters. Even if business and innovation was the goal of the 
cluster cooperation, no innovation occurred as a result of the CI1, at least not as 
experienced by the involved actors. Rather, a lot of ‘playground quarrels’ and conflict 
was taking place. Politics came into focus in favor of business and innovation.  
 
In addition to external forces seeking to reduce the relevance of the CI1, the lack of 
outputs inside the Initiative contributed to the downfall of the CI1. In the surrounding 
cluster environment, several similar cluster initiatives and public and institutional actors 
were competing. Realistically, there was not enough critical mass in the Oslo region to 
serve the inflation of initiatives oriented toward the same business field. This led to 
cluster cannibalism. Consequently, some initiatives died out, others were merged, while 
others again grew stronger and more visible. After a year of struggle, the CI1 died out, 
while pieces of it were picked up by another more competitive cluster initiative, which 
developed into a stronger and more powerful unit in the business environment. 
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Chapter 9 – Politics and Innovation in Clusters  
9.1 Introduction  
The previous chapters have discussed in detail the arguments related to why initiated 
cluster cooperation does not always lead to innovation, showing how the attention of the 
involved actors easily moves toward issues of power and politics. The arguments are 
based on findings from an Oslo-located cluster initiative, the CI1, looking into four 
challenging events in the life of the Initiative. These events played out between actors 
directly involved in the CI1 and actors in the surrounding environment, and cost most of 
the attention of the CI1 management. In total, they represent examples on how political 
features and behavior play a substantial part in dealing with clusters. The events lead to 
challenges within the cluster initiatives in the cluster arena, as well as conflicts between 
the cluster initiatives and other actors present in the field. As the popularization of 
cluster strategies has increased the initiation of cluster initiatives, competition among 
these initiatives and the involved actors emerged, leading to a kind of cluster 
cannibalism in the field. In the longer run, some cluster initiatives are enlarged, some 
join forces, while others die out. The following sections summarize key points from the 
analysis and point to some practical implications of the popularization of cluster 
strategies.  
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9.2 Findings and Summary of Analysis 
Why does cluster cooperation seldom result in innovation? This study has been 
concerned with challenges related to initiated cluster cooperation, facilitated by public 
or institutional actors. Michael Porter (2000:15) defines clusters as:  
Geographical concentrations of interconnected companies, specialized 
suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries, and associated 
institutions (e.g., universities, standards agencies, trade associations) in a 
particular field that compete but also cooperate.  
He argues that clusters contribute to enhance productivity and innovation. Porter 
(1998:45) further defines innovation:  
…to include both improvements in technology and better methods or ways of 
doing things. It can be manifested in product changes, process changes, new 
approaches to marketing, new forms of distribution, and new concepts of scope.  
In this study, a second condition for defining innovation as an output of cluster 
cooperation has been added: In order to be counted as innovation, the output must be 
regarded as an innovation by participating actors. Porter’s theory on clusters can 
however not explain why cluster constellation fails to produce innovation. The data of 
the CI1 shows how a cluster initiative set out to cooperate on innovation was not able to 
achieve any such output. The study contributes to new insight on what brings challenges 
to cluster cooperation, related to how power and politics influence the field.   
 
The popularity of the cluster strategies resulted in a development of a range of smaller 
formal cluster oriented initiatives in Norway in the first decade of 2000. This boom 
became most apparent in the capital region, Oslo, where the population is the largest, 
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the educational level is the highest, and the presence of companies and research 
environments likewise. The increased existence of various types of cluster-like 
initiatives is a result of key public and institutional actors putting cluster enhancement 
on their strategic agenda, encouraging the development of inter-organizational 
initiatives with an innovation focus.  
 
These arenas or initiatives were formed almost simultaneously, and received help from 
various facilitator organizations who had cluster strategy on their agenda. The goals of 
the formal initiatives were usually relatively precise and targeted toward the interests of 
the members, concerned with concrete cooperation and steps for taking action for 
cooperation on innovation. Consequently, the formal initiatives were expected to deal 
with some kind of issues of innovation and business development. As more cluster 
initiatives were developed, more actors were competing for the same resources, 
focusing their attention on the same pool of organizations, people, time and funding. 
Furthermore, most initiatives could be assumed to have an agenda of expanding their 
attention and member-base, in order to develop the fundament for their ‘cluster’ 
initiative and become leading in their field.   
 
In 2009, the sum of cluster-oriented initiatives in a Norwegian context seemed to make 
out a whole new field of innovation stakeholders. Surrounding the smaller, formal 
cluster initiatives, a new informal cluster arena was appearing. This arena was larger, 
but without any distinct borders. Due to this arena’s fluctuating features, it was more 
difficult to delineate key representatives. Actors (more or less) present in this arena 
were various representatives from public and private funding and facilitator agencies, 
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business organizations, research and business organizations as well as a range of formal 
cluster initiatives mentioned. 
 
In both the formal and informal cluster arenas, new kinds of conversations, debates and 
controversies took place. These new arenas became meeting places for an undefined 
mix of business and political logic, representing both private and public interests.  
 
Although the formal and informal cluster arenas included both public and private actors, 
they appeared to be dominated by public and institutional actors with more time and 
political experience at hand than what is common for business stakeholders. They were 
to a greater degree concerned with issues related to regional development and politics of 
innovation, rather than with practical issues related to achieving innovation within 
cluster constellations. In the case of the CI1, meta-conversations on how to organize the 
larger field of stakeholders involved with issues of innovation, politics and regional 
development seemed to get a disproportionate amount of attention. Disagreements on 
such issues further contributed to conflicts and a dominance of political orientated 
behavior.  
 
The analysis shows how multiple interests dominated the CI1 and its surrounding 
environment. These interests were related to individuals, concrete organizations and 
companies, cluster initiatives or issues of regional development. Some actors had 
business considerations and were focused on opportunities to achieve some kind of 
innovation, while others were more political and power oriented. The sum of these 
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interests complicated the field and created various kinds of conflicts of interest and 
power play.     
 
Perceptions on other actors’ interests, actions and involvement also seemed to flourish 
in the field. In relation to the events challenging the CI1s existence, perceptions among 
the involved CI1 actors was definitely stronger if the CI1 was the one ‘attacked.’ Then, 
‘conspiracy theories’ on ‘ulterior motives’ on strategies seemed to be nurtured. 
Perceptions on other actors’ agendas provided a fundament for a distrustful environment 
of actors, and further led to attention toward competition and conflict.  
 
Data shows that conflict occurred somewhat differently in the four events analyzed. In 
some events, actual conflict was apparent, while in others, competitive aspects were the 
most visible and conflict did not result in any actual encounters. The dominating 
participants in conflicts were the public and organizational ‘players,’ who had 
motivations for, experience in, and time to involve themselves in politics and quarrels.  
 
Strategies related to the events of the CI1, were of both implicit and explicit nature. 
They could be divided into issues of relevance to the institutionalization of the CI1, 
which can be labeled network structuring, and issues of relevance to win a certain game, 
which can be labeled game management. Both types of strategies were present and 
sometimes seemed to overlap among actors involved in and surrounding the CI1. 
Perceptions on strategies developed by other parties also seemed to flourish.  
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Power play occurred somewhat differently in the analyzed events. In certain events 
active games seemed to be played out, while in other such activity did not seem to be as 
‘operative’ or intended. Either way, the situations playing out were time consuming, 
difficult to keep track of and took away important focus from the planned activity of the 
CI1.  
 
The complexities of the cluster and the diversities of interests and perceptions of the 
actors involved invited various kinds of political behavior. Conflict, strategy and power 
play were important elements of behavior in the key events experienced by the CI1. 
This may be natural features of inter-organizational interaction and therefore 
assumingly also cluster cooperation.  
 
The popularization of cluster strategies increased the initiation of cluster initiatives, 
leading to a new form of competition between initiatives, as well as competition 
between the actors initiating the cluster initiatives. As several cluster initiatives were 
oriented towards the same resources, ‘political’ aspects of such cooperation were 
strengthened. 
 
In the case of cluster cooperation, action and business would be expected as the 
fundamental orientation of actors, with a goal of innovation enhancement. 
Consequently, the dominating presence of politics and talk in and around the CI1 
contributed to a reduction in legitimacy of the formal initiative toward the business-
oriented actors. Private companies ended up as observers of a politicized field, which 
contributed to support their prejudice on involvement with public governmental actors. 
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As public actors dominated the cluster field, and talk and politics became increasingly 
time consuming, private actors lost interest. As a result, the relationship between the 
goal of innovation through business and action and the strong presence of politics and 
talk became a paradox. It produced unintended results and influenced the opportunity to 
innovate within a cluster context. In sum, the observed features and behaviors suggest 
and may explain why the CI1 had challenges in achieving innovation. 
 
In the long run, successful cluster initiatives can be enlarged and join forces to become 
stronger, while others die out. In this study, these phenomena have been labeled cluster 
cannibalism and characterize the somewhat ‘brutal’ nature of the cluster field, as 
observed in the case of the CI1. The popularization of cluster strategies led to a 
competition between the actors initiating and facilitating cluster initiatives, as well as 
between the cluster initiatives themselves. In the case of the CI1, the cluster cannibalism 
led to a restructuring of the cluster field. The CI1 was not able to provide any significant 
results related to innovation, while other cluster initiatives represented increasingly 
strong competition. Consequently, the relevance of the CI1 was highly reduced and in 
the end led to its downfall. In table 9.1 a summary of findings from events analyzed in 
the case of the CI1 can be found.  
 
Table 9.1 Summary of Findings from the Events Analyzed in Chapter 6-8 
 Event 1: Funding 
& public 
competition 
Event 2: 
Cluster 
competition – 
part one  
Event 3: Public 
regulation 
interference 
Event 4:  
Cluster 
competition - 
part two 
Interests Coherent interests 
among facilitator 
organizations, 
turning into 
Similar, but 
(partly) 
competing 
interests 
Divergent 
interests  
Similar, but 
competing 
interests 
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competition  
Perceptions Flourishing among 
CI1 stakeholders 
Less among CI1 
stakeholders, 
more among CI2  
Flourishing 
among CI1 
stakeholders 
Flourishing 
among CI1 
stakeholders 
Conflict  Conflicts of interest 
and competition 
between public 
‘facilitator’ 
organizations. 
Potential 
competition 
between cluster 
initiatives 
Conflict of 
interests and 
competition 
between 
involved actors 
in relation to 
respective 
cluster 
initiatives 
Conflict 
between public 
regulator and 
specific actors in 
the cluster 
initiative 
Conflict of 
interest and 
competition 
between 
initiatives, 
potentially also 
between 
‘facilitator’ 
organizations 
Strategy Game management 
between facilitator 
organization, 
network structuring 
interests for the CI1 
Network 
structuring in 
focus both for 
the CI1 and the 
CI2, which 
resulted in game 
management 
Game 
management 
between actors 
in the CI1, also 
representing the 
PDO, and the 
GDO 
Network 
structuring in 
focus both for 
the CI1 and the 
CI3, potentially 
game 
management as 
a result, in 
addition to 
potential game 
management 
between 
facilitator 
organizations  
Power play Power play between 
facilitator 
organizations. 
Actual encounters 
Less presence of 
power 
play/games. 
Actual 
encounters 
Power play on 
who had final 
word. No 
conflict acted 
out 
 
A perception on 
power play 
among CI1 
stakeholders, not 
possible to 
determine. No 
conflict acted 
out 
Business/act
ion versus 
Politics/talk 
Strong presence of 
politics/talk among 
involved actors 
Presence of 
politics/talk 
among involved 
actors 
Strong presence 
of politics/talk 
among involved 
actors 
Presence of 
politics/talk 
among involved 
actors 
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Learning/ 
Conclusions 
Public and 
institutional 
facilitator 
organizations in the 
cluster field 
influence the 
opportunity for 
development  
Blurring of 
roles, trust 
issues, influence 
opportunity for 
cooperation. 
Negative 
experience stick 
and lead to 
negative 
perceptions  
Previous history 
among actors 
influence 
opportunities for 
cooperation, 
external 
legitimacy is key 
for development 
of cluster 
initiatives 
Cluster 
cannibalism:  
Strong features 
and behavior of 
politics may 
alter 
opportunities for 
cluster 
initiatives in the 
field 
 
The presence of politics, power play and cluster cannibalism shifted focus of the CI1, 
which contributed to the lack of attention on innovation and therefore also on the 
prospects for innovative outputs. A concern proposed in the study is how public and 
institutional rivalry influence opportunities for cluster initiatives to achieve successful 
results. Initiated cluster initiatives are often facilitated by public or institutional actors. 
Findings suggest that facilitation done by this type of actor may both directly and 
indirectly contribute to the presence and potentially also increase the political-oriented 
focus. The facilitators may contribute to an important level of knowledge on approach 
and access to funding, but may at worst ‘damage’ the cluster initiative’s potential, due 
to misplaced focus. The perspectives of the business and research environments must be 
able to dominate, requiring engaged actors from the field.  
 
The events presented in relation to the case of the CI1 may potentially be regarded as 
trifles. The importance of presenting them is however related to showing how cluster 
cooperation easily gets off track due to politics, strategy development, power play and 
cluster cannibalism. Such issues should be taken into account when looking into cluster 
performance, independent of other explanations as to why a cluster initiative fails to 
‘deliver.’   
293
 
Even if the presented events may seem like bagatelles, they were experienced as highly 
relevant in the field. They concern issues like who was in charge in the field, who was 
allowed to steer the professional development, who behaved like competitors and who 
was willing to cooperate. In sum, the events could be perceived as playground quarrels 
touching upon power and personal likes and dislikes, occurring in a field where ‘kings’ 
or ‘queens’ of various organizations in the cluster want to make sure their domain was 
not threatened.  
 
A ‘cowboy style’ approach performed by many of the players in the field over time 
caused an increasingly distrustful environment. This again challenged the cooperative 
efforts of the actors involved in and around the CI1. Consequently, what was originally 
regarded overlapping interests easily transformed into competing interests. For several 
reasons, including this conflicting and competitive situation, certain external actors 
indicated a desire to reduce the (potential) relevance of the CI1. 
 
Many cluster initiatives have been accused of being without ‘content.’ As active 
participation in cluster initiatives is a secondary activity for most involved parties, 
actual engagement can be reflected in the initiatives’ relevance, opportunity to influence 
and how activities develop. In the case of the CI1, the lack of engagement among 
participants became a defining turning point. As touched upon, the disengagement may 
have had several explanations. Independent of reason it contributed to reduce both the 
opportunity of the CI1 and its legitimacy.  
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Simultaneously, the cluster environment around the CI1 was increasingly ‘populated’ 
by various types of competition, both between clustered initiatives and between public 
and institutional actors with close links to respective cluster initiatives. Consequently, 
issues of concern became not just what went on within the formal cluster initiative. The 
cluster cannibalism, meaning what went on in the informal and larger arena, between 
cluster initiatives and/or public and institutional actors also became relevant topics. 
Many processes went on at once and a full overview was not possible at the time. A 
total overview probably never will be possible in processes of cluster development 
efforts.  
 
For the politics-oriented participants, various types of conflicts escalated in relation to 
the development of the formal initiatives. Findings also indicated that some actors, 
especially the public ones, had an interest in maintaining conflict, in order to gain 
attention and to ‘influence’ the field in their desired direction.  
 
The environment surrounding the CI1 influenced the opportunities of the initiative. 
Actors present in clusters had a mix of visible and invisible agendas. Hamdouch 
(2008:20) emphasizes that clustering processes can be driven by ‘invisible hands,’ in 
addition to the visible ones. Grasping who is ‘driving’ a process or game may be an 
impossible challenge in the heat of the moment. A blurring of roles also influenced the 
field of the CI1 and initially created difficulties of trust among actors.  
 
The conclusion in this study is that politics and power play are a much more important 
part of cluster development than given credit for in both theory and strategy. 
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Consequently, politics must be taken into account in relation to clusters. 
Simultaneously, it is necessary to emphasize that certain actors seems to have a 
tendency to ‘read too much politics into the field’ and support its dominating features. 
This again easily leads to an undervaluation of private actors’ interests, which should be 
avoided in cluster cooperation. In the case of the CI1, the boom of initiatives wanting to 
serve the same business field led to a deficit of resources and relevant actors in the Oslo 
region. Realistically, there was not enough of a critical mass of actors to serve the 
increase in cluster initiatives oriented towards the same business field. Competition 
increased and someone had to give in. The situation led to a kind of cluster cannibalism, 
where the CI1 was shut down, due to strong competition from other initiatives.  
 
9.3 Potential Implications of Cluster Strategies in the Field 
As argued previously in this study (see Chapter 3, section 3.5.2), case study research 
offers little opportunity for generalization. Consequently, generalization has not been an 
objective of the research. This does not mean that there are no relevant lessons of 
importance to other cases of cluster initiation. In order to take advantage of a study’s 
knowledge in another setting, one has to take contextual issues into account, both in the 
situation where the research was carried out and where the relevant knowledge is to be 
applied. This will help to understand whether the fundament of the two situations have 
sufficient similarities to actually take advantage of the new knowledge (Greenwood & 
Levin, 1998:79). Such perspective requires that the reader themselves make the 
considerations and search for perspectives of relevance to their respective practice or 
field.  
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A recent study produced by International Research Institute of Stavanger, involving 
more than 1600 companies in the five largest Norwegian regions, reveal some 
interesting findings: The number of regional partners seems to have little effect on the 
innovation-rate of a company. There does however seem to be a strong and visible 
connection between the ones who are the most innovative and their number of 
international partners. The data material indicates that each international partner 
increases the probability of a company’s innovation on products by twenty-one percent 
(Fitjar & Rodríguez-Pose, 2011). The authors quantitative findings corresponds with 
this study’s qualitative ones, which argues that cluster cooperation does not necessarily 
lead to innovation. 
 
Cluster theory seeks to explain how a company could enhance its business and 
innovation through cooperation and competition locally. Cluster theory can however not 
explain how clusters are created or why innovation fails to occur in such constellations. 
As clusters have been widely promoted as a strategy for enhancing innovation in 
regions (EU, 1995; OECD, 2007), the theoretical fundament proposes some challenges. 
Conceivably, the application of the cluster theory is more problematic than the 
theoretical fundament itself.  
 
Innovation may be a naïve expectation of cluster cooperation. Potentially, Michael 
Porter’s (1990, 1998) cluster theory has been misinterpreted. But his lack of limitations 
and precise definitions of clusters leaves great room for misconceptions. For instance, 
Porter (1998) seems to be relatively unclear about where innovation in a cluster actually 
takes place. From time to time, innovation occurs within a business field in a region. 
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Whether this is a result of cluster-initiated cooperation or completely different factors 
undoubtedly varies.  
 
Pålshaugen (2011) underlines how the Capital Project recognized that innovation does 
not necessarily occur at the joint cluster arena, but may occur as a result of meetings, 
knowledge and bonds made at this arena. Possibly, innovation occurs outside the cluster 
arenas, due to higher attention among involved actors. But then, what makes the cluster 
label unique from other types of initiatives or arenas? Does the ‘cluster’ have something 
additional to offer? And furthermore, does this mean that the institutions involved do 
not really expect innovation as an explicit outcome of cluster cooperation?  
 
During interviews, several of my business-oriented informants explained that they 
expected few, if any outcomes of participating in a cluster cooperation effort. One 
informant was advised by colleagues to keep efforts at a minimum, but wanted to use it 
as a business-networking platform. The same colleagues had experiences with similar 
types of initiatives, with little or no experience with achieving any (measurable) 
success. This questions whether participants camouflage the defining arguments and 
interests of cluster participation. For instance, networking and monitoring of 
competitors may be viable explanations for involvement, rather than any expectation of 
cooperation on innovation.    
 
Potentially initiated cluster initiatives are really not developed for achieving innovation. 
In a Norwegian context, when looking at cluster initiatives considered successful, their 
role in the environment seems to be connected to their ability to create attention toward 
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the companies and research environments involved in the cluster effort. But is this 
really innovation? These initiatives are concerned with attracting the right organizations 
and people, in order for the involved actors to access important resources. The cluster 
initiative brand and market the businesses and research environments they are 
representing. They also initiate and maintain conversations, internally and externally, on 
key interests of the business field. To be fair, access of people and organizations, 
marketing and agenda settings are all mechanisms that may be regarded as important in 
obtaining increased innovation, but such tasks cannot be recognized as innovation itself.  
 
The observations made in this study concerns perspectives of initiated cluster 
development that to a little extent seems to have been acknowledged or regarded as 
relevant in previous research. Cluster environments and cluster cooperation seems to be 
intrinsically political. Organizations and actors involved have diverse and potentially 
conflicting interests, which sometimes lead to power play, strategic behavior and cluster 
cannibalism.   
 
The tendencies towards competition and conflicting behavior seem to have been most 
present between institutional and public actors. The revealed competition has mainly 
been experienced between the actors operating on the larger informal cluster arena, but 
has simultaneously influenced the opportunities of the formal cluster initiatives. 
Clusters have potentially become arenas for playing out conflict and power games 
between public and/or institutional organizations through cluster cannibalism. This 
definitely is beside the intentions and attention clusters have been getting the past 
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decades. Consequently, power play and conflicts contribute to hinder a focus on 
innovation.  
 
Brunsson (1989:11) argues that traditional theories on organizations make it difficult to 
understand attributes of disintegrative art. Consequently, disintegrative attributes are 
regarded as dysfunctions, which should be corrected. He further suggests that both 
integrative and disintegrative qualities of an organization may be of relevance for the 
organization, depending on context.  This insight may be applicable to the field of 
clusters. It is important to emphasize that conflicts in cluster environments are not 
necessarily bad. It is possible to imagine that certain conflicts are necessary in order to 
organize and prepare the cluster field, focusing attention toward the most sustainable 
concepts. As pointed out, the cluster field is still immature. In a Norwegian context, the 
past decade represents a phase of experimentation with approaches to cluster 
cooperation. A tentative conclusion must be that improvements on various levels seem 
to be necessary in order to become more relevant to the cluster’s stakeholders.  
 
If strategic cluster efforts are continued as a public instrument for innovation 
enhancement, several new theoretical and empirical debates should be called for. In a 
Norwegian context, evaluations are still needed. The organizing actors of the policies of 
innovation, both at national and regional level, needs new conversations on possible 
outcomes of initiated cluster arenas. Furthermore, there is a need to investigate 
necessary prerequisites for developing and improving cluster efforts. In this respect, 
conversations on competition and behavior in the informal cluster arena, looking into 
300
 
overlapping and possibly competing institutional agendas, leading to cluster 
cannibalism, should also be addressed.  
 
Potentially, an overall coordination of cluster efforts should be considered. Over the 
past decade, actors surrounding the formal cluster initiatives seem to have been unable 
to agree on and cooperate on any joint direction. The cluster environment has an interest 
in clarifying tasks and roles of the present cluster initiatives, as well as of the 
institutional actors involved, in order to secure the available resources.  
 
Some cluster initiatives have a focus on business development for companies, some 
have a focus on enhancement of research, while a third group has a more strategic 
attention toward regional development. Even if issues are related, the varieties create 
slightly different attentions and approaches, and there seems to be little awareness on 
this variety in the field.  
 
Debates on cluster management and involvement should be strengthened. The 
uniqueness of managing efforts with a complex mix of public and private interests must 
be emphasized and investigated further. Presently, it seems like management and 
necessary institutionalization processes of a cluster effort have not been taken seriously 
enough. In order to improve the cluster field, ‘politics’ must be accounted for when 
dealing both theoretically and empirically with clusters.  
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9.4 Conclusion  
The goal of this study has been to show and explain why certain features of cluster 
cooperation easily interfere with the intended goals of innovation and business 
development. The presence of various types of politics in the cluster influences the 
attention of the initiated cluster initiatives. The cluster becomes business- and politics-
oriented simultaneously. The complex mix of business and politics in the field and 
diversions of attention plays a role in achieving results. Consequently, colliding 
understandings, expectations and goals operate along each other. As a result, innovation 
as an output of cluster cooperation becomes fundamentally difficult to achieve.  
 
The objective of the cluster is to increase innovation, economic prosperity and 
competitiveness. The way to do this is to enhance activity potentially leading to 
innovation. There are however no ‘true’ answers to what activities will lead to 
innovation. Clusters are complex initiatives, leading to complex processes and complex 
management. Consequently, cluster cooperation quite often lead to unintended results 
not related to innovation. This dissertation introduced what happened in one case over a 
relatively short time. The findings indicate that at present time, cluster arenas seem to 
be arenas more relevant to public politically oriented stakeholders, than for private, 
business oriented companies.  
 
At best, cluster initiatives can contribute to knowledge enhancement, cooperation and 
opportunities for innovation. That is, if business and innovation is the actual agenda of 
the involved actors. At worst, cluster initiatives become tools for ‘positioning’ and 
conflict among public and institutional facilitators. Cluster strategies today seems to 
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have become strategies for organizing the policy field of innovation, rather than a way 
to actually achieve innovation. Efforts of cluster enhancement will definitely develop 
and change in the long run. In the mean time, a more nuanced conversation on clusters 
should be encouraged. 
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(…) I was becoming sadder and sadder: If a reader skips a single sentence of my novel 
he won’t be able to understand it, and yet where in the world will you find a reader who 
never skips a line? Am I not myself the greatest skipper of lines and pages? 
                                      Milan Kundera, Immortality, 1989:365
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